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      Conceptualism and Objectivity in Locke’s Account of Natural Kinds  
           ABSTRACT   
 
Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding is considered by many to be 
the locus classicus of a number of influential arguments for conventionalism, according 
to which there are no objective, privileged ways of classifying things in the natural world. 
In the dissertation I argue that Locke never meant to reject natural kinds. Still, the 
challenge is to explain how, within a metaphysics that explicitly denies mind-independent 
essences, we can make sense of a privileged, objective sorting of substances. I argue that 
we do so by looking to Locke’s conception of God as divine architect of created 
substances. 
The account I provide is in keeping with Locke’s conceptualism, the view that 
universals or general natures that correspond to genus and species are to be understood, 
not as metaphysical constituents in numerically many particulars, but rather only as 
concepts in the mind. On the reading I defend, objective kinds, on Locke’s view, are 
grounded in divine ideas, ideas in accordance with which God designs natural things.  
My account also explains why Locke did not embrace what many consider to be 
one of the consequences of corpuscularian mechanism, a view about the nature of 
material bodies to which Locke subscribes. Objective kinds, many argue, have no 
foothold in a corpuscularian world. On Locke’s account, however, God makes material 
bodies by organizing their matter such that, I argue, they have the properties 
 iv  
characteristic of a kind. God’s creative acts thus explain how there can be objective 
distinctions in kind between corpuscularian bodies.  
We do not have access to God’s ideas of kinds, nor to the hidden real essences of 
substances that answer to those ideas. In that case, do the objective kinds play any role in 
how we classify things? I argue that God places observable marks of distinction in things 
that reveal how we are to classify them. In addition, God makes us such that we are able 
to track objective kinds sufficiently well to promote our own interests and survival. I 
argue that this story is of a piece with Locke’s conception of God as the benevolent 
creator of man.  
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Chapter I 
 
          An Introduction to the Debate 
 
                  §1.1 Anti-Realism and Locke’s account of Kinds and Classification 
 
 
At the heart of a widely accepted reading of Locke’s metaphysics is the claim that 
we cannot be mistaken in regard to classifying things in the natural world because there 
are no kinds, on Locke’s view, apart from those reflected in our activity of grouping 
things together. Locke, the story goes, is an antirealist, and so thinks that there are no 
independent standards to which we can appeal in evaluating the accuracy of a 
classificatory scheme. That is not to say that Locke doesn’t tout the value, even the 
necessity, of the enterprise of classification. Locke would be the first to acknowledge that 
it promotes our understanding of the natural world. Nor is it lost on him that classification 
is necessary to the improvement of knowledge, for otherwise we would never proceed 
beyond claims about the particular things that come under our observation.1 Nevertheless, 
how we group things together into kinds is something to be determined on pragmatic 
grounds. When we have reason, then, to prefer one scheme of classification over another, 
it is only because it better serves our particular aims and interests, given the kinds of 
creatures we are.   
In the dissertation I challenge this widely accepted reading, henceforth the 
“Standard Reading”. Although Locke is indeed an anti-realist of a certain stripe, he was 
nevertheless committed to the existence of objective kinds, i.e., kinds apart from those 
                                                
1 One might object that if one is an anti-realist about kinds, classification could not serve to 
advance any knowledge claims, for there is no subject matter to know. The anti-realist might reply that 
classification does advance knowledge insofar as it can be used to codify observed regularities in nature. In 
that case, the enterprise of classification enables us to make reasonably certain predictions about the 
behavior of particulars. 
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reflected in our own classificatory activity. Further, these objective kinds serve as the 
standard in terms of which the adequacy of our classificatory scheme is to be measured.  
Locke saw his account of language and classification as of a piece with the 
Essay’s2 broader project of doing away with the jargon of the schoolmen – unintelligible 
terms, or terms that have no cognitive significance – and scholasticism’s attendant 
metaphysics of Aristotelian substantial forms. The new science of corpuscularian 
mechanism saw the overthrow of Aristotelian hylomorphism, according to which 
individual substances – particular samples of gold and silver, particular trees, horses, and 
human beings – are the combination of matter and form, the matter of a thing its 
particularizing feature, or that whereby it is a particular thing, while the form of a thing 
“enforms” its matter and constitutes its essence and so makes it the kind of thing that it is. 
According to Aristotelian realism, there are a limited number of such essences or forms, 
and every existing substance necessarily has one of them.3 These essences or forms 
determine a thing’s character or nature. Thus insofar as I have the form of humanity, I am 
a rational animal. My form determines my nature – I am a living, perceiving thing that 
has the capacity for rational thought – and my form thus grounds the distinction between 
what is essential to me and what is accidental to me. Insofar as I have the form human 
being, I am necessarily a rational animal. My form does not, however, determine my hair 
color. Though I am brunette, I could have been blonde and still remain a human being.  
                                                
2 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Peter H. Nidditch (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1975). All references to Locke’s Essay are given as E, followed by book, chapter, and 
section, followed by pagination, e.g., E I.i.1: 43.  
 
3 Walter Ott, Locke’s Philosophy of Language (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004).   
Walter Ott refers to Aristotelianism as “the Aristotelian family of views,” in order to indicate that, while 
there are differences in detail between proponents of the view, in broad strokes this family of views shares 
some basic commitments.  
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On the Aristotelian view, my essence or form not only determines my nature, or 
what is essential to me qua human being, but how I must be classified. These essences are 
thus “specific essences” in the sense that they are essences that determine the species and 
genus to which a thing belongs.4  What distinguishes me from other things is my 
humanity, and what determines the fact that I ought to be grouped together with other 
human beings is our shared essence. While any scheme of classification might be 
proposed, a classification according to which human beings, whales and three-toed sloths 
all belong to the same lowest species would, according to the Aristotelian, fail to 
distinguish particulars that, while all mammals, in fact belong to distinct lowest species in 
virtue of their respective forms. 
According to the Standard Reading, Locke’s ontology departs from the 
Aristotelian ontology in sufficiently radical ways as to rule out the possibility of objective 
essences, and with that the possibility of objective kinds. The Aristotelian embraces an 
ontology of universal natures – substantial forms – that particular, existing things have, 
and are thus that whereby a particular thing belongs to a kind. Locke, on the other hand, 
embraced an ontology wholly exhausted by particulars such that the “general natures” in 
accordance with which it is commonly thought we classify particulars into kinds are not 
real existing entities out in the world, but are rather located in the minds of language 
users in the form of abstract, or general ideas.  
In the following sections we see that Locke’s rejection of the Aristotelian view, 
sometimes referred to as “moderate realism”, might reasonably be thought to signal a 
                                                
4 Thus Michael Ayers writes “Locke took the dual function of the Aristotelian specific essence to 
be, first, that of determining the boundary of the species by being present in, and only in, its members; and 
second, that of explaining or giving rise to the ‘properties’ of the species.” Michael Ayers, Locke: 
Epistemology and Ontology (New York: Routledge, 1991), 2:67. 
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further commitment on his part, namely, a commitment to a form of conventionalism 
about natural kinds, which are kinds that correspond to the classification of so-called 
natural substances according to genus and species concepts.5 According to 
conventionalism about natural kinds, which of our abstract general concepts are to count 
as the genera and species in accordance with which we classify things in the natural 
world is a matter of our free choice, and thus a subjective and arbitrary matter.6 And 
while it may well be argued that conceptualism does not entail conventionalism about 
natural kinds, there are two, further Lockean commitments – Locke’s new theory of ideas 
and his embrace of the corpuscularian mechanical philosophy – that proponents of the 
Standard Reading argue do decisively entail conventionalism. The argument of this 
dissertation is that in spite of Locke’s rejection of moderate realism, in spite of his new 
theory of ideas, and in spite of his endorsement of corpuscularian mechanism, Locke did 
not embrace conventionalism about natural kinds.  
 
                 §1.2 Realism, Moderate Realism, and Conceptualism 
 
 
Locke rejects what are often referred to in the literature as moderate realist, or 
Aristotelian accounts of genus and species. In deference to Aristotle’s critique of Platonic 
realism (realism), according to which forms exist in a non-sensible realm altogether 
distinct from sensible particulars, many scholastics embraced moderate realism, 
                                                
5 Note Jan-Erik Jones’ observation that “when Locke thinks of a species or genus, he is not 
thinking of these terms as applying exclusively in the biological realm, but rather as applying generally to 
any possible classification scheme we create when we organize our world through naming. So, for 
example, gold is as much a species of the genus metal as human is a species of the genus animal”. Jan-Erik 
Jones, "Locke on Real Essence”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2013 Edition), Edward 
N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/real-essence/> 
 
6 I owe this way of expressing the thesis of conventionalism to Marilyn McCord Adams, William 
Ockham (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987), 1:109-110.  
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according to which forms are actual, metaphysical constituents of sensible particulars.7 
The moderate realist, viz., the Aristotelian, holds that genera and species exist not only as 
universals in thought but as numerically many in particulars that are co-specific or co-
generic – that is, genus and species exist in particulars as metaphysical constituents of 
those particulars, and thus as the entities in respect of which those particulars really are 
co-specific or co-generic. As we will see below, this is because the Aristotelian insists 
that the similarity in virtue of which particulars are co-generic or co-specific is to be 
analyzed in terms of identity. Of course, this means that the moderate realist must say that 
genus and species cannot be the only metaphysical constituent of particulars that are co-
generic or co-specific. In addition, each particular must have some constituent that 
individuates it as distinct from other particulars with which it is co-specific or co-generic, 
and this was sometimes thought to be the matter of the particular.8  
The conceptualist, however, denies that the similarity in virtue of which 
particulars are co-generic or co-specific is to be analyzed in terms of identity, and thus 
rejects the moderate realist’s claim that genus and species are real, metaphysical 
constituents of things. Genus and species are nothing over and above ideas or concepts in 
the mind. As Gyula Klima explains the difference between moderate realism and 
conceptualism, moderate realists “assert the existence of real universals in…particular 
things,” while conceptualists “allow universals only, or primarily, as concepts of the 
mind.”9 
                                                
7 Adams, 1:13-15; Gyula Klima, “The Medieval Problem of Universals," The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2008/entries/universals-medieval/>.  
 
8 Adams, 1:13-15.  
 
9 Klima, Winter 2008, §1.  
 6 
Locke clearly sides with the conceptualist and against the moderate realist when 
he writes:  
General and Universal, belong not to the real existence of Things; but are the 
Inventions and Creatures of the Understanding, made by it for its own use, and 
concern only Signs, whether Words, or Ideas.10 
 
Regarding the question of what extra-mental things correspond to our genus and species 
concepts, Locke can thus be seen to side with the conceptualist, who denies that genus 
and species are real constituents numerically multiplied in particulars that are co-specific 
or co-generic.11  
What that real constituent was thought to be according to the moderate realist was 
a substantial form. Particulars are analyzed as composites of form and matter. Like many 
who embraced corpuscularian mechanism, however, Locke eschewed the scholastic’s 
substantial forms. Bodies, according to early moderns like Boyle and Locke, are not 
composites of form and matter, but are rather composed exclusively of matter consisting 
of insensible corpuscles characterized in terms of a sparse number of properties – 
extension, solidity, and being at rest or in motion – where all remaining properties of 
bodies are reducible to modifications of these fundamental properties.12  
Although it is true that many early moderns who embraced the mechanical 
philosophy also embraced some form of nominalism or conceptualism, it is not obvious 
that in dispensing with substantial forms one thereby rejects some version of the 
moderate realist position about genus and species. For bodies understood in 
                                                
 
10E III.iii.11: 414.  
 
11 Adams, 1:12.  
 
12 Peter Anstey, “Essences and Kinds,” in Philosophy in Early Modern Europe, eds. Desmond 
Clark and Catherine Wilson (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 11-31.   
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corpuscularian terms exhibit properties, and genus and species are still a matter of 
predicating properties of bodies.13 It seems, then, that we can understand Locke’s 
conceptualism as logically independent of his commitment to the corpuscularian 
philosophy. And while it is certainly true that once the mechanical philosophy rejects 
substantial forms, the view appears to entail the rejection of the entity that makes the 
Aristotelian position regarding genus and species a realist one, I’m going to suggest that 
Locke’s conceptualism has less to do with his rejection of substantial forms than with 
what we would imagine his response would be regarding the question of whether we need 
to analyze the relation of similarity that holds between co-generic or co-specific 
particulars in terms of identity, as the moderate realist does, or rather only as a primitive, 
as the conceptualist does.  
As a conceptualist, Locke rejects the realist’s position that particulars that are co-
generic or co-specific resemble one another by virtue of some real metaphysical 
constituent that is numerically multiplied in these extra-mental particulars.14 Rather, 
Locke appears to embrace the conceptualist position, characterized by the view that 
“similarity is a primitive, two term relation that is not to be further analysed in terms of 
identity[.]”15 In summary, on the conceptualist’s view, particulars that satisfy or agree 
with a particular species or genus concept are co-specific or co-generic only by virtue of 
resembling one another, where that latter relation is not to be further analyzed in terms of 
                                                
13 By ‘property’ here I mean our ordinary or commonsense notion of a trait or quality, although, as 
we will see, what in Locke’s parlance captures that ordinary commonsense notion is the term ‘quality’, for 
Locke himself reserves the term ‘property’ for what the scholastic tradition termed a ‘proprium’ or a 
feature that flows from the (real) essence of a thing.  
  
14 Adams, 1:12.  
 
15 Ibid.  
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a real constituent that is numerically multiplied in those particulars. Thus when Locke 
writes that “the great Business of Genera and Species, and their Essences, amounts to no 
more”16 than abstract ideas in the minds of men, Locke is, I’m suggesting, signaling his 
commitment to conceptualism for roughly the reasons just outlined.17  
 
§1.3 From Conceptualism to Conventionalism 
 
It is often held that it is but a short path to conventionalism once the conceptualist 
position is advanced.18 Conventionalism with respect to a certain domain is the view that 
the phenomenon in question is due to human convention, “perhaps despite appearances to 
                                                
16 E III.iii.20: 420.  
 
17 It is worth noting that Locke’s rejection of universals in the Essay is only explicit with respect to 
kinds, while the debate over universals has historically embraced not just kinds, but properties, actions, and 
relations. Thus Michael Loux observes that “[d]ifferent objects, realists have claimed, can possess one and 
the same property; different persons can perform one and the same action; different things can belong to 
one and the same kind; and different n-tuples (i.e., pairs, triples, etc.) of objects can enter into one and the 
same relation. According to the realist, their jointly possessing, performing, belonging to, and entering into 
are all cases of multiple exemplification; and what they jointly possess, perform, belong to, or enter into is 
a universal.” Michael Loux, “The Existence of Universals,” in Universals and Particulars: Readings in 
Ontology, ed. Michael Loux (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1976), 3. Given Locke’s 
rejection of real “general natures” in the world, one would expect that his anti-realism would embrace not 
just natural kinds, but properties and relations as well. However, as Ott observes, Locke’s own 
commitments make it difficult to discern his stance with respect to properties: “Although it is usual to 
subsume the question of natural kinds under that of properties or universals, Locke’s novel move is to give 
a quite different treatment of each. Since his main purpose is to attack the Aristotelians, he spends most of 
his time arguing against realism about natural kinds” (Ott, 71-77). Thus while Locke certainly embraced 
property talk, many of his commitments, as we will see, and as Ott rightly observes, appear to entail some 
form of realism about properties. Ott writes, “We can distinguish the restricted nominalist, who imposes 
extra-linguistic or extra-mental limits on the nature and number of kinds we construct, from what we might 
pejoratively call the rabid nominalist, who accepts no such constraints. […] Locke is [in this sense] a 
restricted nominalist with respect to natural kinds, but a realist with regard to properties construed as 
foundations of objective resemblances at the corpuscular level” (Ott, 72). I note Ott’s observation regarding 
the “novelty” of Locke’s approach to universals only to set aside the question of whether Locke was a 
nominalist or an antirealist with respect to properties. For nothing about the Standard Reading, nor my 
argument against it here dissertation, turns on its answer.  
 
18 Adams, 1:109.  
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the contrary.”19 The hallmark of conventionalism – what distinguishes it from other 
views according to which some phenomenon is theorized to be “due to us”20 – is the fact 
that, with respect to the domain in question, there are other possible or already existing 
conventions that are thought to be “equally good”.21 In that case, which of the possible 
alternative conventions ought to be adopted with respect to the domain in question is not 
determined by how things are but is rather a matter of our free choice.22  
Conceptualism is thought to lead to conventionalism because it dispenses with the 
metaphysical entities in virtue of which things really are co-specific or co-generic. 
Marilyn McCord Adams captures this line of thought when she writes that “if there are 
no universal things corresponding to general terms, then which concepts count as genus- 
and species-concepts, and which particulars count as co-generic and co-specific will be 
arbitrary and subjective.”23 Adams outlines the argument as follows. On a realist view 
like that of the Platonist or Aristotelian, it is the nature of real, existing forms that 
determines our species and genus concepts. Once such entities are rejected, however, it 
appears that it is to some degree a matter of convention which of our general concepts are 
                                                
19 Michael Rescorla, "Convention," The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2011 
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/convention/>. 
Spring 2011, §1.2. 
 
20 Ibid.  
 
21 Ibid. 
 
22 “[A] distinctive thesis shared by most conventionalist theories is that there exist alternative 
conventions that are in some sense equally good. Our choice of a convention from among alternatives is 
undetermined by the nature of things, by general rational considerations, or by universal features of human 
physiology, perception, or cognition. This element of free choice distinguishes conventionalism from 
doctrines such as projectivism, transcendental idealism, and constructivism about mathematics, all of which 
hold that, in one way or another, certain phenomena are “due to us”” (Rescorla, Spring 2011, §1.2).  
 
23 Adams, 1:109. 
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to count as genus and species concepts. 24 And here the observation that something is a 
matter of convention when it is a matter of free choice proves decisive. For, as Adams 
notes, “what depends on contingent human free choices is arbitrary and subjective.” In 
that case which particulars are co-specific or co-generic is itself an arbitrary or subjective 
matter because which abstract general concepts count as generic and specific is a matter 
of our free choice.25  
However, Adams also notes that a conceptualist need not embrace this line of 
thought. For instance – and for reasons that are beyond the scope of the dissertation – 
William Ockham, a leading proponent of conceptualism in the scholastic period, did not, 
Adams argues, hold that conceptualism entails conventionalism.26 As we will see in the 
next section, Locke scholars, however, are in virtually unanimous agreement that Locke 
embraced not only conceptualism, but conventionalism as well, although there is 
disagreement regarding precisely why.  
  
     §1.4 Locke’s Route to Conventionalism, Two Readings 
 
 
 Locke begins his account of general terms by noting that all things that exist are 
particular. Given that the signification of words is supposed to be conformable to things, 
Locke notes that we would expect that words would be particular in their signification. 
Locke notes, however, that the “far greatest part of Words, that make all Languages, are 
general Terms.”27 This raises the question of what “those general Natures [general terms] 
                                                
24 Adams, 1:109-110. Note that I follow Adam’s language quite closely here.  
 
25 Ibid.  
 
26 Adams, passim.  
 
27 E III.iii.1: 409.  
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are supposed to stand for.”28 General natures are not real, existing things, in which case 
they are not something to be apprehended, as the Aristotelian would propose, by way of 
intelligible species arrived at by abstracting the forms of particular things.29 That story is 
one that Locke outright rejects. Locke argues, rather, that the general natures that words 
are the signs of just are abstract or general ideas in the mind, their generality consisting 
in their capacity to pick out a number of particulars that “agree” with their content.  
Locke then considers what it is that general terms signify, arguing “they do not 
signify a plurality; for Man and Men would then signify the same,” in which case “the 
distinction of numbers” “would be superfluous and useless.”30 General words signify not 
a plurality of things, but rather sorts:  
That then which general Words signify, is a sort of Things; and each of them does 
that, by being a sign of an abstract Idea in the mind, to which Idea, as Things 
existing are found to agree, so they come to be ranked under that name; or, which 
is all one, be of that sort.31 
 
The apparent consequences of Locke’s account are striking. The essences of genus and 
species, Locke argues, are abstract ideas, and membership in these species is solely a 
matter of having a right to a general term or the “name” of a species:  
[T]he Essences of the sorts, or Species of Things, are nothing else but these 
abstract Ideas. For the having the Essence of any Species, being that which makes 
any thing to be of that Species, and the conformity to the Idea, to which the name 
is annexed, being that which gives a right to that name, the having the Essence, 
and the having that conformity, must needs to be the same thing: Since to be of 
any Species, and to have a right to the name of that Species, is all one.32 
                                                
 
28 E III.iii.6: 410.  
 
29 Ott, 79.  
 
30 E III.iii.12: 414.  
 
31 Ibid.  
 
32 E III.iii.12: 414-15. 
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Locke concludes that “the great Business of Genera and Species, and their Essences,” 
which “the Learning and Disputes of the Schools” have been so preoccupied with, really 
amounts to no more than this:  
That Men, making abstract Ideas…with Names annexed to them…enable 
themselves to consider Things, and discourse of them, as it were in bundles for 
the easier and readier improvement, and communication of Knowledge, which 
would advance but slowly, were their Words and Thoughts confined only to 
Particulars.33 
 
From the standpoint of the Standard Reading, the significance of Locke’s 
departure from an Aristotelian metaphysics of universal natures or substantial forms is 
best appreciated at this juncture. For, as we saw, conventionalism about natural kinds is 
the view that, consistent with certain constraints to be articulated by the view in question, 
there is some degree of latitude regarding how we may classify or group things together 
in the natural world since which general concepts or abstract ideas are to count as the 
genera and species in terms of which classification proceeds is a matter of our free 
choice. Thus once general natures are, on Locke’s view, analyzed in terms of the 
capacity of general ideas to embrace a number of particulars, what determines which of 
our general ideas are to count as genus and species concepts becomes a pressing question. 
Locke argues that general ideas – in which we find the essences of genus and species – 
are “the Workmanship of the Understanding,” “since it is the Understanding that 
abstracts and makes those general Ideas.”34 It is precisely this claim that motivates the 
Standard Reading’s contention that there is wide latitude regarding how we classify 
                                                
  
33 E III.iii.20: 420.  
 
34 E III.iii.12: 415.  
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things in nature because, so the story goes, there is some degree of freedom or latitude 
with respect to how we may make our general ideas, and thus what concepts are to count 
as genus and species is an arbitrary and subjective matter.  
Regarding the question of precisely why there is latitude with respect to how we 
form our general ideas, the Standard Reading divides into two camps.35 The first, 
propounded by Paul Guyer and Martha Bolton,36 restricts itself to Locke’s “new theory of 
ideas,”37 and is what Bolton refers to as the Idea-Theoretic Account. The other, more 
traditional view, articulated by Ayers (among others), attributes that latitude to Locke’s 
commitment to corpuscularian mechanism.38 I take up the Idea-Theoretic account first.  
As Margaret Atherton notes, the Idea-Theoretic approach appeals to “Locke’s 
seminal claim that ideas are the immediate objects of thought.”39 In that case, words stand 
for things only by the mediation of our ideas, and what we cognize of the world is wholly 
                                                
35 Margaret Atherton, “Locke on Essences and Classification,” in The Cambridge Companion to 
Locke’s ‘Essay Concerning Human Understanding’, ed. Lex Newman (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007), 258-285. 
 
 36Paul Guyer, “Locke’s Philosophy of Language,” in The Cambridge Companion to Locke, edited by 
Vere Chappell (1994; repr., Cambridge University Press, 1999), 115-145. Atherton notes that Martha 
Bolton is also a proponent of this approach in her paper “The Idea-Theoretic Basis of Locke’s Anti-
Essentialist Doctrine of Nominal Essences,” in Minds, Ideas, and Objects: Essays on the Theory of 
Representation in Modern Philosophy, ed. Phillip D. Cummins and Guenter Zoller (Atascadero, CA: 
Ridgeview). 
  
37 Atherton, 267.  
 
38 Atherton notes that Woolhouse, Alexander, Ayers, and Jolley are all proponents of the 
corpuscularian approach. See Roger Woolhouse, Locke’s Philosophy of Science and Knowledge (Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1971); Michael Ayers, “Locke Versus Aristotle on Natural Kinds,” The Journal of 
Philosophy 78, no. 5 (May 1981): 247-272; Peter Alexander, Ideas, Qualities and Corpuscles: Locke and 
Boyle and the External World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Nicholas Jolley, Leibniz 
and Locke (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984); Nicholas Jolley, Locke: His Philosophical Thought (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1999).   
 
39 Atherton, 268.  
 
 14 
determined by the nature of our ideas and how we arrive at them.40 The factors at play in 
the formation of our ideas will thus play a significant role in underwriting conclusions 
about the status of genus and species, whose essences just are general ideas. On Paul 
Guyer’s articulation of the Idea-Theoretic Account, it is a built-in feature of Locke’s 
story of how we form general ideas that there is wide latitude in respect of which general 
ideas we may form, in which case it follows, Guyer argues, that there is wide latitude 
with respect to how we may classify things.  
We make ideas general by making our complex ideas of particular things capable 
of representing more than one particular. Our complex ideas of particular things consist 
in the combination of many simple ideas of their primary qualities – e.g., the shape and 
size of a thing – secondary qualities – e.g., a thing’s color, taste, or odor – and tertiary 
qualities,41 or a thing’s powers or dispositions – e.g., solubility in aqua regia. An idea of 
a particular is made capable of representing many particulars just insofar as it represents 
the respects in which things resemble one another. The first step, then, is to separate 
“circumstances of Time, and Place” and “any other Ideas, that may determine [an idea] to 
this or that particular Existence.”42 We are left with a number of simple ideas of qualities 
that do not determine the idea to a particular thing, but rather capture the respects in 
which it may resemble other things.  
While these resemblances are objective in the sense that they are a matter of how 
things are with particulars, it must be noted that there are “indefinitely” many ways in 
                                                
40 Atherton, 268.  
 
41 This is not Locke’s term; Locke refers to powers and dispositions as “secondary qualities, 
mediately perceiveable” in order to indicate that our ideas of these powers “terminate” in ideas of 
secondary qualities (E II.viii.24-26: 141-143).  
 
42 E III.iii.6: 411.  
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which particulars resemble one another.43 And that means, Guyer argues, that there are 
innumerably many ways of marking off the resemblances between things in a general 
idea, the only real limitation being that our general idea must capture at least one respect 
of resemblance and so must include at least one simple idea of a quality. From there, 
however, we may mark off as many or as few similarities between things as we find in 
the world, in which case there are innumerably many general ideas we might make. 
Finally, given that classification proceeds according to our general ideas, it follows that 
there are innumerably many ways in which we might classify things in the natural world. 
That we recognize only some of the possible ways of grouping things together according 
to their similarities (and differences) is, Guyer argues, a matter of our own “intellectual 
choices” with respect to which similarities are important for the purposes of 
classification.44  
 According to the second, more traditional reading, it is Locke’s commitment to 
corpuscularian mechanism that explains why there is wide latitude with regard to what 
general ideas we may make, and thus wide latitude with respect to how we may group 
things together for the purposes of classification. The thought is that if the world itself is 
to determine just one way of grouping things together, it must be the case that there are 
clear, easily discernable qualitative gaps between things such that it is obvious where to 
draw boundaries between kinds. It must also be the case that particulars adhere to these 
boundaries with relative stability, that it is readily discernable when a particular ceases to 
be a member of a kind when it undergoes alteration, and that there are limits on the kind 
of alterations a thing can undergo.  
                                                
43 Guyer, 129.  
 
44 Ibid. 
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The commitments of corpuscularian mechanism, according to many proponents of 
the Standard Reading, defy the conditions just articulated. Corpuscularian mechanism 
conceives of the nature of material bodies as mere masses of matter consisting of the 
aggregation of insensible corpuscles whose qualities are exhausted by their solidity, 
shape, size, and motion. The nature of matter as such varies only in these respects, while 
the differences between particular bodies is a matter of the primary qualities of their 
corpuscles, how many are united in them, and how they are arranged – what Locke refers 
to as “texture”. While such differences are indeed grounds for drawing distinctions 
between things, such differences, so the argument goes, are not differences in kind, but 
differences in degree. In addition, whatever might be said about a particular body at a 
moment, its micro-constitution is in a state of constant flux and may conceivably mutate 
in any number of ways, thus undermining the stability requisite to the existence of fixed 
kinds. Jan-Erik Jones captures the seeming naturalness of the move from 
corpuscularianism to conventionalism below:  
[S]ince according to mechanism everything is indefinitely mutable, all changes 
are essentially mere alterations of the particular order, motion, and structure of 
minute particles. These insensibly small corpuscular structures can be re-arranged 
in such a way that what was lead one day could be gold the next. Thus it would 
seem that the denial of substantial forms, along with the infinite mutability of 
objects which differ only in minor structural differences of their minute particles, 
might lead mechanists…to conclude that natural classes are not provided by 
nature but are something we create.45 
 
Thus, as Atherton observes, while we might think that we apprehend clear 
differences in kind between things at the level of their observable qualities, when we 
descend to their microstructures it becomes more difficult to justify such assertions:  
                                                
45 Jan-Erik Jones, “Boyle, Classification and the Workmanship of the Understanding Thesis,” 
Journal of the History of Philosophy 43 no. 2 (April 2005): 173. 
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While it is true that it may seem crystal clear to me that my mother cannot 
possibly be a fish, this intuition cannot be based on a grasp of the inner 
constitutions of mothers and fish. This is because the observable qualities of a 
woman like my mother depend upon an ever-shifting structure of corpuscles that 
could perfectly conceivably alter into that structure of corpuscles on which the 
observable qualities of a mackerel or a walleye depend. If, therefore, I find there 
to be something wrong with the claim that my mother is a fish, this has to do with 
the ideas that I attach to the words ‘mother’ and ‘fish’, which are indeed strongly 
antithetical, and not with the inner constitution of my mother or a walleye.46 
 
If there were kinds that exist apart from our ideas of them, these kinds must be marked 
off by clear boundaries to which particular bodies stably conform. The commitments of 
corpuscularian mechanism would appear to defeat those assumptions.  
 In support of their own reading, proponents of the Idea-Theoretic account will cite 
what they take to be a weakness of the argument from corpuscularian mechanism, 
namely, that Locke’s account of classification is contingent on its truth. If it turns out that 
there really are stable, fixed boundaries to be discerned at the level of micro-structure, the 
only real interest of Locke’s anti-realist theory of classification will be its status as an 
artifact of an outdated world view. And as Atherton among others argue – although it is a 
controversial claim – the progress of science has arguably revealed that there are 
sufficiently clear qualitative gaps to be discerned at the level of micro-structure as to 
ground a privileged way of classifying things, where the classification we find in 
chemical theory’s periodic table can be cited as the most convincing piece of evidence for 
that claim. On the Idea-Theoretic approach, however, Locke’s theory of classification is, 
so its proponents argue, rendered invulnerable to objections from the progress of 
                                                
46 Atherton, 267.  
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science.47 The thought is that new discoveries do not change the fact that kinds are still a 
matter of the nature of our ideas and how we arrive at them.  
Ayers, however, dismisses the Idea-Theoretic Account as one that does not pay 
sufficient attention to the pivotal role that corpuscularian mechanism plays in Locke’s 
thought, and in his arguments, particularly those that, by Ayers’ lights, make direct 
appeal to the fact that we can discern no qualitative gaps between the internal 
constitutions of things:  
Guyer’s attempt to extract…an argument based purely on a theory of meaning and 
totally independent of Locke’s world-view (and with a conclusion smacking 
fashionably of ontological relativism, to boot) gets no support here.48  
 
Atherton helpfully steps in, noting that “nothing can be gained by accusing proponents of 
either view of historiagraphical failings.”49 Both approaches, she observes, capture “the 
uniqueness of one of Locke’s two novel entities.” The Idea-theoretic account rightly 
notes that the nature of our general ideas and how we arrive at them has consequences for 
Locke’s theory of classification, while the argument from corpuscularian mechanism 
shows Locke to be “working out the implications of identifying [essences] with quasi-
mechanical structures thrown up out of ever-changing arrays of corpuscles.”50  
                                                
47 Atherton, 268.  
 
48 In particular, Ayers challenges Guyer’s reading of a passage at E III.vi.39 in which Ayers takes 
Locke to be arguing that a watchmaker could not discern clear gaps between the internal constitutions of 
various watches, in which case there is a great deal of latitude with respect to how we sort things on the 
basis of their internal constitutions. Ayers thinks that the passage invokes a clear parallel between the inner 
mechanical constitutions of watches and the internal constitutions of corpuscularian bodies. Michael Ayers, 
“The Cambridge Companion to Locke (Edited by Vere C. Chappell): A Review,” Locke Newsletter 28 
(1997): 175-176. Guyer, on the other hand, reads Locke as arguing in the passage that even acquaintance 
with the micro-constitutions of things would not militate which similarities and differences we are to 
recognize in our general ideas (Guyer, 136-38).  
 
49 Atherton, 269.  
 
50 Ibid.  
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It is worth noting, however, that only the argument from corpuscularian 
mechanism would appear to secure the metaphysical conclusion that there are no 
objective kinds. While the Idea-Theoretic Account (if true) certainly draws attention to 
the arbitrariness that infects the method by which we arrive at general ideas, which in 
turn says something about the status of kinds as set out by these ideas, the rejoinder that it 
renders Locke immune to objections from the progress of science falls short of 
demonstrating Guyer’s claim that there are no natural kinds.51 At most the Idea-Theoretic 
Account can conclude that however much we know about the observable properties of 
things, or their microstructures, Locke’s story regarding how we arrive at our general 
ideas, and thus their status, remains the same.  
In any case, Atherton’s observations of the virtues of each approach would appear 
to provide an air-tight case for a conventionalist account of kinds in Locke. The evidence 
marshaled by both positions compounds on the side of thinking that there is wide latitude 
regarding how we make our general ideas, and so wide latitude in how we may classify 
things in the natural world.  
 
                  §1.5 Reconsidering the Arguments for Conventionalism 
 
 
 
 I argue in the following chapters that Locke in fact believed that there are 
objective kinds in nature and that these kinds are sufficiently apparent to us that we 
roughly approximate their boundaries in general ideas we make. The challenges such a 
reading faces are, however, numerous, chief of which is accounting for what in Locke’s 
                                                
51 Guyer, 130.  
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metaphysics grounds the reality of the objective kinds if not Aristotelian universal 
natures. Thus it is a sometimes tacit sometimes explicit premise of the Standard Reading 
that if Aristotelian general natures do not ground the objectivity of kinds, nothing does. 
For, as we have already seen, it appears that the natural world, understood according to 
the commitments of corpuscularian mechanism, fails to supply clear boundaries requisite 
for objective kinds. Thus Ayers remarks: 
Locke really believed that nothing on earth could possibly perform the function 
that the Aristotelians ascribe to their specific essences or forms.52  
 
Ayers’s point is that once we eliminate Aristotelian specific essences or forms, nothing 
else could supply objective boundaries requisite for objective or natural kinds. I will 
argue that there are grounds for challenging that premise.   
Locke did hold that there are objective kinds, and the essences of objective kinds, 
I argue, are to be understood as corpuscularian structures characteristic of bodies of a 
certain kind. That corpuscularian bodies have stable structures characteristic of the kind 
to which they objectively belong is, I argue, a matter of God’s workmanship when he 
creates natural substances and gives them an essence, understood as a corpuscularian 
structure. That there are genuine distinctions in kind between corpuscularian bodies thus 
has to do with the fact that God makes things in the natural world such that they have 
certain corpuscularian structures that are their essences. Thus bodies that are objectively 
co-specific and co-generic are co-specific and co-generic in virtue of resembling one 
another in a certain respect, namely, in respect of a hidden, inner structure, what Locke 
refers to as a disposition of parts, or a “texture”. In one crucial respect, then, Locke is in 
agreement with the Aristotelian, namely, that there are objective kinds.  
                                                
52 Ayers, Locke: Epistemology and Ontology, 2:68.  
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 Yet Locke’s gloss on the essences of material bodies as corpuscularian structures 
is still a significant departure from the Aristotelian understanding of the essences of 
material bodies. Locke’s account is in line with a metaphysics that eschews universals 
understood as real metaphysical constituents in things. As corpuscularian structures, the 
essences of bodies are not to be understood as anything over and above matter disposed 
or arranged in a certain, characteristic way, and the similarity between bodies in respect 
of such structures is not to be further analyzed in terms of identity; that is, a body’s 
essence, understood as a corpuscularian structure, is not to be understood as a universal 
that is both numerically many in particulars and universal in thought, as Aristotelian 
substantial forms are understood. What I am suggesting, then, is that Locke’s term ‘real 
essence’ is a name for that respect of resemblance between particulars that is relevant to 
their classification according to genus and species, where in the case of bodies or 
substances that respect of resemblance is to be understood in terms of corpuscularian 
structure, and is ultimately individuated in terms of God’s ideas.   
 I argue in Chapter II, however, that Locke’s most vociferous objection to the 
Aristotelian concerns not how we are to understand, metaphysically speaking, the status 
of the essences of material bodies, but concerns rather the status of the genus and species 
concepts in accordance with which we classify particular bodies. The essences of material 
things are, on all sides, thought to be unknown. I argue that Locke nevertheless attributes 
to the Aristotelian a tacit commitment not only to the claim that a sorting of bodies in 
accordance with our own genus and species concepts is a sorting of them according to 
their essences, but that our genus and species concepts in fact represent these essences. 
Such commitments are, on Locke’s view, disastrous in that they stand as an obstacle to 
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the improvement of our knowledge and classification of material bodies. For according to 
the Aristotelian, we find a near complete inventory of the real kinds that exist by looking 
to our own species concepts, near complete because there may be real kinds for which we 
do not yet have general ideas. In that case, our work in classification is done – we already 
have the right species concepts since, ex hypothesi, these concepts accurately pick out the 
essences of the real kinds.  
In addition, Chapter II sees the removal of one lynchpin of the Standard Reading; 
namely, its assumption that Locke’s arguments against the Aristotelian single out not 
only the moderate realist view, but any view according to which there are objective kinds. 
Locke’s frequent references to anomalous or defective instances of kinds, while posed as 
a challenge to the Aristotelian, further show, according to the Standard Reading, that 
nature is far too chaotic to support not just Aristotelian realism, but any view according to 
which there are objective kinds, since their existence seems to presuppose that there are 
stable and well-defined boundaries. However, the reading I offer in Chapter II shows 
Locke to be mounting a different criticism of the Aristotelian when he raises these 
examples.  
As proponents of the Standard Reading would be forced to admit, the Aristotelian 
will in fact agree that the existence of defective instances in nature is compatible with the 
view that there are natural kinds, and even compatible with the view that the essences of 
material bodies are to be understood as substantial forms.53 I argue that what Locke finds 
troubling is not the apparent deviancy of the examples, but rather the verdicts speakers in 
                                                
53 Jolley writes that “it is a familiar fact of everyday life that two things which are produced from 
the same mould [form] may turn out very differently; one cake or jelly may have a perfect shape, another 
may be such a poor approximation of the first that it will be discarded” (Jolley, Locke: His Philosophical 
Thought, 145-47).  
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the grip of the Aristotelian view are inclined to issue in the face of such cases. Thus 
regarding the two examples of apparent deviancy that receive the most discussion, Locke 
argues for an adjustment in our initial verdict about whether the thing in fact belongs to 
the species in question, and sometimes he argues for this adjustment by arguing for a 
revision to how we define that species. That such cases call for an adjustment in how we 
in fact classify particulars is, I argue, intended as a challenge to the entrenchment of our 
current classificatory scheme, which entrenchment results from the Aristotelian’s claim 
that we already sort things according to their essences, and that our genus and species 
concepts represent, and thus are fully adequate to those essences.  
The account I provide in Chapter II also provides an explanation of Locke’s 
motivations for sharply distinguishing two kinds of essences in his philosophy. As we 
have seen, there are the essences of bodies, what Locke understands as their hidden, 
corpuscularian structures. Locke argues that the essences of bodies are unknown. Still, 
we do sort bodies into genera and species and we do so in accordance with abstract or 
general ideas we make. Locke argues that the abstract ideas of genera and species we 
make are themselves essences – they are the essences of kinds in accordance with which 
we classify particular bodies in lieu of not knowing their (bodies’) essences. Locke 
denominates the essences of bodies ‘real essences’, and he denominates the essences we 
make ‘nominal essences’.  
By arguing that we make the kinds that are reflected in our genus and species 
concepts, and by arguing that the essences of these kinds are distinct from the real 
essences of bodies, Locke is attempting to correct a common although tempting mistake. 
For if we conceive of our genus and species concepts as anything less than full-blown 
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kinds with essences in their own right, we are liable, Locke thinks, to conceive of our 
genus and species concepts as placeholders for unknown real essences. When we do so, 
Locke argues, we tacitly make something unknown the criterion for membership in a 
kind. In that case, we are never in a position to know whether any given particular is a 
member of a kind since the real essence thought to be the criterion for membership in the 
kind, not to mention the real essence of any given body, cannot be known. What Locke 
seems to be arguing is that we cannot have it both ways. Either we classify according to 
criteria set out in our genus and species concepts, or we go by the unknown real essence. 
If the latter, we get nowhere. Thus if classification is to proceed, we must defer fully to 
our genus and species concepts as kinds with essences in their own right.  
The essence of kinds as set out in our genus and species concepts and real 
essences are thus to be kept distinct. I refer to kinds set out in our genus and species 
concepts as parochial kinds – my term, not Locke’s – in order to capture and emphasize 
the fact that these kinds and their essences are kinds that we literally bring into existence 
when we make abstract ideas. In that case, however, one might argue that the objective 
kinds and their unknown real essences are for the most part idle on Locke’s view. In later 
chapters of the dissertation, I argue, however, that though we cannot conceive of our 
genus and species concepts as placeholders for unknown real essences, we can 
nevertheless conceive of the parochial kinds set out in these concepts as the upshot of our 
ability to track at the level of the observable qualities of bodies distinctions between 
bodies that are relevant to their classification. On Locke’s view, I argue, God places 
observable marks of distinction in bodies that are unique to the kinds to which they 
belong and are thus markers in accordance with which we are to classify them. Thus 
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while we don’t know the real essences of bodies, we can, on the basis of their observable 
qualities, roughly approximate, by way of parochial kinds we make in deference to such 
marks of distinction, a classification of bodies that would have resulted had we known 
their hidden real essences and classified them accordingly.  
In Chapter III, I step back from the first-order metaphysical debate regarding 
Locke’s stance with respect to objective kinds and turn to questions of method in Locke’s 
Essay. For things turn murky when we consider its methodological aims and the modesty 
with which Locke is often thought to approach metaphysical questions in that work. On 
the one hand, the Essay is often seen as issuing a largely pessimistic verdict with respect 
to what metaphysical questions we may justifiably pursue given the limits of human 
knowledge. On the other hand, the methodological aims of the Essay would appear to 
debar Locke from pursuing in earnest those metaphysical questions regarding which he 
thinks we can make progress. For this would be to jumble together two distinct 
theoretical aims Locke has reasons to keep separate. Thus while Locke’s position with 
respect to some metaphysical topics – the materialist theory of mind, for instance – is in 
no need of clarification (he is agnostic), others, for instance the status of the distinction 
between primary and secondary qualities, are the subject of controversy in the secondary 
literature.   
I argue that Locke’s treatment of morality in the Essay provides an example of 
Locke’s willingness to signal metaphysical commitments for which he is unable to 
provide much further argument due to the methodological constraints of that work. Thus 
while Locke makes clear his belief in a divinely decreed moral law, in response to 
correspondents who pressed him for further details, Locke wrote that the Essay was no 
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place to “run out into a discourse of the divine law.”54 I go on to argue that the moral case 
provides the model for how we ought to understand Locke’s treatment of natural kinds. 
While it might be thought that Locke’s modest approach to metaphysics debars any 
conclusions, positive or negative, with respect to that question, I argue that, here, too, 
Locke makes clear his belief in kinds apart from those we find in general ideas we make. 
However, for reasons I go on to articulate, Locke was in no position to run into such a 
discourse in the Essay.  
In Chapter IV, I return to first-order metaphysical questions, and take up Guyer’s 
claim that Locke’s Idea-Theoretic account of general ideas entails conventionalism about 
natural kinds. As we saw in section 1.4, Guyer argues that there is wide latitude regarding 
how we may classify things in the natural world, a claim that follows from how we form 
general ideas. I argue that this approach glosses over much of the detail of Locke’s 
account. What we aim to capture in our general ideas, Locke argues, are just those 
qualities of things that regularly co-occur together in particular substances, which regular 
co-occurrence merits the inference that those and only those qualities flow from a 
common cause. This common cause is to be identified with a modification or aspect of 
the hidden, internal constitutions of particulars in which we find those regularly co-
occurring observable qualities. I go on to argue that the adequacy of our ideas of kinds 
formed on this basis is measured in terms of how accurately, and how exhaustively, we 
collect such regularly co-occurring qualities into an idea.  
Two features of this account immediately stand out. First, it assumes that the 
regular co-occurrence of certain observable qualities is a criterion that clearly demarcates 
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which of substances’ observable qualities are candidates for inclusion in a general idea. 
However, one might plausibly object that regular co-occurrence is itself a criterion that 
depends on our estimation of what counts as an instance of a regularity or its violation, in 
which case the criterion cannot escape a certain degree of arbitrariness. For instance, if it 
turned out that all samples of gold were observed to be ring-shaped, this would, 
according to the criterion, be grounds for including shape in our general idea of gold.55 If 
the example generalizes – and it would be difficult to argue that it doesn’t – there appears 
to be little hope that the criterion is any less arbitrary than the criterion of resemblance.  
This leads to the second feature of the account. The account assumes that that 
modification or aspect of the microstructure of a thing that explains the regular co-
occurrence of certain qualities is the modification or aspect that is objectively relevant to 
a thing’s classification. But there are many possible ways of isolating aspects or 
modifications in a thing’s internal constitution. We can isolate structure at varying 
degrees of resolution depending on how fine- or course-grained we want to be. I can 
discern the structure in a house at the level of its posts and beams, but I can also discern 
structure in the smoothness of the sheet rock in its walls, or in the nap of its curtains. The 
first observation doesn’t help matters, either. At first it seemed as though the 
modification or aspect of a thing’s microstructure is fixed prior to our coming on the 
scene to classify it, which in turn fixes which qualities will regularly co-occur in it and 
other bodies that share that modification or aspect. But given that co-occurrence now 
appears to be a moving target, with less objective purport than first assumed, what 
modification or aspect in a thing counts as a common cause relevant to its classification is 
itself a matter of what in our estimation counts as an instance or violation of a regular co-
                                                
55 I thank Alison Simmons and Jeffrey McDonough for drawing my attention to this objection.  
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occurrence.  
These objections can be understood as a matter of drawing out the implications of 
corpuscularian mechanism. In Chapter V, I argue that, in spite of his guarded 
endorsement of the view, Locke did not take its anti-realist consequences to bear on his 
theory of kinds and classification in the way that commentators have suggested. First, I 
argue that a passage commonly thought to signal Locke’s appreciation and endorsement 
of mechanism’s anti-realist implications – what I refer to as the Watch Passage – in fact 
addresses an altogether different topic. Once again, Locke shows himself to be 
preoccupied not with a question about the possibility of objective kinds, but rather with 
the Aristotelian’s (and the vulgar’s) mistake of taking the essences of our parochial kinds 
for real essences; thus the passage highlights one of the interesting ways in which that 
mistake gets expressed in our judgments about what makes it the case that something is a 
member of a parochial kind, that is, a member of a kind set out in one of our general 
ideas.  
I go on to argue that a passage that immediately follows the Watch Passage shows 
that, at least in the case of artifacts, Locke did not think that classification is arbitrary. 
Locke argues that what fixes which features are relevant to an artifact’s classification is 
the designer’s or artificer’s idea. A designer imposes structure on matter such that it has 
certain characteristic features and functions. The observable features of an artifact 
relevant to its classification are individuated in terms of the artificer’s intentions, and that 
inner aspect or modification on which such observable features depend are themselves a 
function of how an artificer modifies its constituent matter into an organization of parts. 
It is thus the artificer’s idea that provides an independent standard in light of which we 
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determine not only the resolution at which we isolate the internal aspect or modification 
that is relevant to an artifact’s classification, but that aspect or modification in turn 
determines which of its observable features are likewise relevant to its being the kind of 
artifact it is.  
The essences of artifacts are fixed by an independent standard, one that, Locke 
argues, is easily known. Further, Locke suggests that this fact explains why there is a 
degree of inter-subjective agreement regarding the definitions of the species of artifacts 
that we do not find in the case of so-called natural substances, substances like gold and 
water. I argue that, on Locke’s view, what distinguishes artifacts from natural substances 
on this count is the fact that the essences of natural substances – their real essences – are 
unknown, while the essences of artifacts are, Locke argues, easily known. Even so, as I 
argue in the following chapter, there is a clear parallel between artifacts and natural 
substances in that the essences of the latter are likewise fixed by an independent standard, 
namely, the ideas in accordance with which God creates natural substances and their real 
essences. But those ideas, and the internal constitutions or real essences that answer to 
those ideas, because they are unknown, do not fix our ideas of species. Rather, we must 
resort to “collecting” piecemeal the qualities of substances we have grounds for thinking 
flow from their unknown essences, i.e., their propria. Individual speakers will collect 
different such candidate qualities in their abstract ideas because these qualities are 
“differently discovered” by different speakers, and no speaker can collect all of them, in 
which case the essences we find in our parochial species of natural substances differ 
across speakers. And this is precisely where the disanalogy between artifacts and natural 
substances shows up.  
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 There are, then, clear parallels between Locke’s account of artifacts and his 
account of the natural world as a product of God’s creative acts. Like a watchmaker, God 
imposes a structure on the matter of particular things such that they have the features 
characteristic of a kind. It is thus God’s ideas that determine the “resolution” at which a 
natural substance’s real essence, or internal structure, is individuated, while that aspect or 
modification in turn determines which of its observable features (its regularly co-
occuring qualities) are likewise relevant to its kind. And while we do not have access to 
God’s ideas, nor do we have ideas of the internal modifications or aspects of the inner 
constitutions of things, God places marks of distinction in things such that we can discern 
the boundaries between kinds sufficiently well to promote our survival.  
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    Chapter II 
 
    Real Essences and Two Forms of Realism about Kinds 
 
          §2.1 Introduction 
 
 
Locke famously rejects an Aristotelian conception of kinds and classification in 
Book III of the Essay. The dispute in large part concerns how we ought to understand the 
real essences of corporeal substances. On a neutral description, real essences are the 
hidden, and therefore unknown, inner constitutions of substances responsible for (at least 
some of) their observable qualities. So understood, Locke’s disagreement with the 
Aristotelian over real essences might be articulated by way of a few choice points.  
First, we can ask whether real essences are the essences of objective kinds. The 
realist believes that they are. However, the realist faces an additional, epistemological 
question. If real essences are indeed the essences of objective kinds, what is the 
relationship between a sorting of particulars according to real essences and a sorting of 
particulars according to our species concepts? On Locke’s view, the Aristotelian believes 
that a sorting of particulars according to our species concepts just is a sorting according 
to real essences, in which case a sorting of particulars according to our species concepts 
is a sorting according to the objective kinds to which they belong. For the Aristotelian 
realist, then, we find a near complete inventory of the real kinds by looking to our own 
species concepts, near complete because there may be species as set out by real essences 
for which we do not have concepts – for example, undiscovered species of bacteria in the 
deepest reaches of the ocean.  
A more cautious realist might counter, however, that the Aristotelian subscribes to 
a false view of the adequacy of our species concepts to mind-independent reality. In fact, 
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the Aristotelian position could even be said to stand as an obstacle to the advancement of 
our knowledge of substances and their correct classification. For by virtue of her 
metaphysical commitments, the Aristotelian thinks our work in classification is done. We 
already have the right concepts, since ex hypothesi these concepts pick out real 
essences.56 And although there may be undiscovered kinds, we can rest assured that the 
concepts we do employ both track and are fully adequate to real kinds in the world.  
The cautious realist may thus reject Aristotelian realism. In this chapter I argue 
that Locke was just such a cautious realist. Rather than opposing realism, Locke in his 
criticism of the Aristotelian instead advances a form of realism more modest in its 
epistemology. What Locke finds objectionable is not the Aristotelian’s commitment to 
natural kinds as set out by real essences, but rather the Aristotelian’s claim that our 
species concepts reflect species as set out by real essences. The Aristotelian thus confers 
a metaphysical status on the species reflected in our current classificatory scheme, which 
status stands as an obstacle to the improvement of our knowledge and classification of 
substances. Locke’s arguments against the Aristotelian are thus intended to make us 
better at classifying things, and that is no strike against realism.  
Returning to the choice points described above, it is worth locating the moment at 
which Locke in fact parts ways with the Aristotelian. According to the Standard Reading, 
Locke rejects the Aristotelian’s claim that real essences are the essences of objective 
kinds. Against the Standard Reading, I argue that the real disagreement concerns the 
Aristotelian’s response to the second choice point. Locke’s several criticisms of the 
Aristotelian picture of kinds and classification are directed not at the thesis that there are 
                                                
56 Ott observes that there is “a core thesis on which both the seventeenth century Aristotelians and 
orthodox Aristotelians agree: words in definitions signify real essences that exist in physical objects” (Ott, 
82).  
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natural kinds as set out by real essences, but at the thesis that we have located those kinds 
in our own species concepts. On my interpretation, Locke’s critique of the Aristotelian is 
altogether compatible with an understanding of real essences as the essences of objective 
kinds.  
I argue for this claim by taking up what Locke refers to as “Two Opinions” about 
how to understand the real essences of corporeal substances, the first of which is the 
Aristotelian opinion, the second, Locke’s own opinion. According to the Standard 
Reading’s gloss of the Two Opinions, Locke’s own preferred concept of real essence is to 
be understood as the unknown, microstructure of an unsorted particular causally 
responsible for all of its observable qualities. On such an understanding, a real essence, as 
a merely causal-explanatory essence, does not itself determine the boundary of a kind. 
The Aristotelian, on the other hand, understands real essences to be the essences of 
objective kinds, in which case real essences do determine the boundaries of kinds. 
According to the Standard Reading, Locke’s disagreement with the Aristotelian is a 
disagreement over whether real essences determine the boundaries of objective kinds.  
Against the Standard Reading, I argue that Locke was not concerned with the 
Aristotelian’s conception of real essences as essences that determine the boundaries of 
objective kinds but rather with her conception of real essences as the essences of the 
kinds in terms of which we sort and distinguish substances. On Locke’s view, the 
essences of the kinds in terms of which we sort and distinguish substances are 
individuated solely in terms of speakers’ abstract or general ideas. In fact, Locke argues 
that these essences just are abstract ideas. Again, I refer to kinds whose essences just are 
our abstract ideas as “parochial kinds” in order to capture and emphasize their special 
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status: these kinds are literally brought into existence by way of our own activity of 
forming abstract ideas. Such kinds are the workmanship of the understanding. In that 
case, unknown real essences cannot be the essences of our parochial kinds, since their 
essences are abstract ideas.  
The Aristotelian, Locke argues, conceives of the essences of parochial kinds to be 
real essences. Locke reserves the term “specifick real essence” for real essences 
conceived as the essences of our parochial kinds. Locke argues that the notion of a 
specifick real essence finds its origin in our attempt to secure common significations for 
our species names. Speakers suppose a real essence common to particulars we group 
together under the same species concept. We thus take our species names to pick out 
unknown real essences, which real essences are also supposed to fix the meaning of our 
species names. This is because speakers take the species names themselves – the very 
words – to have natural significations that uniquely and accurately describe the specifick 
real essences posited by the view. It is no wonder, then, that Locke ascribes to the 
Aristotelian an unearned confidence in the adequacy of our species concepts to mind-
independent reality.   
Finally, I argue that, on Locke’s view, the Aristotelian conception of a specifick 
real essence is not only an obstacle to the improvement of our knowledge and 
classification of substances, it is deeply incoherent precisely because it conceives of real 
essences as the essences of our parochial kinds. I argue that this strengthens the case for 
thinking that, on Locke’s view, the Aristotelian’s error lies not in the thought that there 
are objective kinds as set out by real essences, but rather in the thought that our parochial 
kinds are objective kinds as set out by real essences. This, in turn, means that Locke did 
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not intend his critique of Aristotelian realism to foreclose on the possibility of objective 
kinds as set out by real essences (although such kinds would be distinct from our 
parochial kinds). In that case, it is no longer obvious that Locke could not have been the 
kind of cautious realist described above, as the Standard Reading claims.  
 
               §2.2 Two Opinions about Real Essences 
 
 
The Aristotelian view is expressed in the first of two “opinions” about the real 
essences of corporeal substances. The First Opinion belongs to those who  
using the Word Essence, for they know not what, suppose a certain number of 
those Essences, according to which, all natural things are made, and wherein they 
do exactly every one of them partake, and so become of this or that Species.57 
 
Situating the passage in terms of the choice points mentioned above, the First Opinion 
holds that particulars come in types or kinds as set out by real essences, a proposal that 
appears to offer a plausible rendering of what it would take for there to exist natural 
kinds. 
Locke then contrasts the First Opinion with his own “more rational opinion”:  
 
The other, and more rational Opinion, is of those, who look on natural Things to 
have a real, but unknown Constitution of their insensible Parts, from which flow 
those sensible Qualities, which serve us to distinguish them one from another, 
according as we have Occasion to rank them into sorts, under common 
Denominations.58 
 
According to the Second, or more “rational” Opinion, real essences are the unknown 
constitutions of the insensible parts of corporeal substances. These essences are the 
causal source of the qualities in terms of which we distinguish substances into kinds, but 
                                                
57 E III.iii.17: 418; Locke continues “[This opinion]…supposes these Essences, as a certain 
number of Forms or Molds, where in all natural Things, that exist, are cast, and do equally partake[.]” 
 
58 E III.iii.17: 418. 
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they are not conceived as that in terms of which substances “become of this or that 
Species”.  
It seems natural to assume, then, that Locke’s opposition to the First Opinion is 
opposition to the thesis that particulars naturally belong to kinds as set out by their real 
essences. In that case, it would appear that by real essence, Locke does not understand an 
essence in the traditional sense of the word; that is, as having to do with kinds or sorts. 
Rather, the concept of a real essence seems to be captured by an exhaustive description of 
a thing’s microstructure, which microstructure is causally responsible for its observable 
qualities, some of which qualities we freely choose to be the basis for distinguishing 
substances into kinds. On such an understanding, the real essence of a thing is “the 
totality of features of its insensible particles that explains the totality of its sensible 
qualities.”59 In that case, it appears as though the role that a real essence plays on Locke’s 
view is not, as the Aristotelian conceives it to be, a classificatory one, but is rather only 
an explanatory one: a real essence is the causal source of all of a thing’s qualities, and so 
the causal source of the qualities we freely choose to be the basis for classifying it. But a 
real essence, so understood, cannot, of itself, independently of our classificatory activity, 
be an essence of a kind. Indeed, it seems reasonable to assume that a real essence, so 
                                                
 59 See Guyer, 133. Admittedly Guyer reserves this description for Locke’s use of the term ‘real 
constitution’ while arguing that the term ‘real essence’ is restricted to pick out those insensible qualities 
that explain just those observable qualities in terms of which a speaker freely distinguishes that substance 
into a sort. As I argue elsewhere, however, Locke uses the terms ‘real essence’ and ‘real constitution’ 
interchangeably, and so does not distinguish them in the way that Guyer (and others) have suggested. In 
fact, and as we will see, Locke’s claim that by ‘real essence’ is meant the essence of particular things 
without giving them any name suggests that real essences are logically prior to nominal essences and so not 
individuated relative to nominal essences and the species names to which they are annexed. In any case, the 
Standard Reading’s basic contention is that the unknown inner corpuscularian constitutions of substances 
do not, of themselves, supply boundaries for kind membership and so cannot be the essences of objective 
kinds.  
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understood, is what in part distinguishes particular substances one from another, in 
which case they could not even be candidates for the essences of kinds.  
This understanding would seem to accord with Locke’s description of the “proper 
original signification” of the word “essence”, a signification he assigns to the concept of 
real essence:    
Essence may be taken for the very being of any thing, whereby it is, what it is. 
And thus the real internal, but generally in Substances, unknown Constitution of 
Things, whereon their discoverable Qualities depend, may be called their Essence. 
This is the proper original signification of the Word, as is evident from the 
formation of it; Essentia, in its primary notation signifying properly Being. And in 
this sense it is still used, when we speak of the Essence of particular things, 
without giving them any Name.60  
 
Locke writes that by this sense of essence is meant the “Essence of particular things, 
without giving them any Name,” implying that when we abstract from the names or 
general terms by which we sort substances into kinds, we abstract from any kind to which 
they might belong. We’re left with the thought, not of things qua members of a kind, but 
of things qua “unsorted” particulars.61 
 This way of understanding the passage is in line with the Standard Reading, 
according to which Locke rejects the Aristotelian’s claim that real essences are not 
merely explanatory essences but are the essences of objective kinds. Returning to the first 
choice point of the previous section, it looks as though, on Locke’s understanding, real 
essences are not the essences of objective kinds, since real essences play only an 
explanatory role as the explanatory essences of unsorted particulars. But the Standard 
Reading neglects an alternative way of understanding what it means to speak of the 
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61 David Owen, “Locke on Real Essence,” History of Philosophy Quarterly 8 (1991): 105-118.  
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essence of particular things without giving them any name. Indeed, by considering things 
without giving them any name we consider them apart from kinds or species to which 
they belong, but – and this is the crucial point – we consider them apart from species for 
which we have names, i.e., apart from our parochial species.  
 
              §2.3 The Two Opinions Reconsidered  
 
 According to the Standard Reading, the Two Opinions about the real essences of 
corporeal substances differ over whether real essences are the essences of kinds. Locke, 
on this reading, believes that real essences are the explanatory ground of the qualities of 
unsorted particulars. The Aristotelian, on this reading, believes that real essences are the 
essences of objectively individuated kinds. The Standard Reading appears to find support 
in Locke’s description of a real essence as “the essence of particular things without 
giving them any Name”, suggesting that by real essence he means merely what in an 
unsorted particular plays the role of causing and therefore explaining its observable 
qualities, some of which qualities are those in terms of which we go on to sort that thing.  
Against the Standard Reading, I argue that the two opinions rather have to do with 
whether real essences are the essences of “species as distinguished and denominated by 
us,”62 that is, whether real essences are the essences of species reflected in our activity of 
ranking things under names. When Locke argues, then, that by real essence is meant the 
essence of particular things without giving them any name, he means that we abstract 
away from the names of our parochial species, in which case we abstract away from a 
sorting of particulars in terms of our species concepts. Nowhere does Locke argue that 
                                                
62 E III.iii.13: 415.  
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species as distinguished and denominated by us are the only kinds there are, although he 
certainly thinks that they are the only kinds we know.   
 It is worth taking a second look at the first, Aristotelian opinion about how the 
notion of real essence ought to be understood. Locke writes that the first opinion 
supposes “a certain number of those Essences, according to which all things are made, 
wherein they do exactly every one of them partake[.]” While this sounds like an 
articulation of the thesis that there are natural kinds and that real essences are the 
essences of those kinds, it is worth noting that Locke then goes on to explain that, 
according to the Aristotelian opinion, it is by virtue of exactly partaking in real essences 
that natural things become “of this or that Species”:  
[The First, Aristotelian Opinion supposes] a certain number of those Essences, 
according to which, all natural things are made, and wherein they do exactly 
every one of them partake, and so become of this or that Species.63 
 
By “Species” Locke means species as distinguished and denominated by us, that is, 
species reflected in our activity of ranking things under names or general terms, or 
parochial species. For the majority of speakers, these species are “thought to be made by 
Nature”.64 More precisely,   
It is usual for Men to make the Names of Substances, stand for Things, as 
supposed to have certain real Essences, whereby they are of this or that 
Species[.]65 
 
Here Locke is explaining that real essences are typically thought to be the essences of 
species, since possession of a real essence is taken to be that whereby a thing is of this or 
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64 E III.vi.43: 465-66.  
 
65 E II.xxxi.6: 378; bold emphasis mine.  
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that species. The view expressed in this passage is virtually identical to that expressed in 
the First Opinion, which supposes a certain number of real essences “wherein [things] do 
exactly every one of them partake, and so become of this or that Species.”66 The only 
difference is that in the latter passage, Locke makes it explicit that the species in question 
are those reflected in the activity of ranking substances under names. Men take the names 
of substances to stand for things whose real essences are conceived to be that whereby 
they belong to this or that species for which we have names.  
 
 
         §2.4 Real Essences and the Essences of Species  
 
 
 On the view I am defending, the Two Opinions about the real essences of 
corporeal substances differ not over whether real essences are the essences of objective 
kinds, but over whether real essences are the essences of our parochial species. 
According to the Aristotelian, the essences of parochial species are real essences, and so 
parochial species are thought to be species made by nature. Their essences are real 
essences. According to Locke, parochial species are “the workmanship of the 
understanding”, and their essences are abstract ideas in the mind. Support for this reading 
can be found by looking to the project of Book III of the Essay. There Locke shines a 
light on the confusions that surround the use of general terms and the species they 
signify. The primary confusion concerns the essences of the species signified by our 
general terms, i.e., our parochial kinds.   
We can start with the names of these species, or general terms. On Locke’s view 
everything that exists is particular. A general term picks out a class of particulars, but not 
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by picking out a universal or general nature common to those particulars. This raises a 
puzzle. Words, Locke says, “ought to be conformed to Things”. And one would expect 
that by conforming to particulars, all words would be particular in their signification. But 
the “far greatest part of Words, that make all Languages, are general Terms.”67 In virtue 
of what, then, do these words “conform” to many particulars if not by conforming to a 
general nature they each possess?      
On Locke’s view, the conformity between a general term and the particulars it 
picks out is mediated by the conformity between those particulars and a general idea, 
which the name signifies. Each particular is picked out by the name by virtue of its 
“agreement” with the general idea annexed to the name. Locke concludes that the 
essences of species we pick out with names are not general natures or universals in things 
but general (abstract) ideas in the mind: “the abstract Idea, for which the [species] name 
stands, and the Essence of the Species, is one and the same.”68 Locke writes:  
[I]t being evident, that Things are ranked under Names into sorts or Species, 
only as they agree to certain abstract Ideas, to which we have annexed those 
Names, the Essence of each Genus, or Sort, comes to be nothing but the abstract 
Idea, which the General, or Sortal…Name stands for.69  
 
The species we care about, the species that are the subject of Locke’s exposition 
and analysis, are the species reflected in our activity of ranking things under names. 
These species are analyzed in terms of a three-place relation between a name, an abstract 
idea, and a particular that agrees with that idea, which relation falls entirely under the 
province of the understanding:  
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69 E III.iii.15: 417; bold emphasis mine.  
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When we therefore quit Particulars, the Generals that rest, are only Creatures of 
our own making, their general Nature being nothing but the Capacity they are put 
into by the Understanding, of signifying or representing many particulars. For the 
signification they have, is nothing but a relation, that by the mind of Man is added 
to them.70 
 
Names thus play a constitutive role in Locke’s analysis of species, and this is 
nowhere more evident than in his observation that membership in a species is a matter of 
“having a right to a name,” which in turn is a matter of a thing’s agreeing with the 
abstract idea to which the name is annexed:  
[T]he Essences of the…Species of Things, are nothing else but these abstract 
ideas. For the having the Essence of any Species, being that which makes any 
thing to be of that Species, and the conformity to the Idea, to which the name is 
annexed, being that which gives a right to that name, the having the Essence, and 
the having that Conformity, must needs be the same thing: Since to be of any 
Species, and to have a right to the name of that Species, is all one.71  
 
Striking a deflationary tone, Locke concludes that “this whole mystery of Genera and 
Species, which make such a noise in the Schools, and are, with Justice, so little regarded 
out of them, is nothing but abstract Ideas, more or less comprehensive, with names 
annexed to them.”72  
It is important to note what follows from these claims; namely, that the essences 
of species, what Locke refers to as the “artificial Constitution of Genus and Species,” are 
distinct from “the real Constitution [essence] of things.”73 Locke writes that we do not 
sort or name substances according to their real essences, “nor indeed can we rank, and 
sort Things, and consequently (which is the end of sorting) denominate them by their real 
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Essences, because we know them not.”74 Even more to the point, real essences are 
distinct from “the species we rank things into” because, as Locke writes, “two Species 
may be one, as rationally, as two different Essences be the Essence of one Species.”75 
Taking real essences for the essences of species as distinguished and denominated by us 
thus amounts to a logical mistake.     
The majority of speakers, however, including the Aristotelian, do not distinguish 
the real constitution of things (real essences) from the artificial constitution of genus and 
species. Most speakers consider the essences of genus and species to be essences “made 
by nature” i.e., real essences. Locke refers to real essences so conceived as “specifick real 
essences,” i.e., real essences conceived as the essences of species. As we will see, there is 
a fundamental difference in how real essences are conceived when they are conceived as 
the essences of genus and species. One of the primary differences is that specifick real 
essences, so conceived, are tied to our species names, which is in obvious conflict with 
Locke’s own preferred description of real essence as the essence of things without giving 
them any name.  
    §2.5 Specifick Real Essences 
 
 
Speakers in the grip of the First (Aristotelian) Opinion use the names of 
substances with a certain thought in mind. They suppose that these names pick out a real 
essence whereby a substance belongs to the species named. On Locke’s view, this is a 
mistake. That whereby a substance belongs to a species named is its agreement with a 
general idea or “nominal essence”. In the passage below, Locke refers to real essences 
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conceived as the essences of species as distinguished and denominated by us as 
“specifick real essences”:  
That men (especially such as have been bred up in the Learning taught in this part 
of the World) do suppose certain specifick Essences of Substances, which each 
Individual in its several kind is made conformable to, and partakes of, is so far 
from needing proof, that it will be thought strange, if any one should do 
otherwise. And thus they ordinarily apply the specifick Names, they rank 
particular Substances under, to Things, as distinguished by such Specifick 
real Essences. Who is there almost, who would not take it amiss, if it should be 
doubted, whether he call’d himself Man, with any other meaning, than as having 
the real Essence of a Man?76  
 
According to widespread practice, real essences are invoked as the essences of species we 
pick out with our “specifick Names”. For instance, it is common to use the specifick 
name “Man” to pick out substances with the thought that they possess a real essence 
whereby they are men.  
By Locke’s lights, this is a mistake, and his observation that the essences of 
species as distinguished and denominated by us are logically distinct from real essences 
shows why. What makes it the case that a substance is a member of a species as 
distinguished and denominated by us – say the species we denominate “man” – is its 
agreement with the abstract idea annexed to that name. As Locke argues, this is both a 
necessary and sufficient condition for membership in the species. In that case, substances 
distinguished and denominated men are so distinguished and denominated if and only if 
they agree with the abstract idea annexed to the name “man”. 
In order to clarify things, let us assume, against the Standard Reading, that real 
essences are the essences of objective kinds. Since the essences of species as 
distinguished and denominated by us are distinct from real essences, conditions on 
membership in species as distinguished and denominated by us are distinct from 
                                                
76 E II.xxxi.6: 378-79; bold emphasis mine.  
 45 
conditions on membership in kinds as set out by real essences. If you understand real 
essences as the essences of kinds, given that real essences are in any case distinct from 
the essences of species as distinguished and denominated by us, membership in species as 
distinguished and denominated by us is logically distinct from membership in kinds as set 
out by real essences. It follows that there is no real essence possession of which is that 
whereby a thing is a man. And this goes for any species as denominated by us.  
In fact, passages in which Locke appears to identify and attack an understanding 
of real essences as the essences of objective kinds on close inspection reveal a different 
lesson: real essences are not the essences of species as distinguished and denominated by 
us. Consider the following passage, where Locke makes an observation regarding how 
real essences show up in our reasoning about kind membership. He is clear that the 
reasoning he targets is reasoning that invokes real essences as that whereby a thing 
belongs to a species as distinguished and denominated by us:    
[W]hen Men apply to this particular parcel of Matter on my Finger, a general 
Name already in use, and denominate it Gold, Do they not ordinarily, or are they 
not understood to give it that Name as belonging to a particular Species of Bodies, 
having a real internal Essence; by having of which Essence, this particular 
Substance comes to be of that Species, and to be called by that Name?77  
 
 It is worth comparing the sense of real essence that has emerged – the notion of a 
‘specifick real essence’ embraced by the First Opinion – with Locke’s own more rational 
opinion. Specifick real essences are conceived as the essences of species as distinguished 
and denominated by us, as that whereby a thing belongs to one of those species. 
According to Locke’s own more rational opinion, while real essences are the causal 
origin of the qualities in terms of which we rank substances under names, they are not the 
                                                
77 E II.xxxi.7: 380.  
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essences of the species that correspond to those names, and they play no role in 
membership in the species that correspond to those names. The two opinions thus posit 
very different entities corresponding to the concept of a real essence. As will become 
clear in a later section, Locke thinks that there is a built-in incoherence in the very notion 
of a specifick real essence.      
         *** 
  
Let me state precisely what is at stake in Locke’s articulation of the Two 
Opinions. According to the Standard Reading, a disagreement over how to understand the 
real essences of corporeal substances stands proxy for a debate over realism about kinds. 
As I have argued, however, what Locke sees in his Aristotelian opponent is rather a 
competing account of the metaphysical basis for membership in species as distinguished 
and denominated by us. Once his argument against the Aristotelian comes into focus, 
Locke’s opposition to the Aristotelian position no longer looks like opposition to the 
thesis that there are natural kinds (as set out by real essences), but rather opposition to a 
certain explanation of what makes it the case that things belong to species as 
distinguished and denominated by us. In short, the two opinions Locke articulates are two 
opinions about the metaphysical basis for membership in our parochial kinds.  
According to Locke, the First Opinion is held not just by Aristotelians – those 
“who have been bred up in the Learning taught in this part of the World” – but by most 
speakers. Thanks to scholastic metaphysics, the specific real essence becomes the 
metaphysically dubious substantial form.78 But as much as Locke routinely vilifies the 
                                                
78 Locke writes “Those therefore who have been taught, that the several Species of Substances, 
had their distinct internal substantial Forms; and that it was those Forms, which made the distinction of 
Substances into their true Species and Genera, were led yet farther out of the way, by having their Minds 
set upon fruitless Enquiries after substantial Forms, wholly unintelligible, and whereof we have scarce so 
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substantial form, the notion of a specifick real essence has more innocent beginnings. 
Part of Locke’s project is to give a naturalistic account of how speakers first arrive at 
something roughly like the view articulated in the First Opinion, in which we find the 
notion of a specifick real essence. The view is borne out of an attempt to secure common 
significations for our kind terms.  
 
 
§2.6 Specifick Real Essence: The Origin of the Concept 
 
 
In Locke’s memorable words, species as distinguished and denominated by us are 
“the Workmanship of the Understanding,” by which he means that speakers make the 
abstract ideas or nominal essences that constitute the essences of parochial species.   
We make these abstract ideas by attending to candidate observable qualities of 
particular substances – their real essences are perfectly unknown. We collect some of 
these candidate qualities into a general idea. Which such qualities speakers include in 
their abstract ideas depends on how much investigation they do.79  
                                                
much as any obscure, or confused Conception in general” (E III.vi.10: 445; bold emphasis mine); c.f. E 
II.xxxi.6: 379-380; E III.vi.24: 452.  
 
79 In order to explain precisely how we make our abstract ideas, Locke imagines how Adam 
arrives at his nominal essence of gold: “One of Adam’s Children, roving in the Mountains, lights on a 
glittering Substance, which pleases his Eye; Home he carries it to Adam, who, upon consideration of it, 
finds it to be hard, to have a bright yellow Colour, and an exceeding great Weight. These, perhaps at first, 
are all the Qualities, he takes notice of in it, and abstracting this complex Idea, consisting of a Substance 
having that peculiar bright Yellowness, and a Weight very great in proportion to its Bulk, he gives it the 
Name Zahab, to denominate and mark all Substances, that have these sensible Qualities in them (III.vi.46: 
468). But these are not the only qualities Adam includes in his nominal essence, for Locke continues “[T]he 
inquisitive Mind of Man, not content with the Knowledge of these, as I may say, superficial Qualities, puts 
Adam upon farther Examination of this Matter. He therefore knocks, and beats it with Flints, to see what 
was discoverable in the inside: He finds it yield to Blows, but not easily separate into pieces: he finds it will 
bend without breaking. Is not now Ductility to be added to his former Idea, and made a part of the Essence 
of the Species, that Name Zahab stands for? Farther trials discover Fusibility and Fixedness. Are not they 
also, by the same Reason, that any of the others were, to be put into the complex Idea, signified by the 
Name Zahab stands for, and so be the Essence of the Species, marked by that Name. Which Properties, 
because they are endless, it is plain that the Idea made after this fashion by this Archetype, will be always 
inadequate” (E III.vi.47: 468-69; bold emphasis mine).  
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Locke writes that ideas “made after this fashion” are inadequate. Candidate 
qualities are “endless”, and no speaker can include all of them.80 What’s more, speakers 
differ in which candidate qualities they happen to include in their abstract idea. Locke 
concludes that “the Names of Substances would not only have, (as in truth they have) but 
would also be supposed to have different Significations, as used by different Men”. This, 
Locke observes “would very much cumber the use of Language”:  
For if every distinct Quality, that were discovered in any Matter by any one, were 
supposed to make a necessary part of the complex Idea, signified by the common 
Name given it, it must follow, that Men must suppose the same Word to signify 
different Things in different Men: since they cannot doubt, but different Men may 
have discovered several Qualities in Substances of the same Denomination, which 
others know nothing of.81   
 
(It’s worth noting that different men attach different significations to the same general 
term even when men “propose to themselves the very same Subject to consider”.82)
 Speakers thus face a massive coordination problem. To Locke’s mind, this is the 
moment we go astray. In an attempt to secure common significations for the names of 
substances, speakers have illicitly “supposed a real Essence belonging to every Species”. 
In addition – and this is important – speakers make the species name stand for these 
supposed real essences.83 Speakers “put the name or sound, in the place and stead of the 
                                                
 
80 ! III.vi.47: 469.  
 
81 Ibid. 
 
82 “Because these simple Ideas [qualities] that co-exist, and are united in the same subject, being 
very numerous, and having all an equal right to go into the complex specifick Idea, which the specifick 
Name is to stand for, Men, though they propose to themselves the very same Subject to consider, yet 
frame very different Ideas about it; and so the Name they use for it, unavoidably comes to have, in several 
Men, very different significations” (III.ix.13: 482; bold emphasis mine).  
 
83 E III.vi.49: 469-70.  
 
 49 
thing” that we suppose has that real essence “without knowing what that real Essence 
is[.]”84  
And here is the crucial point in Locke’s story. Locke writes, “this is that which 
Men do, when they speak of Species of Things, as supposing them made by Nature, and 
distinguished by real Essences.”85 We take the things we pick out with our species names 
to possess a common real essence whereby they belong to the species, when in fact 
membership in the kind is a matter only of their agreement with the abstract idea annexed 
to the species name, which idea expresses the essence of that species. In effect, we regard 
species that are in fact the workmanship of the understanding to be species “made by 
nature”.  
Notice the resulting transformation in our understanding of both real essences and 
species as distinguished and denominated by us once we suppose a real essence 
belonging to every species in terms of which we distinguish and denominate things. On 
the one hand, we now regard the essences of parochial species not as the upshot of our 
own workmanship, but as made by nature. Take, also, real essences. Locke writes that by 
real essence is properly meant “the Essence of particular things without giving them any 
Name”. Now, however, real essences are conceived as the essences of things just insofar 
as we give them species names, that is, real essences are conceived to be specifick real 
essences, or the essences of species as distinguished and denominated by us.   
 
 
 
                                                
84 E III.vi.49: 470.  
 
85 Ibid. 
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        §2.7 Taking Stock and Looking Ahead 
 
 
Thus far my aim has been to show that the First Opinion conceives of real 
essences not as the essences of kinds per se, but as the essences of species as 
distinguished and denominated by us. Just after articulating the First Opinion, Locke 
writes that it “has, I imagine, very much perplexed the Knowledge of natural Things.”86 
Looking ahead, I argue that one of Locke’s primary objections to the First Opinion 
concerns the resulting metaphysical status conferred on these parochial species, which 
status Locke argues is an obstacle to the improvement of our knowledge and 
classification of substances.  
I start with Locke’s observation that those who hold the First Opinion believe 
(falsely) that a species name – the written inscription or its vocalization – “stands for” the 
specifick real essence posited by the view.87 Further, the word itself is thought to have a 
natural signification that “agrees to” that specifick real essence. Given the imputed 
relation between a specifick real essence and a species name, and given that the species 
name is thought to have a natural signification that agrees to the specifick real essence, 
the criteria expressed in a definition are thereby conceived to be certain or infallible 
indication of the presence of a specifick real essence. In fact, speakers take the species 
name itself to stand proxy for a specifick real essence, as if the word could stand in the 
stead of the supposed specifick real essence.88  
                                                
86 E III.iii.17: 418.  
 
87 “It is usual for Men to make the Names of Substances, stand for Things, as supposed to have 
certain real Essences, whereby they are of this or that Species” (E II.xxxi.6: 378).  
 
88 E III.vi.49; c.f. E IV.iv.12.  
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One of Locke’s many complaints against the view is that our species names, 
“being referred to standards that cannot be known,” “their significations can never be 
adjusted and established by those standards.”89 But this is lost on the Aristotelian, for 
whom there is no reason to adjust meanings thought to already agree to specifick real 
essences. By Locke’s lights, the Aristotelian thus invests an unearned confidence in the 
adequacy of our definitions to mind-independent reality. More to the point, she overlooks 
the actual insight we stand to gain by the more prosaic strategy of carefully 
distinguishing things by their sensible qualities, the only strategy that is in fact available 
to us, given that what in fact plays the role of a real essence is unknown: 
[T]hose…who pretend not any insight into the real Essences, nor trouble 
themselves about substantial Forms, but are content with knowing Things one 
from another, by their sensible Qualities, are often better acquainted with their 
Differences; can more nicely distinguish them from their uses; and better know 
what they may expect from each, than those quick-sighted Men, who look so deep 
into them, and talk so confidently of something hidden and essential.90  
 
Those not in the grip the First Opinion – those who “pretend not any insight into the real 
Essences, nor trouble themselves about substantial Forms” – have a distinct advantage 
with respect to knowledge, not to mention the practical benefits that accrue to having 
such knowledge.  
 In the following sections we see that speakers take species names to stand for 
supposed specifick real essences and take those species names to have natural meanings 
that accurately describe those specifick real essences. Locke argues that this use of our 
species names is ‘jargon’. On the basis of these conclusions, I argue that insuperable 
difficulties face the Standard Reading’s suggestion that by “the essence of particular 
                                                
89 E III.ix.12: 482.  
 
90 E III.vi.24: 452.  
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things without giving them any name,” Locke means an explanatory essence of an 
unsorted particular. The primary significance of these findings, however, lies in the light 
they shed on Locke’s claim that the First Opinion stands as an obstacle to the 
improvement of our knowledge and classification of substances.  
 
        §2.8 Species Names taken for the “Representatives” of Specifick Real Essences 
 
                                                                                                                                      
In making their own abstract ideas, speakers arrive at different significations of 
the same kind term. In an effort to correct for this, they suppose a specifick real essence 
common to all members of the kind, which fixes the signification of the name. By 
Locke’s lights, this is no solution to one of the inevitable, that is, natural, “Imperfections 
of Words.”91 It engenders error upon error, not the least of which is an “abuse” of words.  
To start, we run afoul of the fact that names can signify only our complex ideas:  
This supposition, however, that the same precise internal Constitution goes 
always with the same specifick name, makes Men forward to take those names 
for the Representatives of those real Essences, though indeed they signify 
nothing but the complex Ideas they have in their Minds when they use them.92  
 
As Locke hints here, and explains in detail elsewhere, we take the names of substances – 
the very names and sounds93 – to stand for real essences, to be their “representatives”. In 
fact, it is thought that the natural meaning of the word itself is such as to uniquely 
describe a specifick real essence. To show this, Locke invokes a debate about how the 
word “man,” or the greek word “!"#$%&'(”, should be defined:  
                                                
91 ) III.ix.1: 476.  
 
92 ) III.x.20: 502; bold emphasis mine.  
 
93 ) III.xi.20: 519.  
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Thus when we say, that Animale rationale is, and Animale implume bipes latis 
unguibus, is not a good definition of a Man; ‘tis plain, we suppose the name Man 
in this case to stand for the real Essence of a Species, and would signifie, that a 
rational Animal better described that real Essence than a two-leg’d Animal with 
broad Nails, and without Feathers.94  
 
Aristotle’s definition of the word is typically favored over Plato’s. But this dispute over 
definitions presupposes, Locke argues, that the word “man” or “!"#$%&'(” (i) stands for 
or is the representative of a specifick real essence, and (ii) that the word has a natural 
meaning that uniquely and accurately “describes” that specifick real essence. Each party 
to the dispute thus take itself to have a better grip on the natural meaning of the word 
“man,” which natural meaning is thought to better describe the supposed specifick real 
essence of man. Locke continues:  
For else, why might not Plato as properly make the Word !"#$%&'( or Man 
stand for his complex Idea, made up of the Ideas of a Body, distinguished from 
others by a certain shape and other outward appearances, as Aristotle, make the 
complex Idea, to which he gave the Name !"#$%&'( or Man, of Body, and the 
Faculty of reasoning join’d together; unless the Name !"#$%&'( or Man, were 
supposed to stand for something else, than what it signifies; and to be put in the 
place of some other thing, than the Idea a Man professes he would express by 
it?”95  
 
It’s important to recognize that Locke is not arguing that the two definitions are equally 
adequate to mind independent reality – Locke will offer criticisms of both. Rather, Locke 
is arguing that the disagreement over the definition of the word “man” is predicated on 
the assumption that the written word or its vocalization “stands for the real Essence of a 
Species,” and that the word “man” has a natural signification such that Aristotle’s 
definition best describes that specifick real essence.  
                                                
94 ) III.x.17: 500; bold emphasis mine.  
 
95 Ibid.  
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Thus when Locke says that, on the contrary, Plato can “as properly” make the 
word stand for the definition “a two-leg’d Animal with broad Nails, and without 
Feathers” he is rather echoing a point he makes elsewhere, namely, that “words have no 
natural meanings”:96  
[T]he sound Man, in its own Nature, [is] as apt to signifie a complex Idea made 
up of Animality and Rationality, united in the same Subject, as to signify any 
other combination[.]97 
 
However, Locke’s analysis of this practice gives rise to an interpretive difficulty. 
For even Locke claims that, according to one, traditional way of understanding the real 
essences of things, real essences are unknown.98 Why, then, does he attribute to most 
speakers the assumption that our words can be the representatives of unknown real 
essences, and that the definitions we annex to these words uniquely describe those real 
essences? 
Locke writes that there are two “false suppositions” that correspond to the use of 
species names to pick out specifick real essences, the first of which Locke describes here:  
First, That there are certain precise Essences, according to which Nature makes 
all particular Things, and by which they are distinguished into Species. That 
every Thing has a real Constitution, whereby it is what it is, and on which its 
sensible Qualities depend, is past doubt: But I think it has been proved, that this 
makes not the distinction of Species, as we rank them; nor the boundaries of 
their names.99     
 
This should all ring familiar. However, when it comes to the second “false supposition,” 
Locke writes that we tacitly suppose that we have ideas of these specifick real essences:  
                                                
96 Guyer, 119.  
 
97 ! III.xi.20: 519; bold emphasis mine.  
 
98 Locke writes that “[T]he Essences of Things are Thought, by some, (and not without reason,) to 
be wholly unknown” (! III.iii.15: 417).  
 
99 E III.x.21: 502; bold emphasis mine. 
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Secondly, This tacitly also insinuates, as if we had Ideas of these proposed 
Essences. For to what purpose else is it, to enquire whether this or that thing have 
the real Essence of the Species Man, if we did not suppose that there were such a 
specifick Essence known?100 
 
Those who engage in the practice of taking species names to pick out supposed 
specifick real essences would not, on reflection, avow that they have ideas of those real 
essences. But, Locke suggests, the logic of the practice suggests that speakers tacitly 
suppose that they do. How do we otherwise make sense of an argument that one 
definition better describes a specifick real essence? In the next section I argue that, on 
Locke’s view, the use of species names to pick out specifick real essences amounts to 
‘jargon’.  
   
                  §2.9 Names, Specifick Real Essences, and Jargon 
 
 
The First Opinion is implicated in the practice of taking a species name to stand 
for a supposed specifick real essence, a practice originally intended as a means to secure 
common significations for our kind terms.  
That practice creates confusion and uncertainty in our discourse with one another. 
Locke writes, “any Sound that is put to stand for [a specifick real essence], must be very 
uncertain in its application.”101 The word in fact signifies an abstract idea, but it is made 
to stand for, or “put in the place of,” a real essence:  
So that, if I may so say, signifying one thing [an abstract idea], and being 
supposed for, or put in the place of another [a supposed specifick real essence], 
                                                
100 E III.x.21: 502; bold emphasis mine. 
 
101 E III.ix.12: 482.  
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[our species names] cannot but, in such a kind of use, cause a great deal of 
Uncertainty in Men’s Discourses.102 
 
We cannot override the actual signification of a species name, even when we intend to 
make the word stand for a supposed specifick real essence.  
I will argue that this observation helps to clarify Locke’s reasons for describing a 
real essence as the “essence of particular things without giving them any name”.103 The 
description is itself polemical, for the First Opinion could not countenance an 
understanding of real essences as the essences of things without giving them any name. 
And yet, because of that very fact, the notion of a specifick real essence is, I will argue, 
incoherent, or ‘jargon’. 
We have seen one reason why Locke would describe real essences as the essence 
of particular things without giving them any name. The names of substances, if they 
signify anything, signify the abstract idea to which the name is annexed. That would 
suggest that we could not use parochial names to pick out real essences because they 
signify abstract ideas. In fact, Locke will tell us that he himself must remain alert to this 
fact when articulating the Aristotelian position and arguments against it.  
For instance, after concluding that “the supposed real Essences of Things, stand 
not in stead for the distinguishing Substances into Species,” Locke considers a possible 
rebuttal from the Aristotelian. A real essence is, by all accounts, the source of a unique 
set of properties. If we had a grip on that unique set of properties, so the rebuttal goes, we 
                                                
102 Locke adds, “especially in those, who have thoroughly imbibed the Doctrine of substantial 
Forms, whereby they firmly imagine the several Species of Things to be determined and distinguished” (E 
III.x.20: 502).  
 
103 According to the Standard Reading of this description, real essences are the causal-explanatory 
essences of unsorted particulars. I have argued that Locke rather intends that description to distinguish real 
essences from the essences of our parochial kinds. Locke writes, “I have often mentioned a real Essence, 
distinct in Substances, from those abstract Ideas of them” (III.vi.6: 442).  
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would be in a position to know when two things have the same real essence, even if we 
do not know the real essence itself. In that case, we could be said to sort things by their 
real essences.  
But the suggestion is hopeless. As Locke explains, we are not in a position to 
know that we have a complete accounting of every property that flows from an unknown 
real essence, in which case we are not in a position to be certain that the real essence in 
question is in fact present in a given particular:104  
We can never know what are the precise number of Properties depending on the 
real Essence of Gold, any one of which failing, the real Essence of Gold, and 
consequently Gold, would not be there, unless we knew the real Essence of Gold 
it self, and by that determined that Species.105  
 
The real interest of this passage for us, however, lies in the caveat that immediately 
follows:  
By the Word Gold here, I must be understood to design a particular piece of 
Matter; v.g. the last Guinea that was coin’d. For if it should stand here in its 
ordinary Signification for that complex Idea, which I, or any one else calls Gold; 
i.e. for the nominal Essence of Gold, it would be Jargon: so hard is it, to shew 
the various meaning and imperfection of Words, when we have nothing else but 
Words to do it by.106 
 
Here is an instance in which Locke intends to pick out a real essence with a species name, 
but then asserts that he is not using the name with its ordinary signification in mind, i.e., 
the nominal essence or abstract idea to which the name is annexed. He rather “designs” to 
pick out the real essence of an unnamed, arbitrary particular we would ordinarily classify 
as gold, e.g., the last guinea coined. Recall that by real essence Locke means the essence 
                                                
104 “But neither can this be done: for being ignorant of the real Essence it self, it is impossible to 
know all those Properties, that flow from it, and are so annexed to it, that any one of them being away, we 
may certainly conclude, that that Essence is not there, and so the Thing is not of that Species” (III.vi.19: 
449); see also Locke, Works, 4:49.  
 
105 E III.vi.19: 449.  
 
106 Ibid.  
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of particular things without giving them any name. It is precisely that concept of real 
essence that is in force in the passage. This is clear from how Locke communicates his 
intent to make use of the word ‘gold’ to stand for a particular he isolates with a definite 
description, namely, “the last Guinea that was coin’d,” i.e., without giving it any species 
name.  
Notice, also, the implication that there is a sense of real essence that would be in 
force had Locke not stipulated the sense in which he intends the word ‘gold’ to be 
understood in the passage. Locke claims that that use of the term ‘gold’ would be jargon. 
And it is jargon, I will argue, because it makes use of the concept of real essence as 
articulated in the First Opinion. It makes use of the concept of a specifick real essence, 
i.e., a real essence that is “supposed” to be picked out by the species name ‘gold’.  
 Locke argues that there is an insuperable difficulty that faces the attempt at 
leading the mind to the thought of a specifick real essence with a species name. Given 
that the supposed specifick real essence is thought to be an essence of a species as 
distinguished and denominated by us, in order to direct his reader’s mind to a given 
specifick real essence, Locke must make use of that species name. At the same time, 
however, this use of the term must be a use that, in effect, sets aside the ordinary 
signification of the species name, that is, the abstract idea or nominal essence, for the use 
of the term is supposed to suggest to the mind, not the abstract idea, but the specifick real 
essence itself. Locke hints at the difficulty below:  
I desire, it may be considered, how difficult it is, to lead another by Words into 
the Thoughts of Things, stripp’d of those specifical differences we give them: 
Which things, if I name not, I say nothing; and if I do name them, I thereby rank 
them into some sort, or other, and suggest to the Mind the usual abstract Idea of 
that Species; and so cross my purpose.  
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In order to suggest to the mind things as distinguished by the supposed specifick real 
essence itself, Locke must make use of the species name: “which things, if I name not, I 
say nothing.” However, if he does name them, he suggests “to the Mind the usual abstract 
Idea of that Species,” and this undermines his purpose. The point is made explicit when 
Locke takes up an example of this attempt in the case of Man:  
For to talk of a Man, and to lay by, at the same time, the ordinary signification of 
the Name Man, which is our complex Idea, usually annexed to it; and bid the 
Reader consider Man, as he is in himself, and as he is really distinguished from 
others, in his internal Constitution, or real Essence, that is something, he knows 
not what, looks like trifling: and yet thus one must do, who would speak of the 
supposed real Essences and Species of Things, as thought to be made by Nature, if 
it be but only to make it understood, that there is no such thing signified by the 
general Names, which Substances are called by.107  
 
Locke writes that what he is attempting to undertake is to lead his reader to consider a 
substance we rank under the name ‘man’ insofar as that substance is distinguished as a 
man, but so distinguished, not by virtue of its agreement with an abstract idea, but by 
virtue of a supposed specifick real essence. That attempt “looks like trifling,” i.e., it is 
“jargon”. But this is the hurdle the Aristotelian must clear when speaking of the 
“supposed real essences of the Species of Things, as thought to be made by Nature.” 
Locke concludes that there are no such things signified by our species names.  
 
                                  §2.10 Conclusion 
 
 
 According to the Standard Reading, Locke, the anti-realist, squares off against the 
Aristotelian realist. The Aristotelian view, as articulated in the First Opinion, supposes 
real essences to be the essences of objective kinds. Locke’s opposition to the First 
Opinion, and his own preferred description of real essence as the essence of particular 
                                                
107 E III.vi.43: 465-66; bold emphasis mine.  
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things without giving them any name, go far in suggesting that real essences are not the 
essences of objective kinds, but are rather to be understood as the totality of the 
microstructural features of an unsorted particular that explains the totality of its sensible 
qualities. Locke, the anti-realist, does not countenance kinds apart from those that are the 
workmanship of the understanding.  
 In this chapter I have argued that Locke is more convincingly read as opposing 
the thesis that the essences of our parochial kinds are real essences. At the same time, 
Locke’s description of real essence as the essence of particular things without giving 
them any name is intended to distinguish his own preferred understanding of real essence 
from the notion of a specifick real essence, a notion that is constitutively tied to species 
names, and incoherent as a result.  
 In addition, my reading provides an explanation for why the Aristotelian (and 
vulgar) conception of real essence has “very much perplexed the Knowledge of natural 
things.” Speakers, in order to secure inter-subjective agreement about the significations 
of general terms, have supposed a real essence common to particulars they classify 
according to names and the species concepts (general ideas) to which they are annexed. 
Such supposed real essences are then mistakenly presumed to be that “whereby” things 
belong to the kinds set out in those general ideas, and are thus conceived to be “specifick 
real essences”. Further, speakers take species names to stand for these supposed specifick 
real essences, and these words are taken to have natural significations that accurately 
describe those real essences. In that case, the Aristotelian believes that a sorting of 
particulars according to our species concepts just is a sorting according to real essences. 
Our work in classification is in large part finished on such a conception.  
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While the alternative reading I have proposed removes some familiar obstacles to 
a realist reading of Locke – where such a reading countenances real essences as the 
essences of objective kinds – it may appear that it does not remove all of them. Against 
the First (Aristotelian) Opinion, Locke cites cases of monsters, changelings and other 
strange issues of humane birth, not to mention bizarre cases of interspecies breeding, as 
“not possible to consist with this Hypothesis”.108 These cases appear to suggest that 
nature is far too unruly to support the thesis that there are natural kinds.  
 Locke, however, cautions his reader more than once against such a reading:  
I would not here be thought to forget, much less to deny, that Nature in the 
Production of Things, makes several of them alike: there is nothing more obvious, 
especially in the Races of Animals, and all Things propagated by Seed.109  
 
And in the passage below Locke goes so far as to suggest that it is probable that nature 
makes many particular things that agree with one another in their real essences:  
Nature makes many particular Things, which do agree one with another, in many 
sensible Qualities, and probably too, in their internal frame and Constitution: but 
‘tis not this real Essence that distinguishes them into Species[.]110 
 
This raises an interpretive question over how we ought to read the significance of 
Locke’s examples of monsters, changelings, and hybrid species. On the Standard 
Reading, these examples reveal that deviant cases are sufficient in Locke’s mind to defeat 
realism about kinds.  
  The interpretation I offer here suggests that these examples reveal a different 
lesson. At issue for Locke is not the apparent deviancy of the examples, but rather the 
                                                
108 E III.iii.17: 418.  
 
109 E III.iii.13: 415.  
 
110 E III.vi.36: 462; bold emphasis mine.  
 
 62 
verdicts speakers in the grip of the First Opinion are inclined to issue in the face of such 
examples. It is notable that with regard to the two examples of deviant cases that receive 
the most discussion, Locke argues for an adjustment in our initial verdict about whether 
the thing in fact belongs to the parochial species in question, and sometimes he argues for 
this adjustment by arguing for an adjustment in how we define that parochial species.  
In the first case, Locke considers the Abbot Malotru, whose disfigurement at birth 
was so dramatic that it was doubted whether he was human.111 Locke argues that if 
possession of the faculty of reason had been weighted properly in deliberations about 
whether the infant was really human, the question would have been postponed as one that 
could be answered only once the infant reached the age of reason, at which point, as we 
now know, there would have been no doubt as to the Abbot’s humanity. In the second 
case, Locke argues that Changelings – creatures that do not possess reason, but have our 
outward appearance and so are deemed to be human – should not in fact be classified as 
human (because they have no reason) but rather belong to a species “between man and 
beast”.112  
The point of these examples is not to draw attention to their deviancy as a 
refutation of the objectivity of kinds. Rather Locke’s point is that speakers are mistaken 
in their initial verdicts about the thing’s membership, or non-membership, in a kind, as 
the case may be. And to Locke’s mind, these errors, and how they are to be corrected, 
would otherwise be apparent to us were we not in the grip of the First Opinion, according 
to which we already have the right species concepts since, ex hypothesi, our species 
                                                
111 E III.vi.26: 453-454.  
 
112 E IV.iv.13: 569.  
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names stand for specifick real essences and our definitions accurately describe them. I 
close with Locke’s remarks cautioning against such an assumption:   
I think we cannot be too cautious, that Words and Species, in the ordinary Notions 
which we have been used to of them, impose not on us. For I am apt to think, 
therein lies one great obstacle to our clear and distinct Knowledge, especially in 
reference to Substances[.]113 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
113 ! IV.iv.17: 573.  
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                  Chapter III  
 
              Method and Metaphysics in Locke’s Essay 
 
             §3.1 Introduction 
 
 
In the previous chapter, I argued that species as distinguished and denominated by 
us are not, on Locke’s view, kinds made by nature. I also argued that such a denial falls 
short of a denial that there are objective kinds apart from those picked out by our 
parochial kind terms. My reading thus departs significantly from the Standard Reading, 
according to which there are no natural kinds.  
One of the Standard Reading’s mistakes is that it does not take sufficient care in 
identifying the significance of Locke’s argument against the Aristotelian. The 
Aristotelian conflates kinds made by us with kinds made by nature. The Standard 
Reading mistakes Locke’s argument against that conflation for an argument against the 
very possibility of natural kinds. And the confusion arises, I argue, because the Standard 
Reading neglects Locke’s very particular use of the term “species” to pick out parochial 
kinds.  
There are, however, other powerful considerations in favor of the Standard 
Reading. In chapters to come, I refute the two remaining primary reasons why the 
Standard Reading has enjoyed such broad appeal. These reasons have to do with Locke’s 
account of how our kind terms acquire a general signification as well as his guarded 
commitment to corpuscularian mechanism as a theory of the nature of material 
substances. In this chapter, however, I take a step back from what might be called a first- 
order metaphysical question about the existence of objective kinds and survey Locke’s 
method in the Essay. My aim in doing so is to sketch and defend a broader picture of 
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Locke’s overall stance towards metaphysics in that work and thereby gain some clarity 
on Locke’s position on natural kinds.  
Another reason for turning to questions of method in the Essay concerns the status 
of the Standard Reading itself. For there is a tension between the Standard Reading and 
one of the leading, influential accounts of Locke’s methodological aims in the Essay, an 
account that receives clear support in the texts. According to the latter, Locke’s project in 
the Essay was not primarily a metaphysical one but rather that of providing an account of 
what ideas we have, how we acquire them from sensation and reflection, and what 
knowledge claims we may justifiably assert on their basis. As a result of these 
methodological constraints, Locke not only charts the reach of “humane understanding” 
within fairly narrow limits, Locke abstains from making metaphysical pronouncements 
beyond those limits. On this story, Locke is held to champion a modest or abstemious 
approach to metaphysical inquiry.  
One can see right away that such an account does not sit well with the Standard 
Reading, for the latter attributes a robust metaphysical position to Locke, one that denies 
the existence and possibility of natural kinds. According to the Standard Reading, Locke 
holds that all that exists are particulars, these particulars more or less objectively 
resemble one another, but the sorting of them into kinds is determined solely by criteria 
freely chosen by individual speakers. On this story, things have no essential natures per 
se, a property is essential to a thing only on some description of it, and classification is 
subject only to pragmatic constraints. In short, Locke takes an anti-essentialist, 
conceptualist approach to natural kinds – one that, incidentally, enjoys broad appeal to 
this day.  
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Table-thumping Metaphysician or Modest Under-Labourer to the Sciences? In 
this chapter I argue that Locke has more subtle positions that do not fall neatly under 
these common portrayals. In some instances Locke dismisses a metaphysical view for its 
sheer unintelligibility, i.e., as an “abuse of words” (incidentally, the chief ground on 
which Locke rejects the Aristotelian account of kinds and classification), in others he 
recommends agnosticism, and in others yet he endorses a position as our best going 
hypothesis.  
The best model for understanding Locke’s approach to natural kinds, I argue, is to 
be found in his treatment of morality. Though Locke indeed assumed the existence of a 
divinely decreed and therefore objective moral law, Locke’s own stated task in the Essay 
was not to argue for its truth nor demonstrate its consequences, but rather to give an 
account of how we form our ideas of ethical kinds whether or not we do so by correctly 
apprehending the moral law. Thus in Locke’s scathing reply to James Tyrrell, who gently 
chided Locke for inviting confusion about his stance on divine law in the Essay, Locke 
writes that it was “besides my purpose and against all rules of method” to “run out into a 
discourse of the divine law” and “shew how and when it was promulgated to mankinde” 
and to “demonstrate its inforcement by rewards and punishments in another life” in “a 
place where I had nothing to do with all this[.]”114  
In similar fashion, I argue, Locke aimed to provide an account of how we in fact 
form our ideas of substantial kinds in light of our ignorance of the real essences of 
material bodies. Nevertheless, like the moral case, there are good reasons for thinking 
that Locke himself believed in God-given objective kinds grounded in unknown real 
essences apart from kinds embodied in our ideas of parochial kinds, which ideas receive 
                                                
114 Locke to Tyrrell, August 4, 1690.  
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the lion’s share of Locke’s attention in the Essay. What my account shows, however, is 
that certain constraints – among them methodological – preclude Locke from explicitly 
arguing in favor of that commitment, not the least of which is that it would have been 
beside his purpose and against all rules of method to do so in the Essay.  
 
           §3.2 Origins of Locke’s Essay and “The Historical Plain Method”  
 
 
 As Locke reports in his Epistle to readers of the Essay, the origins of that work 
grew out of a discussion among friends on a topic that had nothing to do with the Essay’s 
declared topic, namely, the determination of the nature, scope and limits of human 
understanding. The discussion led to their agreement that such a project was a necessary 
first step towards gaining clarity on their original question:  
Were it fit to trouble thee with the History of this Essay, I should tell thee that five 
or six Friends meeting at my Chamber, and discoursing on a subject very remote 
from this, found themselves quickly at a stand, by the Difficulties that rose on 
every side. After we had a while puzzled our selves, without coming any nearer a 
Resolution of those Doubts which perplexed us, it came into my Thoughts, that we 
took a wrong course; and that, before we set our selves upon Enquiries of that 
Nature, it was necessary to examine our own Abilities, and see, what Objects our 
Understandings were, or were not fitted to deal with. This I proposed to the 
Company, who all readily assented; and thereupon it was agreed, that this should 
be our First Enquiry.115 
 
James Tyrrell was among that group of friends, and, according to a marginal note made 
in his copy of the Essay, their discussion on that occasion “began about the principles of 
morality and reveal’d religion.”116 Von Leyden ventures that “the discussion among 
Locke’s friends was at first about the law of nature as the basis of morality and its 
                                                
115 ‘Epistle to the Reader’, E, 7.  
 
  116 Wolfgang Von Leyden, John Locke, Essays on the Law of Nature (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1954), 60. 
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relation to natural and revealed religion.”117 However, there could be no satisfactory 
progress on that topic, the group decided, until it was determined what “Objects our 
Understandings were, or were not fitted to deal with.”  
 This is the earliest announcement of what is sometimes easy to lose sight of as we 
progress deeper into the Essay, namely, that Locke’s primary, and, as some convincingly 
argue, sole objective in that work was to provide what Ed McCann describes as “a natural 
history of the human understanding”118 by way of, in Locke’s own words, the “Historical, 
plain Method”. Locke describes that method as in the first instance an enquiry into “the 
Original of those Ideas…which a Man observes, and is conscious to himself he has in his 
Mind” and “the ways whereby the Understanding comes to be furnished with them.”119 
Once a full accounting of our ideas and their sources in sensation and reflection is made, 
Locke goes on to assess what we can be said to know with certainty on their basis, and, 
finally, the grounds of faith and opinion.  
Of interest is the fact that Locke is bound by the project’s normative implications 
in which he sees the project’s primary value:  
If by this Enquiry into the Nature of the Understanding, I can discover the Powers 
thereof; how far they reach; to what things they are in any Degree proportionate; 
and where they fail us, I suppose it may be of use, to prevail with the busy Mind 
of Man, to be more cautious in meddling with things exceeding its 
Comprehension; to stop, when it is at the utmost Extent of its Tether; and to sit 
down in a quiet Ignorance of those Things, which, upon Examination, are to be 
found beyond the reach of our Capacities.120  
                                                
117 Von Leyden, 60.  
 
118 Ed McCann, “Locke’s Distinction between Primary Primary Qualities and Secondary Primary 
Qualities,” in Primary and Secondary Qualities, The Historical and Ongoing Debate, ed. Lawrence Nolan 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 188.  
 
119 E I.i.3: 44-43.  
 
120 Ibid.  
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Some take away lessons, as Locke suggests, are that we should not “perplex our selves 
and others with Disputes about Things, to which our Understandings are not suited,” nor 
“concern ourselves with things” of which we do not have “clear or distinct Perceptions,” 
or, worse yet, things “whereof we have not any Notions at all.”121 
 We can get a better grip on the vision of Locke’s project by identifying the sorts 
of enquiries and speculations he thinks will be disbarred, and here it is worth noting 
Locke’s charmingly modest description of the value of the project of the Essay. After 
mentioning such towering giants in the sciences as Boyle, Sydenham, and “the 
incomparable Mr. Newton,” Locke confides that it is “ambition enough” to be “employed 
as an Under-Labourer in clearing the Ground a little” and “removing some of the Rubbish 
that lies in the way to Knowledge.”122 But what, exactly, does the ground clearing 
amount to? To put it crudely, what counts as rubbish, and on what basis is it to be pushed 
aside?  
It might come as some surprise that by Locke’s own account the main obstacle to 
advances in knowledge is the introduction of unintelligible terms. Immediately after his 
famous under-labourer remarks, Locke writes that knowledge would  
certainly had been very much more advanced in the world, if the endeavours of 
ingenious and industrious men had not been much cumbered with the learned but 
frivolous use of uncouth, affected, or unintelligible terms, introduced into the 
sciences[.]123 
                                                
121 E I.i.3: 44-43. 
 
122 ‘Epistle to the Reader’, E, 9-10.  
 
123 Ibid. Locke goes on to write that “Vague and insignificant Forms of Speech, and Abuse of 
Language, have so long passed for Mysteries of Science; And hard and misapplied Words, with little or no 
meaning, have, by Prescription, such a Right to be mistaken for deep Learning, and height of Speculation, 
that it will not be easy to persuade, either those who speak, or those who hear them, that they are but the 
Covers of Ignorance, and hindrance of true Knowledge” (‘Epistle to the Reader’, E, 10).  
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Locke concludes that despite the modesty of his project, it is “some service to human 
understanding” “[t]o break in upon the sanctuary of vanity and ignorance,” which 
shrouds itself in affected and unintelligible forms of speech.  
 To see how such a project might achieve the modest results Locke envisions we 
need look no farther than his critique of the Aristotelian account of species. By way of an 
account of what we can possibly mean by our kind terms – ideas in the mind acquired 
from sensation – Locke is in a position to show not only that we cannot mean real 
essences, but that such a use of general terms is jargon (as we saw in Chapter II). Thereby 
a certain metaphysical picture of real essence is disqualified. But note that the 
metaphysical implications do not extend beyond the reach of what can be said about our 
ideas. For the question Locke asks is: which kinds do our kind terms, and the ideas to 
which they are annexed, put us in touch with? Certainly not kinds as set out by real 
essences, or kinds made by nature, for our ideas of kinds, and thus their essences, are the 
workmanship of the understanding. It is thus no accident that Locke concludes the 
paragraph in which we find his Under-Labourer remarks with a sheepish admission of 
Book III’s comparatively lengthy discussion of various abuses of words, one important 
entry on which is the view of species and real essence held by the Aristotelian and the 
vulgar.124 
While Locke is thus in a position to engage in metaphysical disputes, any negative 
assessments are sheerly diagnostic in nature: Given the ideas we do have, what sorts of 
                                                
124 “I hope I shall be pardoned, if I have in the third book dwelt long on this subject, and 
endeavoured to make it so plain, that neither the inveterateness of the mischief, nor the prevalency of the 
fashion, shall be any excuse for those, who will not take care about the meaning of their own words, and 
will not suffer the significancy of their expressions to be enquired into” (‘Epistle to the Reader’, E, 9-10).  
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metaphysical confusions do we go in for with respect to those ideas? Of course, these 
confusions are ultimately confusions about the world and not our ideas. But the reasons 
Locke marshals against them advert not to claims about what the world must in fact be 
like but to what can justifiably be asserted on the basis of ideas we can be said to have, 
and, by extension, what limited claims we might legitimately make about the world on 
the basis of that stock of ideas.  
Returning to the case of real essences, this means that while we are in a position 
to assert a conclusion about what real essences are not like – they are not the essences of 
parochial kinds, and they are not substantial forms125 – it is still the case that such an 
assessment is made from a standpoint circumscribed by our stock of ideas. The 
implication is that if Locke were, at heart, an anti-realist, then at least within the confines 
of the Essay, he would not be in much of a position to confront a realist who is in 
agreement with his critique of the Aristotelian.126 By the same token, however, Locke 
would be in no position to vigorously defend realism. As to whether these 
methodological constraints promise disappointingly modest results, Locke writes:  
[T]he taking away false Foundations, is not to the prejudice, but advantage of 
Truth; which is never injur’d or endanger’d so much, as when mixed with, or built 
on, Falshood.127  
 
                                                
125 “If any one will say, that the real Essence, and internal Constitution, on which these Properties 
depend, is not the Figure, Size, and Arrangement or Connexion of its solid Parts, but something else, call’d 
its particular form; I am farther from having any Idea of its real Essence, than I was before […] [W]hen I 
am told, that something besides Figure, Size, and Posture of the solid Parts of that Body, is its Essence, 
something called substantial form, of that, I confess, I have no Idea at all, but only of the sound Form; 
which is far enough from an Idea of its real Essence, or Constitution” (E II.xxxi.6: 380).  
 
126 Of course, my claim assumes that Locke’s frequent appeal to monsters, changelings and inter-
species breeding is not itself a threat to natural kinds, a claim for which I argued in the previous chapter.  
 
127 ‘Epistle to the Reader’, E, 10.  
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It is also noteworthy that Locke sets aside whole lines of enquiry by appeal to the 
methodological constraints that are announced in the first pages of the Essay.128 In a 
passage that seems aimed at Cartesians and Hobbesians alike, Locke warns his reader that  
I shall not at present meddle with the Physical Consideration of the Mind; or 
trouble my self to examine, wherein its Essence consists, or by what Motions of 
our Spirits, or Alterations of our Bodies, we come to have any Sensation by our 
Organs, or any Ideas in our Understandings; and whether those Ideas do in their 
Formation, any, or all of them, depend on Matter, or no. These are Speculations, 
which, however curious and entertaining, I shall decline, as lying out of my Way, 
in the Design I am now upon.129  
 
The bright line hinted at in the passage, and to which Locke returns frequently, is that 
between ideas as they are “in the understanding” and “things existing without us”.130 This 
shows up in Locke’s account of ideas from privative causes as well as in his explanations 
as to why the names of simple ideas are not definable.131  
What starts to emerge is the classic picture of Locke as modest in his metaphysics 
by reason of the methodological vision set out in the Epistle. In the next section I turn to 
consider Locke’s treatment of the primary-secondary quality distinction. According to Ed 
McCann’s recent reading, and contrary to how Locke’s discussion of that distinction is 
                                                
128 Although as we will see in the case of primary and secondary qualities, Locke does not always 
remain within the boundaries of those constraints.  
 
129 ! I.i.2: 43-44.  
 
130 Sometimes with infelicitous results, as we will see in Locke’s discussion of the primary-
secondary quality distinction.  
 
131 “[T]he Idea of Heat and Cold, Light and Darkness, White and Black, Motion and Rest, are 
equally clear and positive Ideas in the Mind; though, perhaps, some of the causes which produce them, are 
barely privations in those Subjects, from whence our Senses derive those Ideas. These the Understanding, 
in its view of them, considers all as distinct positive Ideas, without taking notice of the Causes that produce 
them: which is an enquiry not belonging to the Ideas, as it is in the Understanding; but to the nature of the 
things existing without us. These are two very different things, and carefully to be distinguished; it 
being one thing to perceive, and know the Idea of White or Black, and quite another to examine what 
kind of particles they must be, and how ranged in the Superficies, to make any Object appear White 
or Black” (E II.viii.2: 132); bold emphasis mine. For Locke’s discussion of the indefinability of simple 
ideas, see E !II.iv.7-11.  
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ordinarily read, Locke does not attempt to promulgate a metaphysical or ontological 
thesis about the true nature of body, while the account as a whole packs less of a 
justificatory punch for the superiority of mechanism over the rival Aristotelian account 
than commentators have ordinarily assumed. McCann’s reading provides a case study of 
the modesty with which Locke approaches metaphysics, while raising some questions 
pertinent to the reading I defend here.   
 
         §3.3 Case Study: Primary and Secondary Qualities 
 
 
While Locke is certainly not the only philosopher to take up primary and 
secondary qualities, his account is one of the more famous entries in the history of 
philosophical discussion of that distinction. Until recently, it has been a cornerstone of 
Locke interpretation that the corpuscularian hypothesis – what is sometimes referred to as 
“mechanism” – plays a critical role in Locke’s account, its truth either a conclusion of 
Locke’s arguments for the distinction or their presupposition.  
What has puzzled recent commentators like Lisa Downing and Ed McCann, 
however, is that such a reading does not sit well with the modesty with which Locke 
characterizes the project of the Essay.132 For mechanism is itself a metaphysical position 
regarding the nature of bodies or material substances, one self-consciously promulgated 
by its adherents as a challenge to the intelligibility of scholastic, Aristotelian 
hylomorphism and its attendant real qualities. In this section I canvass McCann’s 
                                                
132 Lisa Downing, “The Status of Mechanism in Locke’s Essay,” The Philosophical Review 107, 
no. 3 (July 1998): 381-414; Downing, “Locke’s Ontology,” in The Cambridge Companion to Locke’s 
‘Essay Concerning Human Understanding’, edited by Lex Newman (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007) 352-380; Ed McCann, “How Locke didn’t argue for the primary/secondary quality 
distinction,” Locke Workshop, University of Saint Andrews, June 29th, 2012. 
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argument that we should dramatically dial back on prior assessments of the metaphysical 
significance of Locke’s account of the distinction between primary and secondary 
qualities.  
One of McCann’s objectives is to show that Locke’s account is not so much an 
argument for the distinction between primary and secondary qualities133 as a leveraging 
of our commonsense notion of body against a widespread prejudice about bodies and 
their qualities, a prejudice that also has its origin in common sense; namely, the prejudice 
that our ideas of colors, tastes, odors, sounds and tactile sensations resemble their causes 
in bodies. According to the prejudice, our sensations of secondary qualities represent 
those qualities as they are in bodies veridically.134 Locke argues that since we are in no 
position to compare our ideas of colors, tastes, and odors with their causes in bodies, it is 
natural for us to make the error.135 And as McCann points out, the fact that the error has 
its origin in common sense enshrines the Aristotelian account of real qualities – 
according to which our ideas of secondary qualities literally resemble those qualities as 
they are in bodies – with a natural plausibility.  
McCann argues that the way that Locke arrives at the rival account, according to 
which the nature of body is exhausted by what are referred to as primary qualities – 
shape, size, motion and solidity – is not by appeal to the truth or superior intelligibility of 
                                                
133 McCann, “Locke’s Distinction,” 169. 
 
134 Locke argues that all our simple ideas are real, adequate and true. This is because the criterion 
for their truth is that they are signs of powers in bodies to produce such ideas in us, even if some of our 
simple ideas – our ideas of secondary and tertiary qualities – do not resemble their causes.  
 
135 E II.viii.24-25, pp. 141-142.  
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the corpuscularian hypothesis as ordinarily thought,136 but by a like appeal to our 
commonsense notion of body, which in turn informs our commonsense notion of how 
bodies operate to cause sensations in us.137 The thought is that when we deploy our 
commonsense notion of how bodies are capable of impinging on us and thus produce 
sensations of primary qualities in us – which qualities form part of our starting 
commonsense conception of body – we recognize that such an account must hold equally 
of the causal origin of our sensations of so-called secondary qualities, in which case these 
sensations cannot be said to veridically represent their causes in bodies.138  
One might think that on such a reading there is at best a stalemate between the 
Lockean and Aristotelian accounts, grounded as both are in our commonsense notion of 
body.139 McCann shows why Locke’s account nevertheless has the upper hand:  
                                                
136 [T]he corpusucularian hypothesis…is not presupposed as an argumentative premise for 
drawing the primary-secondary quality distinction. More exactly, Locke’s argument for the distinction does 
not assume or rest on a claim that corpuscularian mechanism is the true natural philosophy (as opposed to 
its Aristotelian, Spagyritic, or Cartesian competitors), or that it is the one best explanation of the nature and 
operation of bodies, and particularly of their qualities and powers, or any other variant of the claim that 
corpuscularianism is on scientific grounds superior to any alternative hypothesis” (McCann “Locke’s 
Distinction,” 179).  
 
137 McCann writes “[Locke] finds that [the Scholastic doctrine of real qualities] originates in the 
commonsense prejudice that the ideas of sensible qualities are, all of them, resemblances of something 
really existing in the object itself, the technical Scholastic theory of perception being a sort of metaphysical 
overlay on this commonsense attitude. This is one of the main motivations for drawing the primary-
secondary quality distinction, namely, to undermine, or at least challenge, the commonsense view that the 
ideas of sensible qualities are, in general, resemblances of qualities actually in the object, and thus 
undermine the Scholastic theory built out of this prejudice. The key point to keep in mind is that it is 
commonsense that provides the tools for undoing the prejudice, namely the commonsense 
understanding of the notion of body and the causality of body. Hence one piece of common sense has 
to give way to another” (McCann, “Locke’s Distinction,” 177; bold emphasis mine).  
 
138 Locke describes all of our simple ideas as ‘real’, ‘adequate’ and ‘true’; while not all of our 
simple ideas resemble their causes in bodies, they are nonetheless signs of the presence of their causes in 
bodies.  
 
139 “[T]he sole basis for drawing the primary-secondary quality distinction is the commonsense 
idea of what body is, together with the commonsense view about the causality of bodies, with nothing 
concerning the alleged truth or scientific superiority of corpuscularianism entering into the argument” 
(McCann “Locke’s Distinction,” 179).  
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[Locke’s] basic claim that we cannot make sense of the causal story [the 
Aristotelian theory of real qualities] has to tell, on which bodies act not by 
impulse or contact action but in entirely nonmechanical ways, and the claim that 
we can, at least in broad terms, understand the causality of bodies 
mechanistically, does succeed in casting a good bit of doubt on the Scholastic 
theory.140 
 
On the other hand, as McCann explains, despite the superiority of the Lockean account 
with respect to commonsense, its metaphysical implications are nevertheless weak.141 
McCann writes:  
[Locke’s account] does not amount to a decisive refutation of the [Aristotelian] 
theory [of real qualities]. Even though we can’t make sense of it, Locke hasn’t 
established that it, or something like it, couldn’t be the truth of the matter, that is, 
that something functionally similar to species could be transmitted to our senses 
via some non-mechanical causal mechanism and be the cause of sensation.142 
 
As a metaphysics of body, we can be as confident in the truth of Locke’s account of the 
primary-secondary distinction as we are in the truth of the commonsense notion of body 
by which we arrive at that distinction. McCann’s point, however, is that Locke’s account 
of the distinction was never really intended as such, that is, as the true metaphysics of 
body. McCann observes that while the corpuscularian hypothesis “hits off common sense 
very well,”   
This doesn’t carry much, if any, justificatory force in favor of corpuscularianism 
and/or against Aristotelianism, but that’s not important in the context of the 
                                                
140 McCann, “Locke’s Distinction,” 187.  
 
141 In part this is because corpuscularian mechanism, as Locke himself takes pains to point out, is 
itself plagued with conceptual difficulties, e.g., its inability to account for cohesion and the transmission of 
motion.  
 
142 McCann continues, “Even though, as I think Locke has established, the corpuscularian theory, 
with its distinction between primary and secondary qualities, fits better with our pre-theoretic conception of 
body and its ways of causing things to happen, and even if, as he’s also established, it provides a generally 
intelligible account of sense perception, there remain all the deep obscurities and conceptual puzzles at the 
heart of mechanism. So while this edge that the corpusucularian theory has over the Scholastic theory may 
give us some reason to prefer the former over the latter, we have not been given reason to decisively reject 
the latter, nor any very strong justification for accepting the former” (McCann, “Locke’s Distinction,” 187).  
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project of giving a natural history of the human understanding, which is, after all, 
what Locke is mainly about.143 
 
For all its apparent metaphysical significance, when we situate Locke’s primary-
secondary quality distinction within the aims of the larger project of the Essay we find 
that it was likely never intended to have that significance.  
 One of the interesting yet counterintuitive features of McCann’s account is that it 
would have Locke admit that even if commonsense favors his own account, something 
like the Aristotelian account of real qualities could be correct. Can something similar be 
said of the rival Aristotelian account of species and real essences? It is interesting to note 
that Locke does admit the possibility of the truth of the Aristotelian account of species. In 
the passage below, Locke explains why it seems so implausible to think that the 
boundaries we find in our abstract ideas – boundaries that often differ person to person – 
cannot possibly be boundaries made by nature, if, Locke then observes, there are any 
“such prefixed Bounds”:  
[T]hough the nominal Essences of Substances, are all supposed to be copied from 
Nature; yet they are all, or most of them, very imperfect. Since the Composition 
of those complex Ideas, are, in several Men, very different: and therefore, that 
these Boundaries of Species, are as Men, and not as Nature makes them, if at 
least there are in Nature any such prefixed Bounds.144  
 
One might read Locke to be entertaining the bare possibility of any prefixed bounds in 
nature – certainly no admission of the truth of the Aristotelian view. However, in remarks 
that follow, Locke clearly entertains the possibility that the Aristotelian thesis is true, that 
“Nature sets the Boundaries of the Species of Things,” although with one qualification, 
                                                
143 McCann, “Locke’s Distinction,” 188. Thus McCann writes “Locke can’t claim to have justified 
any weighty ontological assertions about qualities, and…he can’t claim to have definitely refuted the rival 
Aristotelian theory of real qualities” (187).  
 
144 E III.vi.30: 457-58; bold emphasis mine.  
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namely, that the boundaries we find in our abstract ideas do not “exactly” conform to 
those real species, i.e., species made by nature. Locke writes,  
‘Tis true, that many particular Substances are so made by Nature, that they have 
an agreement or likeness one with another, and so afford a Foundation of being 
ranked into sorts. But the sorting of Things by us, or the making of determinate 
Species, being in order to naming and comprehending under general terms, I 
cannot see how it can be properly said, that Nature sets the Boundaries of the 
Species of Things: Or if it be so, our Boundaries of Species, are not exactly 
conformable to those in Nature.145 
 
What is striking about Locke’s admission is the fact that it shows Locke’s skepticism to 
be directed not at the bare thesis of prefixed boundaries in nature, but rather at the thesis 
that the boundaries of prefixed kinds correspond to the boundaries we find in our abstract 
ideas. However, it is still possible that the boundaries we find in our abstract ideas 
correspond to fixed species in nature, there just couldn’t be an exact correspondence 
between them. Of course, this is no declaration on Locke’s part that there are prefixed 
boundaries in nature. On the other hand, it does not show that Locke was skeptical that 
there are prefixed boundaries in nature. Nor do these passages show that Locke was 
agnostic on that question.  
 There seems to be some evidence, then, that my reading of Locke on kinds and 
classification finds support in McCann’s gloss on Locke’s treatment of the primary-
secondary quality distinction, according to which Locke provides no decisive rival to the 
Aristotelian account of real qualities, nor was Locke’s account intended to provide the 
true metaphysics of body. However, I argue in the next section that the best model for 
understanding Locke’s attitude towards kinds and classification is to be found in Locke’s 
responses to critics of his treatment of morality in the Essay.  
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                                 §3.4 Divine Law and the Objectivity of Morality 
 
 
In his Epistle, Locke explains that the Essay was prompted by a discussion of a 
topic ‘very remote’ from an exploration of the limits of human understanding. As Von 
Leyden documents, however, many parts of Locke’s early, unpublished Essays on the 
Law of Nature show up in the first two drafts of the Essay and are preserved in the fourth 
edition, which forms the basis of the text most commonly read now.146 Von Leyden goes 
so far as to suggest that “we are justified in regarding the [Essays on the Law of Nature] 
as being in some sense the earlier draft of the Essay.”147 
It is worth noting how Locke opens the first of the Essays on the Law of Nature. 
Reasoning that “there is nothing so unstable, so uncertain in the this whole constitution of 
things as not to admit of valid and fixed laws of operation appropriate to its nature,” 
Locke suggests that it is reasonable to ask “whether man alone has come into the world 
altogether exempt from any law applicable to himself, without a plan, rule, or any pattern 
of his life.”148 That is, it seems reasonable to suppose that we are morally bound by a 
divinely decreed moral law.  
                                                
146 Von Leyden, passim.  
 
147 Von Leyden, 62. 
 
148 “[It being granted that] some divine being presides over the world…He who has set bounds 
even to the wild sea and prescribed to every kind of plants the manner and periods of germination and 
growth; it is in obedience to His will that all living beings have their own laws of birth and life; and there is 
nothing so unstable, so uncertain in this whole constitution of things as not to admit of valid and fixed laws 
of operation appropriate to its nature – it seems just therefore to inquire whether man alone has come into 
the world altogether exempt from any law applicable to himself, without a plan, rule, or any pattern of his 
life. No one will easily believe this, who has reflected upon Almighty God, or the unvarying consensus of 
the whole of mankind at every time and in every place, or even upon himself or his conscience” (Essays on 
the Law of Nature; Essay 1:109).  
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Incidentally, the passage is one amongst many in the Essays on the Law of Nature 
that suggest a theological basis for something like prefixed or objective kinds – Locke 
argues that there is nothing in the world that does not admit of fixed laws of operation 
appropriate to its nature. There are faint resemblances between these passages and 
passages in the Essay.149 On the whole, however, the Essays on the Law of Nature afford 
a much more secure foundation for a theological account of natural, or objective kinds.  
The same can be said of Locke’s account of the law of nature itself, or the 
divinely decreed moral law. Von Leyden notes that “much of the epistemological theory” 
of the Essays on the Law of Nature gets reproduced in the first two drafts of the Essay, 
“which in turn contain their germ of his final doctrine concerning human understanding.” 
However, “[a]s to Locke’s early doctrine of natural law,” “most of its metaphysical and 
theological aspects are lost sight of by him during the year 1671.”150 This omission was 
grounds for some insistent pestering from Locke’s friend James Tyrrell after the Essay’s 
publication. Familiar with the fact that Locke was hanging on to the unpublished Essays 
on the Law of Nature, Tyrrell writes in a letter dated 27 July 1690:  
I could wish you would publish your owne thoughts upon this excellent; and 
material subject; since I know you have made long since a Treatise or Lectures 
upon the Law of nature which I could wish you would revise, and make publick, 
since I know none more able, then your self to doe it: and I have heard you say 
more then once that you intended it[.]151 
 
Tyrrell urges Locke to revise and publish his early Essays on the Law of Nature in part to 
settle some questions he was fielding from friends who had read the recently published 
                                                
149 As I will argue in Chapters VI, VII, and VIII.  
 
150 Von Leyden, 65. 
 
151 James Tyrrell to Locke, 27 July 1690.  
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Essay. One source of confusion was what Locke meant by the phrase “divine law” in 
certain passages of the Essay.152 Tyrrell’s friends objected that Locke could only mean 
revealed law, that is, the Mosaical, or Evangelical law, otherwise, Tyrrell reports, Locke 
would be vulnerable to certain objections. For instance, how do we come to know this 
law if not by way of Scripture? If not by Scripture, Tyrrell notes, “it is likewise much 
doubted by some whether the Rewards and punishments you mention can be 
demonstrated as established by your divine Law, which I am satisfyed is the same with 
that which others call the Law of nature.” 
 Locke’s reply is dated 4 August 1690. The first thing to bear in mind is Locke’s 
statement that he does affirm a divinely decreed law of nature apart from revealed law in 
the Essay:  
[I]t is as plain as any thing can well be – L.1. c 3. §13, where it was proper from 
me to speake my opinion of the Law of nature, I affirme in as direct words as can 
ordinarily be made use of to Expresse ones thoughts that there is a Law of Nature 
Knowable by the light of nature[.]153 
 
The passage in the Essay to which Locke refers above occurs in the chapter in which 
Locke denies that there are innate practical principles. Locke writes:  
I would not be here mistaken, as if, because I deny an innate Law, I thought there 
were none but positive Laws. There is a great deal of difference between an innate 
Law, and a Law of Nature; between something imprinted on our Minds in their 
very original, and something that we being ignorant of may attain to the 
knowledge of, by the use and due application of our natural Faculties. And I think 
they equally forsake the Truth, who running into contrary exstreams, either affirm 
an innate Law, or deny that there is a Law, knowable by the light of Nature; i.e. 
without the help of positive Revelation.154 
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153 Locke to Tyrrell 4 August 1690.  
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Locke describes the occasion of this passage as a moment when it was proper for him to 
speak his opinion about the law of nature. He did not want readers to take his denial of 
innate practical principles for a denial that there is an objective, moral law.  
 In reply to the other charge relayed by Tyrrell, namely, that you, Locke, do not 
“expressly tell us, where to find, this Law, unlesse in the SS [Scriptures]”, Locke replies, 
“cannot I tell you in matter of fact that some men many men [sic] do compare their 
actions to a divine law and thereby forme the Ideas of their Moral rectitude or pravity 
without telling where that law is to be found?” This hints at the intent behind Locke’s 
most forceful reply to Tyrrell, one that appeals to Locke’s intended method in the Essay. 
Locke writes,  
But I know not how you would still have me besides my purpose and against all 
rules of method run out into a discourse of the divine law shew how and when it 
was promulgated to mankinde demonstrate its inforcement by rewards and 
punishments in another life in a place where I had nothing to do with all this and 
in a case where some mens bare supposition of such a law whether true or false 
servd my turne. 'Twas my businesse there to shew how men came by moral Ideas 
or Notions and that I thought they did by comparing their actions to a rule.155  
 
Locke then explains that in his chapter on moral relations in Book II, he discussed three 
rules or standards in relation to which men “compare their actions to frame moral Ideas”. 
These rules are “divine law,156 the Municipal law and the law of reputation or fashon”. 
Locke notes that while it is possible that he could be in error about the rules in 
accordance with which men in fact judge the moral pravity of their actions, nevertheless 
[I] cannot be accused for not haveing treated more amply of those rules in that 
place or enterd into a just disquisition of their nature force or obligation when if 
                                                
155 Locke to James Tyrrell, 4 August 1690.  
 
156 As Locke explains elsewhere in the letter to Tyrrell, by ‘divine law’ in this instance of the 
occurrence of that term, Locke only means to speak “indefinitely” of that law; when speaking indefinitely 
of that law, Locke means both the divine law conceived as the law of nature and divine law conceived as 
revealed law.  
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you will looke into the end of that chapter you will finde 'tis not of concernment 
to my purpose in that chapter whether they be as much as true or noe but only that 
they be considerd in the mindes of men as rules to which they compare their 
actions and judg of their morality.157 
 
As if that were not sufficient to convince Tyrrell of his misguided requests for a fuller 
discussion of the law of nature in the Essay, Locke explains that “the grounds of true 
morality” was not his intended topic in the Essay:   
I did not designe here to treat of the grounds of true morality which is necessary 
to true and perfect happinesse and ‘thad been impertinent if I had so designed: my 
businesse was only to shew whence men had moral Ideas and what they were and 
that I suppose is sufficiently don in that chapter.158 
 
Locke’s remarks accord nicely with McCann’s observation that the wider project of the 
Essay was to provide a natural history of human understanding. In the moral case, this 
amounts to showing “whence men had moral Ideas and what they were,” while at the 
same time Locke’s objectives in the Essay would have made it “impertinent” to aim at 
treating the true grounds of morality. However, what should not be lost in Locke’s reply 
is his own professed belief that there is a true ground of morality, namely, a divinely 
decreed moral law.  
 Locke’s reply to Tyrrell also casts a different light on theses in the Essay that are 
often, but mistakenly, taken to demonstrate the relativity of morality, a charge Locke 
circumvents in a lengthy footnote in the chapter on moral relations. There Locke replies 
to a critic,159 who, Locke reports, writes “as if…I went about to make Vertue Vice and 
                                                
157 Locke to James Tyrrell, 4 August 1690.  
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159 As Von Leyden notes, the critic in question, James Lowde, raised the objection in his 
Discourse Concerning the Nature of Man (1694) (Von Leyden, 77).  
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Vice Vertue.” Locke denies arguing any such thing. Regarding the text that provides the 
occasion for that charge, Locke explains 
I was there, not laying down moral Rules, but shewing the original and nature of 
moral Ideas, and enumerating the Rules Men make use of in moral Relations, 
whether those Rules were true or false: and pursuant thereunto I tell, what has 
everywhere that denomination, which in the language of that place answers to 
Vertue and Vice in ours, which alters not the nature of things, though Men 
generally do judge of, and denominate their actions according to the esteem and 
fashion of the place or Sect they are of.160 
 
Locke goes on to make it quite clear that he is no moral relativist, noting that had the 
author in question read a number of specified passages in the Essay, “he would have 
known, what I think of the eternal and unalterable nature of right and wrong[.]”161 More 
to the point, in that very section Locke explains that “though, perhaps by the different 
Temper, Education, Fashion, Maxims, or Interest of different sorts of Men” “Vertues and 
Vices were changed,” he immediately downplays this relativity, writing:  
Yet, as to the Main, they for the most part kept the same every where. For since 
nothing can be more natural, than to encourage with Esteem and Reputation that, 
wherein every one finds his Advantage; and to blame and discountenance the 
contrary: ‘tis no Wonder, that Esteem and Discredit, Vertue and Vice, should in a 
great measure every-where correspond with the unchangeable Rule of Right and 
Wrong, which the Law of God hath established; there being nothing, that so 
directly, and visibly secures, and advances the general Good of Mankind in this 
World, as Obedience to the Laws, he has set them, and nothing that breeds such 
Mischiefs and Confusion, as to the neglect of them.162 
 
 That Locke ultimately downplays the differences in appraisals of right and wrong, 
and of virtue and vice across societies suggests that the occasions on which he does 
emphasize variant ideas of morality are in part rhetorical measures intended to sway his 
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readers against the view that our ideas of virtue and vice are innate. For if these ideas 
were innate, there would be widespread inter-subjective agreement amongst our ideas of 
morality.163  
There is a notable parallel between Locke’s line of reasoning here – that our ideas 
of morality cannot be innate because there is variability in these ideas – and Locke’s 
reasoning that the species in terms of which we distinguish and denominate things cannot 
be made by nature because there is variability across speakers’ abstract ideas. Locke is 
quite explicit about the connection:  
[Our nominal Essences] are made by the Mind, and not by Nature: For were they 
Nature’s Workmanship, they could not be so various and different in several Men, 
as experience tells us they are.164 
 
And in this case, too, Locke cautions a similar rush to judgment about the ultimate 
truth of the matter:  
I do not deny, but Nature, in the constant production of particular Beings, makes 
them not always new and various, but very much alike and of kin one to another: 
But I think it is nevertheless true, that the boundaries of the Species, whereby Men 
sort them, are made by Men; since the Essences of the Species, distinguished by 
different Names, are, as has been proved, of Men’s making, and seldom adequate 
to the internal Nature of the Things they are taken from.165 
 
Here Locke is contrasting a claim about things in the world – nature makes them very 
much alike and “of kin” one to another – with a claim about the variable and inadequate 
nature of our general ideas of beings that are made alike and so of kin one to another. Of 
course, these observations alone do not decisively show that Locke believed in natural 
kinds. And while they do pose a notable similarity between Locke’s reasoning about the 
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moral case and the case of kinds and classification, as striking as the parallels so far noted 
are, to really make the case it seems we would need something like a statement of 
Locke’s own opinion on the matter, namely, a statement that he believes that there are 
natural kinds, along with something like the explanation that it was not part of his project 
of the Essay to defend realism about kinds understood to be distinct from our ideas of 
parochial kinds.  
 Although nothing exactly of this sort turns up in the Essay or elsewhere, there are 
notable moments in Locke’s exchange with Stillingfleet that hint at the view that real 
essences are types and therefore essences in the proper sense of the word, essences 
moreover, fixed by God, which latter claim we find below:  
[I take real essences] to be in every thing that internal constitution, or frame, or 
modification of the substance, which God in his wisdom and good pleasure thinks 
fit to give to every particular creature, when he gives a being.166 
 
A couple of pages later, Locke explains to Stillingfleet that we do not classify the sun in 
terms of its real essence, but rather by our nominal essence and this explains why we do 
not denominate some of the fixed stars as “suns”. What is important for our purposes is 
the fact that Locke goes on to explain that if we did classify the sun by its real essence, it 
is possible that we would find that its real essence is the same with the real essence of one 
of the fixed stars, thus suggesting that by real essence Locke means something that two 
particulars may share:  
[A]nd thus our sun is denominated and distinguished from a fixed star; not by a 
real essence that we know (for if we did, it is possible we should find the real 
essence of constitution of one of the fixed stars to be the same with that of our 
sun). 167 
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As suggestive as these remarks are, they are for reasons I am about to canvass all we can 
hope for from Locke; a reader hopeful for some decisive passage that would demonstrate 
Locke’s commitment to natural kinds will by the very nature of the case come up empty 
handed. In what follows I explain why.  
 In December of 1692, two years after the Essay was published, Locke’s friend 
Molyneux writes to praise Locke’s account of genera and species, but also to express a 
misgiving:  
What you say concerning genera and species is unquestionably true; and yet it 
seems hard to assert, that there is no such sort of creatures in nature as birds: for 
though we may be ignorant of the particular essence that makes a bird to be a 
bird, or that determines and distinguishes a bird from a beast; or the just limits and 
boundaries between each; yet we can no more doubt of a sparrow's being a bird, 
and a horse's being a beast, than we can of this colour being black, and the other 
white[.]168 
 
Like many of Locke’s readers, Molyneux takes Locke’s account of species and genera to 
show not only that they are the workmanship of the understanding, but that apart from 
our general ideas of species and genera, there are no real or objective sorts; and that 
latter claim “seems hard to assert”. Unfortunately, Molyneux makes the fatal mistake of 
using names or general terms for species, i.e., ‘bird’, ‘horse’, ‘sparrow’ – terms for 
parochial species – to express his objection. Sure enough, Locke pounces on the error, 
although with a sympathy suggestive of difficulties Locke himself encountered when 
articulating his views on species and real essences in the Essay:  
In the objection you raise about species, I fear you are fallen into the same 
difficulty I often found myself under, when I was writing on that subject, where I 
was very apt to suppose distinct species I could talk of, without names. For 
pray, sir, consider what it is you mean, when you say, that "we can no more doubt 
of a sparrow's being a bird, and a horse's being a beast, than we can of this colour 
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being black, and the other white," &c. but this, that the combination of simple 
ideas, which the word, bird, stands for, is to be found in that particular thing we 
call a sparrow.169  
 
 
As Locke’s ensuing remarks show, his position on genus and species just summarized 
above do not amount to the view that there "there is no such sort of creatures in nature as 
birds” for that “is both contrary to truth and to my opinion.”  
It is the remarks that follow that promise to shed light on Locke’s views on the 
reality of kinds apart from what he refers to as species and genera:  
This I do say, that there are real constitutions in things, from whence these simple 
ideas flow, which we observe combined in them. And this I farther say, that 
there are real distinctions and differences in those real constitutions, one 
from another; whereby they are distinguished one from another, whether we 
think of them, or name them, or no: but that whereby we distinguish and rank 
particular substances into sorts, or genera and species, is not those real essences, 
or internal constitutions, but such combinations of simple ideas as we observe in 
them.170  
 
If this is indeed an admission of the reality of objective distinctions between the real 
constitutions of things, distinctions that would ground their correct classification were we 
acquainted with those real constitutions, it is the closest thing to an admission of the 
existence of objective kinds that we can hope to get from Locke. For as Molyneux 
inadvertently shows, there is a difficulty that attends the very expressibility of the thesis, 
a difficulty Locke himself appears to acknowledge in the final remarks of the passage:  
This I designed to show, in lib. iii. c. 6. […] Some parts of that third book, 
concerning words, though the thoughts were easy and clear enough, yet cost me 
more pains to express than all the rest of my Essay.171 
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171 Locke continues, “And therefore I shall not much wonder if there be in some places of it 
obscurity and doubtfulness. It would be a great kindness from my readers to oblige me, as you have done, 
by telling me any thing they find amiss; for the printed book being more for others' use than my own, it is 
fit I should accommodate it to that, as much as I can; which truly is my intention.” (Locke to Molyneux, 
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Stepping back for a moment, note that Locke is in a position to express his commitment 
to the moral law with words. But what words could Locke use to express his commitment 
to kinds apart from those picked out by our parochial kind terms? Any general term, not 
to mention the terms ‘species’ and ‘genera’ themselves, are by virtue of Locke’s 
commitments not suitable for the purposes of expressing that commitment. Were one a 
realist about kinds, one would have to resort to just the forms of expression Locke makes 
use of in his reply to Molyneux. 
 
    §3.5 Concluding Remarks 
 
 
I have argued that there are two, primary reasons why Locke never comes right 
out and states his commitment to the reality of objective kinds apart from species and 
genera (what I have referred to elsewhere as parochial kinds). The first is local to the 
Essay. As we saw in the moral case, by virtue of the Essay’s methodological constraints 
Locke restricts himself to providing an account of the ideas we in fact have, how we 
acquire those ideas, and, in the case of our general ideas of kinds, what sorts of 
confusions we go in for with respect to those ideas. As we saw in the previous chapter, 
our confusions with respect to kinds are explained by reference to our attempt to secure 
inter-subjective agreement about the significations of our kind terms, and this kind of 
explanation is in keeping with Locke’s “natural history” of species and genera, which are 
ultimately ideas in the mind.  
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The second reason, I argue, has to do with limits on realism’s very expressibility 
within the confines of Locke’s account. General terms already in use pick out abstract 
ideas. Even were we to coin a general term with the intention of picking out one of the 
real kinds, since the real kinds are unknown, we would end up saying nothing at all. 
Finally, any use of the terms ‘species’ and ‘genus’ to pick out the real kinds, whatever 
they are, would be deviant, not to mention the fact that their real signification would 
override the signification we intend. Apart from ‘real Essence’ and its synonym ‘real 
Constitution’, there seem to be no words for expressing the thesis.  
This raises a question about the concept of real essence itself. Why does Locke 
countenance it at all given that the items out in the world that satisfy the concept are not 
available to sense experience? Lisa Downing takes up a similar question with regard to 
Locke’s “view that all of a thing’s qualities follow from its…real constitution.” Downing 
notes that this “seems the most controversial aspect of Locke’s ontology, and it may well 
sound like the sort of metaphysical commitment that a proponent of epistemic modesty 
ought to eschew[.]”172  
 Downing observes that there are in fact two questions in the vicinity, the first 
being “how do we come up with such a view?” and the second “why should we take it to 
be true?” With respect to the first question, Downing argues that the view is a 
“refinement” on a more fundamental distinction between appearance and reality, itself 
arrived at by “reflection on sensory experience”.  
 The answer to the second question, Downing suggests, has to do with how such a 
commitment makes the world intelligible to us:  
                                                
172 I have for the purposes of brevity simplified things here, but with no cost to the point I wish to 
make, nor to Downing’s own point; see Downing, “Locke’s Ontology,” 379.  
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this is what it would be for the world to be intelligible in principle. Locke has 
already given up on the world’s being fully intelligible to us, as we are presently 
constituted, with the faculties that we have […] That the world is in principle 
intelligible, intelligible to other spirits and perhaps to us, given other ideas, is a 
view that Locke shows no signs of abandoning. He ought to regard it as a 
defeasible assumption – his epistemic modesty demands this much – but he does 
not regard it as defeated.173 
 
Although Downing does not cite them as instances of how the concept of real essence 
plays a role in making the world intelligible to us, the following passages nonetheless 
appear to be fitting examples of her point. Locke writes that:  
The Mind being … furnished with a great number of the simple Ideas, conveyed 
by the Senses, as they are found in exterior things…takes notice also, that a 
certain number of these simple Ideas go constantly together[.]174 
 
As Locke explains below, this observation licenses the inference that qualities that go 
constantly together flow from a thing’s real essence:  
Combinations of simple Ideas, as are by Experience and Observation of Men’s 
Senses taken notice of to exist together…are therefore supposed to flow from the 
particular internal Constitution, or unknown Essence of that Substance.175 
The legitimacy of the concept of real essence lies, as Downing suggests, in the 
intelligibility it lends to certain observed phenomena in the world.176  
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176 As we will see in Chapter IV, Downing’s remarks might suggest that we understand real 
essences – understood as a common cause explanation of qualities that regularly co-occur – in terms of the 
functional role they play in explaining a certain observable phenomenon.  
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   Chapter IV 
 
         Conventionalism and the Idea-Theoretic Account 
 
             §4.1 Introduction 
 
                  
No scientist would investigate the properties common to items in my junk drawer. 
But water – the substance common to oceans, rivers, lakes and streams – and mercury – 
the substance common to, say, amalgam fillings and glass thermometers – both count as 
instances of kinds recognized in the taxonomical divisions we find in the sciences, and so 
are proper objects of study. That is, kinds of this sort are either the starting points of 
further inquiry or the result of such inquiry. This raises the following question: of all the 
logically possible ways of grouping things together, what makes certain of them count as 
kinds such that they figure in the right way in scientific inquiry? According to 
conventionalism, grouping things in accordance with what we ordinarily think of as 
natural kinds – e.g., water and mercury – is, from the perspective of what the world is 
like, really no different from a classification according to which, say, items in my junk 
drawer form a kind. Certainly there are good reasons to exclude a classification that 
recognizes the latter, and thus there are reasons to favor one scheme of classification over 
another, but these reasons can reflect only the particular human interests at stake when we 
seek to organize our knowledge of the natural world.  
Locke’s Essay is considered by many to be the source of one novel and influential 
argument for conventionalism, what is referred to as the Idea-Theoretic Account of kinds 
and classification. Classification, on Locke’s view, proceeds according to general ideas. 
The mark of a general idea is that it represents not some particular thing – in the way that 
my idea of the particular oak tree in my back yard represents and so picks out just that 
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particular – but rather many particulars. General ideas represent many particulars by 
representing some feature or features that many particulars have in common. In 
experience, however, we are confronted with only particulars, which means that the 
ideas we start out with are ideas of particulars, e.g., my idea of the particular oak tree in 
my back yard.  
That we confront only particulars in experience, then, fails to explain why we 
have general ideas at all. Locke argues that we must make our general ideas. Starting with 
our ideas of particular things, we abstract just those qualities in respect of which a 
number of objects resemble one another. In this way we arrive at general ideas. However, 
which of objects’ innumerably many respects of resemblance we do recognize in forming 
our general ideas is, according to the Idea-Theoretic Account, a matter of convention, in 
which case which of many possible general ideas are to count as our genus and species 
concepts is also a matter of convention, and so an arbitrary and subjective matter.   
The Idea-Theoretic Account runs into difficulties, however, when we turn to 
passages in which Locke articulates robust constraints on classification best understood 
within an Aristotelian framework of real essences and the unique sets of properties that 
flow from them. Indeed, I argue that implicit within those constraints is what I will call 
the Discovery Model. According to that model, the unknown real essences of so-called 
natural substances are individuated prior to our coming on the scene to classify them, the 
observable properties that flow from these unknown real essences are a matter of 
discovery, and these facts not only constrain how we form our general ideas, they are the 
independent standard against which their adequacy is measured.  
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Still, against the Discovery Model, one might argue that a conventionalist gloss 
can be given to Locke’s claims that the qualities proper to a kind are a matter of 
discovery and so constrain how we form our general ideas. I articulate the most plausible 
rendering of conventionalism consistent with those claims. According to what I call the 
Voluntarist Model, while it is true that after a conventionally defined boundary is 
introduced, the properties that belong to particulars that fall within that boundary are 
indeed a matter of discovery, this is a concession the conventionalist can happily make. 
In reply to this proposal, I argue that close attention to Locke’s story of how Adam forms 
his concept of a sort he christens Zahab raises difficulties that Voluntarism cannot meet. 
  
                     §4.2 The Idea-Theoretic Account 
 
 
Locke’s ontology is an ontology of particular substances, for example, samples of 
water and gold, and individuals like the oak in my back yard, Audrey Hepburn’s cat in 
Breakfast at Tiffany’s, and my little sister. Their qualities include features like shape and 
size, as well as dispositional properties such as solubility, the power to produce color 
sensations in certain perceivers, and the capacity for rational thought.177 The question that 
animates Book III of the Essay is how we classify particular substances into kinds.  
As we saw in Chapter I, Locke rejects moderate realism, according to which 
membership in a genus or species is a matter of a particular’s instantiating a universal, or 
having a substantial form. According to conceptualism, a particular is a member of a 
genus or species solely by virtue of falling under a genus or species concept the mind 
                                                
177 In addition, Locke recognizes relations and modes, the latter a kind of catch-all category that 
includes not only geometrical figures like a triangle but complex moral properties like justice and murder, 
to mention but a few.  
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itself has made. This is the sense in which Locke is a conceptualist. Still, the question 
under consideration is whether Locke also embraced conventionalism. Is there, on 
Locke’s view, any fact of the matter about which concepts or general ideas are to count 
as the genus and species concepts in accordance with which we are to classify 
particulars? According to the Idea-Theoretic Account, the answer is no; Locke embraced 
not only conceptualism, but conventionalism as well. 
The Idea-Theoretic Account begins with Locke’s claim that everything that exists 
is particular. Thus we apprehend in sensation only ideas of particular substances and their 
many qualities. Yet the hallmark of a general idea is its capacity to represent not just one 
particular, but many particulars. We thus need an account of how we come to have 
general ideas at all.  Locke’s account is the familiar one of abstraction. We make our 
ideas of particulars general by selectively attending to the qualities of things, and, noting 
which are respects in which particulars resemble one another, allow the remaining 
qualities to drop out of the idea. The resulting idea comprehends all those particulars that 
resemble one another with respect to the qualities represented therein.  
The line of thought just sketched would seem to tell us only how we come to form 
general ideas without yet deciding the question of whether or not there is an objective, or 
privileged sorting of particulars.178 Paul Guyer argues, however, that conventionalism is 
secured by reflection on the procedure we follow when we make our general ideas.179 
Conventionalism, Guyer suggests, follows from two tenets of Locke’s view. First, 
Locke’s particularism – “the premise that only particulars exist in nature” – is, Guyer 
                                                
178 I owe this way of putting the point to Jeff McDonough.  
  
  179 Guyer passim.   
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argues, “the basis of all of Locke’s ensuing argument.”180 Guyer then turns to the task we 
face when making a general idea. We must select for respects in which particular 
substances resemble one another, but we find that there are indefinitely many similarities 
between particulars, and therefore indefinitely many possible general ideas we might 
make. Guyer observes that “there seems to be nothing to stop us in the proliferation of 
abstract ideas capturing particular resemblances among individuals.”181 Meanwhile, 
nature offers up “only many particulars resembling each other in many ways,” and so 
nothing to which we might appeal in determining which of indefinitely many possible 
general ideas to privilege in a classificatory scheme.182 In the face of a proliferation of 
general ideas, Guyer insists, “we must decide where to stop, and which species to 
recognize in our system of classification.”183 Thus “while there are natural similarities 
among particulars,” there are “no natural kinds.”184 
 We must, Guyer concludes, bring to bear considerations informed by our own 
aims and interests in deciding which respects of resemblance to recognize in a 
classificatory scheme. Even assuming our current scientific knowledge, on the basis of 
which, say, gold is defined in terms of atomic number, Locke’s thesis would still hold, 
Guyer argues, since nothing in the phenomena forces us to recognize the ways in which 
particular samples of gold resemble one another in terms of their number of protons (that 
                                                
180 Guyer, 126.  
 
181 Guyer, 130.  
 
182 Guyer, 145, n. 4.  
 
183 Guyer, 130.  
 
184 “It is we who must decided, for instance, to ignore all the differences of size, shape, color, 
texture and so on among adult men and women and boys and girls in defining the species of human beings, 
and instead choose as our criterion for membership in a single species something like the potential for 
fertile mating” (Guyer, 130).  
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is, in terms of their atomic number).185 Classification is and can only be a product of our 
intellectual choices.  
As Guyer and many of Locke’s readers understand Book III of the Essay, 
classification requires a necessary and ineliminable element of choice. However, Guyer 
takes care to emphasize the considerations that, in his view, actually inform that 
conclusion. Given Locke’s occasional references to a Great Chain of Being and his 
guarded endorsement of corpuscularian mechanism, one might think that the necessity of 
choice arises because there are no qualitative “gaps” in nature in respect of which gaps 
clear and obvious boundaries between species can be drawn. For example, as white 
shades into black, at what point along the continuum do we distinguish black from grey, 
or grey from white?186 The thought is that with respect to that question, at least, we are 
not really committed to there being a fact of the matter, and only pragmatic reasons could 
inform a decision as to precisely where to demarcate, say, true black from grey. Likewise, 
if there are no “chasms” or gaps between particulars ranged along a continuum, it seems 
fair to conclude that nature offers up no natural or objective ways of demarcating species. 
(Descending to the microscopic level doesn’t help: again, we find only differences of 
degree.) Nor are we really committed to there being a fact of the matter about whether, 
say, we ought to segregate or rather group together individuals in proximity to one 
another on the continuum.  
                                                
185 Guyer, 134.  
 
186 This is a reference to an analogy Molyneux conveys to Locke in correspondence, although 
Molyneux does not think that the sorites considerations he adduces refute the thesis that there are objective 
facts of the matter regarding species membership, although as we saw in Chapter III, Molyneux falls into 
the trap of articulating that thought in terms of the names of parochial species. Molyneux writes: “yet we 
can no more doubt of a sparrow's being a bird, and a horse's being a beast, than we can of this colour being 
black, and the other white: though, by shades, they may be made so gradually to vanish into each other, that 
we cannot tell where either determines” (Molyneux to Locke, December 22, 1692).  
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While Guyer admits that Locke’s “position may have been motivated by the 
corpuscularian hypothesis or the idea of the great chain of being or both,” Guyer argues 
that “it is not logically dependent on either of them.187 Whether particulars ranged along a 
continuum present us with clear qualitative gaps, or rather no gaps, in either case we have 
to make our general ideas, which in turn is a matter of representing respects in which 
particulars resemble one another. The very task of making a general idea requires that we 
attend to resemblances between things, and so the very task of making a general idea 
requires that we arrive at some decision about which of innumerably many respects of 
resemblance between particulars we are to recognize in those ideas.188 Thus on Guyer’s 
reading, apart from their innumerably many respects of resemblance, no appeal to what 
particulars are like, and no appeal to our ignorance of their inner corpuscularian natures is 
necessary for Locke’s conventionalism:  
Locke’s conclusion that species are the workmanship of the understanding is 
derived solely from the logic of his analysis of the force of general terms, and has 
nothing to do with substantive claims about the kinds of similarities that actually 
obtain among individuals in nature or with the specific limits in our scientific 
knowledge of natural objects.189 
 
Guyer thus wishes to distinguish the Idea-Theoretic Account, appealing as it does 
only to “the logic of general ideas,”190 from readings that appeal to Locke’s metaphysical 
                                                
187 Guyer, 145, n. 4.  
 
188 “Many writers have suggested that Locke’s theory of classification follows from his 
assumption of a great chain of being at the level of phenomenal properties, or even more directly from his 
acceptance as part of the corpuscularian hypothesis of the idea that there is an infinite gradation of 
differences among objects at the microscopic level[.] But Locke’s thesis is not that we must draw arbitrary 
lines between species because they naturally form a continuum; his position is rather that just because 
nature contains only many particulars resembling each other in many ways we must decide which 
differences between individual objects, whether grossly salient or barely noticeable, to include in our 
abstract ideas of them and thus in our definitions of general terms” (Guyer, 145, n. 4). 
 
189 Guyer, 130.  
 
190 Guyer, 137. 
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commitments – to a great chain of being, or to corpusuclarianism. This is because it has 
been argued that the progress of science has revealed natural or objective boundaries at 
the level of the real constitutions of things. If that claim has any plausibility, Locke’s 
account is under threat. On the Idea-Theoretic approach, however, Locke’s theory of 
classification is, so its proponents argue, rendered invulnerable to objections from the 
progress of science.191 The thought is that new discoveries do not change the fact that 
kinds are still a matter of the nature of our ideas and how we arrive at them. As an 
example, Margaret Atherton cites our ideas of gold and water. Our ideas of these kinds 
started with the observable qualities of the substances we classify together as gold or 
water. And while we may as we discover more about the micro-constitutions of these 
substances “add new features, such as atomic number and molecular structure, to our idea 
of gold or water,” nevertheless “we do not in any serious way change the kind of idea we 
are producing.”192 This line of thought is most explicit in Guyer’s observation that even a 
classification according to atomic number is not one that nature imposes on us because 
our knowledge of atomic number does not change how we arrive at our general ideas:   
Contrary to Locke’s expectations, we have now learned a great deal about the real 
constitution of many kinds of matter, and among their “insensible particles” we 
can now distinguish, among others, neutrons and protons. But what forces us to 
classify two lumps in the real constitutions of which there are the same numbers 
of protons but different numbers of neutrons as two different isotopes of the same 
substance rather than two different substances? Nothing but our own decision to 
use the number of protons rather than neutrons as the basis of our system of 
classification of the kinds of matter – a choice for which we (or Medeleyev) have 
had very good reason, but which nonetheless remains a product of our own 
                                                
 
191 Atherton, 268.  
 
192 Atherton, 269.  
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intellectual activity and is simply not forced upon us by the objective similarities 
in nature.193  
 
Guyer concludes that “even when we know real constitutions” it is still the case that “the 
boundaries of species” are “the workmanship of the understanding”.194  
In the next sections I argue that there is far more to Locke’s account of 
classification than what we find in Guyer’s Idea-Theoretic account. On my reading, we 
make our abstract ideas of substances by inquiring after the qualities of substances that 
can be conjectured to flow from their unknown real essences, qualities that thus merit the 
status of being a property or “proprium” in the Aristotelian sense. In the next section I 
show that Locke’s notions of a real essence and the properties or propria that depend 
upon a real essence find their home, perhaps surprisingly, in Aristotelian metaphysics.   
 
                                  §4.3 Aristotelian Real Essences and Properties 
 
 
 According to the Aristotelian framework, there are three sorts of qualities: (i) 
qualities that belong to an essence proper – what Locke refers to as a real essence; (ii) 
qualities that flow from that real essence – what are referred to as propria or properties; 
and (iii) accidents, that is, qualities that are neither part of the essence of a thing, nor flow 
from that essence. An accident is “what can belong or not belong to the same thing.”195 
A paradigmatic Aristotelian example can help illustrate these concepts. The 
essence of man is captured by the description “rational animal”. A property that is said to 
                                                
193 Guyer, 134.  
 
194 Ibid.  
 
195 Porphyry, Isagoge, trans. with introduction and notes by Edward W. Warren (Toronto: The 
Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1975), 49.  
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flow from that essence is risibility, the capacity for laughter. An example of an accident 
is being freckled.  
Locke rejected at least some of the metaphysical commitments that attend the 
Aristotelian framework, for instance the notion of a substantial form, which is what, 
according to the Aristotelian, plays the role of a real essence in her metaphysics. Locke 
thought that something plays the role of an Aristotelian real essence, that is, something 
counts as a real essence of a thing that grounds the propria that belong to it. On Locke’s 
view, our best guess as to what, metaphysically speaking, grounds the propria of 
substances and so merits the status of being a real essence is some aspect of a particular’s 
corpuscularian micro-structure. Locke writes:  
This Essence, from which all these Properties flow, when I enquire into it, and 
search after it, I plainly perceive I cannot discover: the farthest I can go, is only to 
presume, that it being nothing but Body, its real Essence, or internal Constitution, 
on which these Qualities depend, can be nothing but the Figure, Size, and 
Connexion of its solid Parts[.]196 
 
 
The Aristotelian notions of a real essence and the prorpria or properties that flow 
from a real essence play a role, I argue, in Locke’s account of how we make our general 
ideas of substantial kinds. According to Locke, we aim to include all and only the propria 
that flow from the unknown real essences of substances. However, this is a task that is 
not easy to meet and impossible to carry out completely. Locke writes that it should not 
be thought strange that “I count the Properties [propria] of any sort of Bodies not easy to 
be collected, and completely known by the ways of enquiry, which our Faculties are 
capable of.” This is because the properties of the sorts of things “being…at least so many, 
                                                
196 E II.xxxi.6: 379.  
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that no Man can know the precise and definite number, they are differently discovered by 
different Men, according to their various skill, attention, and ways of handling[.]197 
However, the task of classification and that of improving our knowledge of the 
propria that belong to the sorts of substances would be considerably easier were we to 
know the real essences from which their propria flow and on the basis of that knowledge 
form our ideas of sorts. In order to see this, consider the case of geometrical figures like 
triangles and ellipses. Locke argues that we do know their real essences – our definitions 
of geometrical kinds capture their real essences. However, Locke asks us to imagine what 
would be true were forming a general idea of an ellipsis not a matter of knowing its real 
essence, but rather involved something like the endeavor we in fact undertake when we 
make our ideas of substantial sorts. What, Locke asks, would be the case “if we were to 
have our complex Ideas of [mathematical Figures]”, only by collecting their Properties, 
in reference to other Figures”? That is, what would be the case were we consigned to 
collect only the properties of mathematical figures were we ignorant of their real 
essences? Locke answers:  
How uncertain, and imperfect, would our Ideas be of an Ellipsis, if we had no 
other Idea of it, but some few of its Properties?198 
 
Of course, we are not in that predicament. And this, Locke explains, makes all the 
difference in the world when it comes to what we can know on the basis of our ideas 
when they are ideas of real essences:  
Whereas having in our plain Idea, the whole Essence of [an Ellipsis], we from 
thence discover those Properties, and demonstrably see how they flow, and are 
inseparable from it.199  
                                                
197 E III.ix.482-483.  
 
198 ! II.xxxi.11: 382.  
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In the case of substances, however, we cannot on the basis of ideas we form by collecting 
their propria alone discover further propria “and demonstrably see how they flow, and 
are inseparable from” real essences. Rather, we must continue to collect propria but by 
painstaking observation and experiment.  
In the following three sections, I show that Locke articulates three constraints on 
classification that are to be understood in terms of real essences and the propria that flow 
from them. In short, Locke argues that in making our general ideas we aim to include all 
and only propria that flow from the unknown real essences of substances. I then go on to 
articulate a version of conventionalism that plausibly makes sense of these commitment 
and argue that it is refuted by Locke’s story of how Adam makes his general idea of a 
sort not previously recognized by his linguistic community.   
 
§4.4 Constantly Co-existing Qualities and the Inference to a Real Essence 
 
According to the Idea-Theoretic account, we make our general ideas by attending 
to the respects in which particulars resemble one another, and, further, we are at liberty to 
choose which respects of resemblance to recognize in our general ideas. Locke certainly 
argues that it is our ability to note and mark off respects of resemblance between things 
that explains how we come to have general ideas.200 However, few conclusions can be 
drawn from these observations for they at most provide an explanation for certain 
phenomena, namely, that we have general ideas at all and what it is about our general 
                                                
199 ! II.xxxi.11: 382. 
 
200 ! III.iii.7: 411.  
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ideas that make such them capable of representing many particulars. Once that account is 
in place, the story regarding how we form our general ideas shows us to be attending to 
something more than the respects in which particular things resemble one another. Or so I 
will argue in this section.  
Locke writes that our abstract ideas of substances are “taken from Combinations 
of simple Ideas [qualities] existing together constantly in things, of which Patterns, [our 
abstract ideas] are the supposed Copies.”201 What we notice as we make our way through 
the world, and what we go on to attend to when we make our abstract ideas, is the fact 
that “a certain number” of substances’ qualities “go constantly together”:  
The Mind being … furnished with a great number of the simple Ideas [of 
qualities], conveyed by the Senses, as they are found in exterior things…takes 
notice also, that a certain number of these simple Ideas [of qualities] go constantly 
together[.]202 
 
 But what does Locke mean by “constant coexistence,” what he elsewhere refers to 
as necessary connection?203 By observation, trial, and experiment we can identify 
qualities that tend to clump together. Suppose we find that all bodies that have qualities q, 
r, s, also have quality t. Upon finding or supposing qualities q, r, s together, we have 
good reason to think we will also find quality t in that body.  
Note that Locke’s reasoning is not unlike the Aristotelian account of how, by 
induction, we closely approximate the kinds that exist by identifying their properties. As 
Michael Ayers explains,   
                                                
201 ! II.xxxii.18: 391.  
 
202 ! II.xxiii.1: 295. At ! II.xxxi.6, p. 379, Locke writes, “[t]he complex Ideas we have of 
Substances, are…certain Collections of simple Ideas [of qualities], that have been observed or supposed 
constantly to exist together.”  
 
203 At E IV.i.3: 525 Locke writes that one of the four “sorts” of agreement between ideas that 
ground knowledge claims is “Co-existence, or necessary connexion.”  
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[The Aristotelian] thought that we could identify the ‘properties’ of the species by 
induction from individuals and then, by philosophical reflection, pick out the 
peculiar ‘difference’. The purpose of identifying the real essence…was 
explanation, not classification: it was simply and not unreasonably presupposed 
that we can identify members of the same species at least fairly well on the basis 
of more or less obvious points of resemblance recurring in our experience.204 
 
Like the Aristotelian, Locke also posits real essences that play an explanatory role; real 
essences are that from which all of a substance’s properties can be derived, at least in 
principle. However, what fulfills the role of a real essence is, as we saw, different. Real 
essences are, on Locke’s view, the hidden micro-structural features of bodies that are the 
causal and explanatory ground of qualities that repeatedly or constantly clump together:  
[W]e come to have the Ideas of particular sorts of Substances, by collecting such 
Combinations of simple Ideas, as are by Experience and Observation of Men’s 
Senses taken notice of to exist together, and are therefore supposed to flow from 
the particular internal Constitution, or unknown Essence of that Substance.205 
 
Note that a real essence grounds not only those constantly coexisting qualities we include 
in our abstract idea but any further qualities that are found or can be supposed to 
constantly coexist with them.206  
Qualities that clump together merit the inference to an unknown real essence as 
their foundation and cause. Note that the mere co-instantiation of qualities in particular 
substances does not itself merit the inference to a real essence as their cause. While 
Locke certainly believes that we find a causal explanation for any of a particular’s 
observable qualities by reference to its constituent corpuscles and their qualities, not all 
of a thing’s qualities can be explained in terms of a real essence. As a particular kind of 
                                                
204 Ayers, Locke: Epistemology and Ontology, 2:71-72.  
 
205 E II.xxiii.3: 296; bold emphasis mine. 
 
206 Locke writes, “By this real Essence, I mean that real constitution of any Thing, which is the 
foundation of all those Properties, that are combined in, and are constantly found to co-exist with the 
nominal Essence [abstract idea]” (! III.vi.6: 442).  
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explanatory cause, a real essence is explanatorily and causally related to only some of the 
qualities we find in particulars, those we find that clump together in a number of 
particulars. Such qualities thus merit the Aristotelian designation of being properties or 
propria.207  
What elicits our inference to a real essence as a common cause is likewise that in 
reference to which we make our abstract or general ideas. We collect into our abstract 
ideas all and only those qualities that, on the basis of experience, or by conjecture, can be 
said to go constantly together:  
The complex Ideas we have of Substances, are…certain Collections of simple 
Ideas, that have been observed or supposed constantly to exist together.208  
 
What Locke’s remarks suggest is that it is not respects of resemblance that we 
attend to in making our ideas of substantial kinds, but rather qualities we have reason to 
believe flow from substances’ unknown real essences. It seems, then, that we have 
located in Locke’s view an independent criterion in light of which only some of 
substances’ qualities merit inclusion in an abstract idea, and that would seem to be at 
odds with the conventionalist reading.  
 In the next section, I argue that Locke’s claim that the properties or propria that 
belong to sorts are a matter of discovery also speaks against the conventionalist reading.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
207 It seems obvious that this should be a defeasible criterion – we might be wrong that some 
quality really is a proprium – although I know of no place where Locke says that it is a defeasible criterion.  
 
208 ! II.xxxi.6: 379.  
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§4.5 Properties are Differently Discovered by Different Speakers 
 
 
As we saw in Chapter II, one feature of natural language that preoccupies Locke 
is the fact that speakers attach different significations to one and the same kind term. 
These differences in signification, Locke writes, gives rise to confusion and uncertainty 
in our discourses about natural substances. For instance, I use the term ‘gold’ to pick out 
one definition, while my chemistry professor’s use of that term picks out a different 
definition. Differences in how we define sorts can lead to disputes between speakers over 
which features in fact belong to the kind.  
According to Locke, the explanation for the variability in how we define 
substantial sorts lies in the fact that different speakers are in different epistemic positions 
with respect to the properties that belong to sorts. What, say, the expert knows about the 
properties common to gold or elm trees is indeed different from what the layperson 
knows, and this results in each having different ideas of these kinds. In fact, Locke argues 
that so many properties belong to sorts that we can expect that their properties are and 
will be differently discovered by different speakers, in which case it is inevitable that we 
each define our idea of a sort differently:  
Men are far enough from having agreed on the precise number of simple Ideas, or 
Qualities, belonging to any sort of Things, signified by its name. Nor is it any 
wonder, since it requires much time, pains, and skill, strict enquiry, and long 
examination, to find out what, and how many those simple Ideas are, which are 
constantly and inseparably united in Nature, and are always to be found together 
in the same Subject.209 
 
                                                
209 ! III.vi.30: 457.  
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In light of similar considerations, Locke elsewhere writes: “who therefore cannot chuse 
but have different Ideas of the same Substance, and therefore make the signification of its 
common Name very various and uncertain.”210  
Differences in the signification of our kind terms are thus the upshot not of 
choice, but of differences in the properties speakers discover. For instance, a child faced 
with a sample of gold knows only its shining yellow color. Another investigates further 
and discovers that it is malleable, while yet another will discover that it is soluble in aqua 
regia, all of which features Locke counts as properties that belong to the sort.  
 Two features of Locke’s account now appear in tension with the conventionalist 
reading. First, it looks as though qualities we find to constantly coexist in certain 
substances provide an independent standard to which we defer in making our abstract 
ideas; second, such qualities are a matter of discovery. In the next section, I show that 
Locke thinks that we may not exclude any such qualities from an abstract idea, which 
prima facie suggests a further way in which the conventionalist reading can be 
challenged.211  
                                                
210 E III.ix.13: 483.  
 
211 I should note that Locke’s account already appears to suggest that there are natural joints in 
nature that we are in a position to track on the basis of the observable qualities of things. As I noted in 
Chapter II, Locke is happy to admit that nature doesn’t make all things new and variable; there are 
resemblances between things that afford the ranking of them into sorts: “I do not deny, but Nature, in the 
constant production of particular Beings, makes them not always new and various, but very much alike and 
of one to another” (E III.vi.37: 462). Elsewhere Locke writes, “many particular Substances are so made by 
Nature, that they have agreement and likeness one with another, and so afford a Foundation of being ranked 
into sorts” (E III.vi.30: 457-58). I thus interpret Locke as making a much stronger claim here than Guyer 
would allow. On Guyer’s view, Locke is to be read as saying only that there are resemblances between 
things, and these resemblances make the very enterprise of making general ideas possible, but which 
resemblances are important for the purposes of classification is up to us. Against this reading, I interpret 
Locke as saying that the resemblances between substances determine how we are to sort them. On Guyer’s 
reading, the resemblances between things results in a proliferation of many possible general ideas, and so 
many possible ways of sorting substances into kinds. On my reading, resemblance in fact narrows 
considerably the field of possible ways of classifying substances into kinds. I provide a more extensive 
argument for this claim in Chapter VII.  
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                         §4.6 Properties Cannot be Excluded from the Idea of a Sort 
 
 
In addition, Locke argues that no speaker is at liberty to exclude from her abstract 
idea any of the known properties that belong to a sort. Here, Locke’s argument is directed 
at the Aristotelian assumption that we can identify which of a thing’s qualities belong to 
its essence proper – its real essence – and which are but properties that flow from that 
essence.  
In the example that Locke gives, Locke notes that the “common idea” of iron is of 
a substance “of a certain Colour, Weight, and Hardness.” Locke observes that we 
mistakenly take this to be a description of the real essence of iron. Further, we take 
malleability to be a proprium that flows from the real essence of iron. However, our 
common idea of iron cannot be an idea of its real essence because we cannot derive on 
the basis of that idea iron’s malleability, which we consider to be a property that flows 
from that real essence. But because we consider malleability to be a proprium, while we 
consider the color and weight and hardness of iron as qualities belonging to its real 
essence, we exclude malleability from our idea as “but a property” of iron, i.e., as not 
belonging to its real essence. But, Locke points out, the qualities we collect into our idea 
are all “but” propria of the substance, in which case we cannot include only some of them 
in our general idea to the exclusion of others, as we do in the case of our idea of iron.  
This argument is directed at the Aristotelian, who takes our ideas of substantial 
kinds to be ideas of real essences. The upshot of that argument, however, has 
consequences for how we are to understand Locke’s own views on how we are to form 
our ideas of substantial kinds. We cannot exclude from our idea any propria we have 
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reason to think flow from the real essence of a thing. And that further tells against the 
conventionalist reading, for the implication is that we are not at liberty to exclude certain 
qualities of things from our ideas of genus and species.  
Our aim in making abstract ideas is to capture the regular co-occurrence of certain 
qualities, those that merit the inference of flowing from an unknown real essence, and so 
merit the designation of being properties or propria. Elsewhere Locke argues that 
properties are inseparable from one another. We can make sense of this claim by 
attributing to Locke the view that they flow from a common cause, in which case, where 
we find some of these qualities together in a particular, we may justifiably posit the 
others. Though the inseparability of properties, or propria, from one another is not an 
inseparability that we apprehend by deriving them from their common cause – a real 
essence – Locke nonetheless thinks that we that we may track the fact that they are 
inseparable from one another in certain bodies, namely, those in which they constantly 
co-occur.212  
As Locke explains below, we may not, on pain of error, expressly exclude from 
our abstract idea any of the inseparable qualities that belong to a sort. Locke writes:  
[N]o one can shew a Reason why some of the inseparable Qualities, that are 
always united in nature, should be put into the [abstract idea of Gold], and others 
left out: Or why the Word Gold, signifying that sort of Body the Ring on his 
Finger is made of, should determine that sort, rather by its Colour, Weight, and 
Fusibility; than by its Colour, Weight, and Solubility in Aqua Regia: Since the 
dissolving it by that Liquor, is as inseparable from it, as the Fusion by Fire[.]213  
                                                
212 “As to Co-existence, or such a necessary connexion between two Ideas, that in the Subject 
where one of them is supposed, there the other must necessarily be also: Of such agreement, or 
disagreement as this, the Mind has an immediate perception but in very few of them” (E IV.vii.5: 594; 
bold emphasis mine). I take Locke to be arguing here that we cannot a priori know which qualities are 
going to be inseparably united in nature because we do not have ideas of the real essences from which they 
flow as their common causes.  
 
213 E III.ix.17: 485-486; bold emphasis mine.  
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Locke goes on to press the point, and his use of the term property drives the argument 
home. Locke asks:    
For by what right is it, that Fusibility comes to be a part of the Essence, signified 
by the word Gold, and Solubility but a property of it? Or why is its Colour part of 
the Essence, and its Malleableness but a property? That which I mean, is this, 
That all these being all but Properties, depending on its real Constitution…no one 
has Authority to determine the signification of the Word Gold…more to one 
Collection of Ideas [of properties] to be found in that Body, than another[.]214 
 
Qualities like solubility in aqua regia, fusibility, and malleability are all properties of gold 
because they are features that depend on a real essence. Again, Locke’s use of the term 
‘property’ is consonant with the traditional, Aristotelian conception of propria, or 
features that flow from the essence of a sort and are therefore inseparable from it.  
Nevertheless, Locke is attacking the Aristotelian assumption that we can identify 
which observable features belong to the essence of a sort, and which belong to the sort as 
“but properties” that flow from that essence. The thought that attends the practice of 
taking what are in fact properties to be “a part of the Essence,” while excluding others as 
“but properties,” thus rests on a mistake about the status of the features we include in our 
abstract ideas. As Locke clearly states, all candidate qualities for inclusion in our abstract 
ideas are but properties. Locke writes:  
[It is a mistake] when I judge, that this complex Idea, contains in it the real 
Essence of any Body existing; when at least it contains but some few of those 
Properties, which flow from its real Essence and Constitution.215  
                                                
214 Locke concludes that “Whereby the signification of that name must unavoidably be very 
uncertain. Since, as has been said, several People observe several Properties in the same Substance; and, I 
think, I may say no body all. And therefore we have but very imperfect descriptions of Things, and Words 
have very uncertain Significations” (E III.ix.17: 485-86).  
 
215 As Locke explains, we know only some few of the Properties that flow from the real essence 
because “those Properties consisting mostly in the active and passive Powers, it has in reference to other 
Things, all that are vulgarly known of any one Body, and of which the complex Idea of that kind of Things 
is usually made, are but a very few, in comparison of what a Man, that has several ways tried and examined 
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 On what basis does Locke maintain, against the Aristotelian, that we do not have 
insight into the essences of substantial sorts, but only into the properties that flow from 
their essences? Locke proposes a test for whether any idea of a substantial sort can be 
said to capture the essence – what he refers to below as the “real essence” – from which 
the properties of that sort flow:  
The complex Ideas we have of Substances are, as it has been shewn, certain 
Collections of simple Ideas, that have been observed or supposed constantly to 
exist together. But such a complex Idea cannot be the real Essence of any 
Substance; for then the Properties we discover in that Body, would depend on that 
complex Idea, and be deducible from it, and their necessary connexion with it be 
known; as all Properties of a Triangle depend on, and as far as they are 
discoverable, are deducible from the complex Idea of three Lines, including a 
Space.216 
 
When our idea captures the real essence of a thing, we may deduce its properties on the 
basis of our idea. Recall Locke’s example of the ellipsis. On the basis of our idea of it, 
which is an idea of its real essence, we can “from thence discover those Properties, and 
demonstrably see how they flow, and are inseparable from it.” That is the test by which 
we may determine whether we have captured in our idea a real essence.  
But in the case of substances, we can never capture the real essence, for the 
various properties that we discover to co-occur are not deducible from our abstract ideas, 
in which case, Locke claims, our complex idea of a substantial sort “cannot be the real 
Essence” of that sort. A moment’s reflection on the example of iron shows why:   
The common Idea Men have of Iron, is a Body of a certain Colour, Weight, and 
Hardness; and a Property that they look on as belonging to it, is malleableness. 
But yet this Property has no necessary connexion with that complex Idea, or any 
                                                
it, knows of that one sort of Things; and all that the most expert Man knows, are but few, in comparison of 
what are really in that Body, and depend on its internal or essential Constitution” (E II.xxxii.24: 392-93).  
 
216 E II.xxxi.6: 379.  
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part of it: And there is no more reason to think, that malleableness depends on that 
Colour, or that Weight depends on its malleableness.217 
 
The common idea of iron is restricted to a certain color, weight and hardness. 
Malleability, on the other hand, is deemed to be a property of that sort. Were the common 
idea of iron an idea of its real essence, we would expect – according to Locke’s test – that 
we could derive malleability on the basis of that idea. However, malleability “has no 
necessary connexion with that complex Idea, or any part of it.”218  
Note that even were we to give up the thought that our definitions reflect real 
essences, it is still, by Locke’s lights, a mistake to judge that we have captured the 
complete collection of properties that belong to a sort when we exclude some of its 
properties. Here, Locke is not targeting the Aristotelian, yet his critique turns on the 
claim that a determinate number of properties belong to a sort, and their status as such is 
not a matter of a speaker’s choices. Locke writes that it is a mistake  
When in its complex Idea, [the Mind] has united a certain number of simple 
Ideas, that do really exist together in some sorts of Creatures, but has also left out 
others, as much inseparable, it judges this to be a perfect complete Idea, of a sort 
of things which really it is not; v.g. having joined the Ideas of substance, yellow, 
malleable, most heavy, and fusible, [the Mind] takes that complex Idea to be the 
complete Idea of Gold, when yet its peculiar fixedness and solubility in Aqua 
Regia are as inseparable from those other Ideas, or Qualities of that Body, as they 
are one from another.219 
 
No speaker may limit her definition of a sort to only some of its known properties 
according to the thought that they are a part of the real essence. Even when a speaker 
                                                
217 E II.xxxi.6: 379. 
 
218 Thus we cannot from our idea of a body of a certain color, weight, and hardness derive the fact 
that such a body must also be malleable in the way that we can from our idea of a triangle derive that such 
a figure must also have internal angles that sum to 180 degrees.   
 
219 E II.xxxii.23: 392.  
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gives up that thought, she makes a mistake when she limits her definition to only some of 
a sort’s known properties and judges her idea to be a perfect, complete idea.220  
To summarize the territory covered thus far, Locke claims that (i) speakers form 
their abstract ideas of sorts by deference to qualities that constantly coexist with one 
another and so merit the inference of flowing from an unknown real essence, in which 
case such qualities are properties; (ii) the properties that belong to sorts are differently 
discovered by different speakers; and (iii) no individual speaker may expressly exclude 
any known properties from her abstract ideas. Stepping back for a moment, it is not 
immediately obvious how these commitments are to be made sense of on the standard 
view articulated by Guyer, according to which classification is a matter of arbitrarily 
choosing from amongst the innumerably many respects of resemblance between things. 
On behalf of that reading, I sketch a version of conventionalism that meets these 
constraints in the next section.  
 
              §4.7 Voluntarism 
 
 
On Locke’s view, the real essences of natural substances are not Aristotelian 
substantial forms, but aspects of their hidden micro-constitutions that give rise to a 
determinate set of constantly coexisting qualities. There is, however, an interpretive 
question over what makes it the case that some aspect of a substance’s microstructure is 
its real essence. The conventionalist argues that the status of being a real essence and the 
status of being a property are designations we impose on reality. Real essences and the 
                                                
220 That Locke thinks that this is a distinct kind of error from that of the Aristotelian is evident in 
Locke’s observation that “The Mistake is yet greater, when I judge, that this complex Idea, contains in it the 
real Essence of any Body existing; when at least it contains but some few of those Properties, which flow 
from its real Essence and Constitution” (E II.xxxii.24: 392).  
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properties that depend on them are not determined in advance of our classificatory 
activity, but rather by our classificatory activity. The Conventionalist thus argues for what 
I will call the Voluntarist Model, henceforth Voluntarism.  
First, the conventionalist will point out that all of a substance’s discoverable 
qualities are causally related to, and thus flow from, some aspect of a particular’s micro-
structural constitution. In this respect, the discoverable qualities of particulars are on all 
fours. However, once a speaker makes a choice to include some of a substance’s 
observable qualities in her abstract idea, in so doing she picks out some aspect of a 
particular’s microstructure as the causal source of just those observable qualities, and 
thereby do facts about real essences come into being. Hence Voluntarism. The properties 
that belong to a sort, then, are just those features a speaker includes in her abstract idea. If 
investigation reveals that particulars that agree with that abstract idea are discovered to 
have further observable qualities in common, these are also properties, since they, too, 
will be causally related to micro-structural features common to those particulars.  
With respect to the three commitments articulated above, the conventionalist will 
argue that we can make sense of standards that exert normative force over how speakers 
define sorts without conceding that those standards are objective. What gives rise to the 
appearance of an objective standard is the fact that no particular speaker’s decisions 
determine which qualities count as properties of a sort, in which case no particular 
speaker’s decisions determine which micro-structural aspects of particulars count as a 
real essence. The conventionalist argues, however, that we can admit that such facts are 
indeed determined independently of particular speakers’ choices without thereby giving 
up conventionalism. There is a common standard, but the common standard is 
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individuated by the common meaning of a kind term already in use within a linguistic 
community.  
Once the use of a kind term takes hold within a given linguistic community, every 
speaker, so the thinking goes, becomes disposed to pick out more or less the same set of 
particulars. Consider Locke’s example of gold. What Locke himself is presupposing in 
his use of that example is a common, conventionally arrived at set of criteria that govern 
what speakers are disposed to recognize as belonging to the extension of that term. It is 
with respect to these particulars and their shared, constantly coexisting qualities – which 
include qualities like malleability, fusibility, and solubility in aqua regia – that we make 
sense of Locke’s normative claims regarding which qualities speakers ought to include in 
their abstract ideas of gold.  
The key thought is that the criteria in accordance with which speakers are 
disposed to recognize more or less the same particulars as members of a kind are to be 
explained by appeal to Voluntarism. The view thus recognizes two moments in the life of 
a natural kind term: (i) a conventional introduction into a community, (ii) and a 
nonconventional investigation of the implications of that introduction. The first stage 
captures the moment at which speakers find it serves their purposes to distinguish 
particulars according to criteria of their choosing. At that point, none of the normative 
constraints Locke discusses are in effect. However, once a community of speakers adopts 
the practice of distinguishing things according to such criteria, and once speakers become 
disposed to recognize more or less the same particulars as belonging to the sort, certain 
normative constraints kick in.  
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It is at this point in the story, says the conventionalist, that we are to make sense 
of Locke’s claims that (i) speakers form their abstract ideas of sorts by deference to 
observations about qualities that constantly coexist with one another and therefore merit 
the inference of flowing from an unknown real essence; (ii) properties of a sort are 
differently discovered by different speakers; and (iii) no speaker may expressly exclude 
any of the known properties that belong to a sort. Thus while it’s true that no particular 
speaker is responsible for individuating the properties that belong to sorts, and so no 
particular speaker is responsible for individuating the real essences of sorts, it does not 
follow that Locke rejected conventionalism. In the history of a sort’s coming to be, 
choices were made regarding which qualities of particulars were relevant to their 
membership in that sort.  
A real essence, on this story, is made up of micro-structural features common to 
those particulars every speaker is disposed to recognize as belonging to the extension of a 
commonly recognized kind. Properties, on this reading, are those qualities that depend on 
micro-structural features common to all particulars in that extension. Real essences and 
the properties that depend on them – and the features that satisfy these concepts in any 
given case – are designations we impose on reality.  
 
                            §4.8 Adam and Zahab: An Origin Story  
 
 
In evaluating the plausibility of this reading, the first thing to note is that it flies in 
the face of Locke’s repeated claims that speakers make their abstract ideas by deference 
to collections of qualities observed or supposed – that is, conjectured – to constantly 
coexist and therefore merit the inference to an unknown real essence as their common 
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cause. Locke’s claim is both factive and normative. It is a description of how speakers do 
and ought to make their abstract ideas. More importantly, it is a description of what in the 
first instance prompts speakers to make their abstract ideas. Some observations and 
conjectures about the qualities exhibited by substances elicit the thought that we are 
confronted with facts relevant to the kinds to which they belong. And the thought that we 
are confronted with a kind is, on Locke’s description of things, prior to or at least 
contemporaneous with our going on to investigate which of a substance’s qualities are 
relevant to its membership in that kind.  
In fact, that Voluntarism faces the difficulty just articulated is confirmed in a story 
Locke tells about Adam. One of Adam’s children brings home a glittering substance 
whose novel qualities prompt him to make an abstract idea on its basis. Certain features 
of the story are immediately worth highlighting.  
In telling the story, Locke’s intention is to account for how a speaker forms an 
abstract idea of a substantial sort before that sort is recognized by his linguistic 
community, and thus before there are facts about what are ordinarily recognized as 
criteria for membership in the kind. In the story, Locke claims that Adam’s procedure for 
making his abstract idea is from the outset a matter of deference to what investigation of 
an exemplar of the sort reveals. Further, Locke claims that all of the properties Adam 
discovers in the exemplar make necessary ingredients in his abstract idea. But here the 
conventionalist cannot appeal to the common meaning of the term as what initially fixes 
the extension of the kind. In this case, there is no prior, conventionally determined 
extension whose members’ shared qualities fix a real essence and the properties that flow 
from it. 
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Turning to Locke’s story, one of Adam’s children brings home “a glittering 
Substance, which pleases his Eye”. Locke writes that “This piece of Matter…being quite 
different from any he had seen before, no Body…will deny to be a distinct Species, and 
to have its peculiar Essence[.]”221Adam, finding the glittering substance to be of a bright 
yellow color and very heavy, goes on to make an abstract idea consisting of these 
qualities.222 Adam names the substance Zahab, which “is the mark of the Species, and a 
Name belonging to all Things partaking in that Essence.”  
Adam continues his investigation into its properties and discovers that it is fusible 
and fixed. Locke reasons, “Are not they also, by the same Reason, that any of the others 
were, to be put into [Adam’s] complex Idea, signified by the Name Zahab?” Reasons that 
necessitate inclusion of the most immediately observable properties equally embrace 
what “farther trials” discover in that body. Locke’s conclusion is damning for the 
conventionalist reading:  
If [Fusibility and Fixedness] must, then all the other Properties, which any farther 
Trials shall discover in this Matter, ought by the same Reason to make a part of 
the Ingredients of the complex Idea, which the Name Zahab stands for, and so be 
the Essence of the Species, marked by that Name.223  
 
All properties – that is, all features that can be conjectured to flow from a real essence – 
should, Locke argues, be included in Adam’s abstract idea.  
It should be emphasized that at no point in the story does Adam make a choice as 
to which qualities are to be the defining features of the sort. Indeed, according to Locke’s 
argument, Adam can find no reason to exclude any properties he discovers in the 
                                                
221 E III.vi.47: 468-69.  
 
222 E III.vi.46: 469.  
 
223 Ibid.  
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exemplar. It is thus difficult to see how Adam can be said to individuate the extension of 
the term, whose members’ shared qualities in turn fix that micro-structural aspect on 
which those qualities supervene. Locke’s normative constraints are in play, in accounting 
for which the conventionalist cannot appeal to a conventionally established boundary.  
In fact, Locke’s account of how a speaker forms her abstract idea of a sort before 
that sort is recognized by her linguistic community is confirmed elsewhere in the Essay. 
In a revealing example that has obvious parallels with the Adam story, Locke imagines 
the first encounter with a substance we would now denominate gold. That speaker is 
prompted to make an abstract idea, and he rightly excludes the shape and size of the 
particular body he encounters since these cannot be conjectured to “depend on its real 
Essence, or internal Constitution”:  
Whosoever first light on a parcel of that sort of Substance, we denote by the word 
Gold, could not rationally take the Bulk and Figure he observed in that lump, to 
depend on its real Essence, or internal Constitution. Therefore those never went 
into his Idea of that Species of Body; but its peculiar Colour, perhaps, and 
Weight, were the first he abstracted from it, to make the complex Idea of that 
Species. 224 
 
Note that the speaker Locke has in mind is “whosoever first lights” on an instance of a 
sort we now classify as gold. This speaker is not faced with a particular that already falls 
within a conventionally imposed boundary, and yet Locke argues that he properly 
excludes from his abstract idea qualities he has reason to believe do not depend on a real 
essence and thus do not merit the designation of being a property, or a proprium.225   
                                                
224 E II.xxxi.9: 381.  
 
225 This highlights a point that is not always made explicit in Locke’s account of the fact that we 
collect all qualities we have reason to believe are propria in a general idea: we collect all and only qualities 
we have reason to believe are propria. Locke seems to be suggesting that, with respect to some qualities, we 
are able to draw such distinctions in advance of observation and experiment. We can make sense of this by 
noting that we can draw upon prior experience and engage in analogical reasoning. For instance, we find in 
similar cases that shape and size do not constantly coexist with qualities we do find to clump together.  
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The preponderance of textual evidence thus weighs against Voluntarism and 
favors rather the Discovery Model, according to which real essences and the properties 
that depend on them are individuated prior to our coming on the scene to classify natural 
substances. The properties that flow from the unknown real essences of substances are a 
matter of discovery, and these facts constrain how we classify natural substances in a 
robust way.  
       §4.9 Deep Resemblance 
 
Still, it is worth saying a bit more regarding why the conventionalist reading 
elicits broad agreement amongst Locke scholars. While qualities do tend to clump 
together, which is in turn grounds for inferring the regular instantiation of some micro-
structural aspect as their common cause, nothing about the world, so proponents of the 
reading will argue, forces us to recognize this respect in which particulars resemble one 
another as opposed to some other respect, as what determines how we are to classify 
things. It is helpful to note Michael Ayers’ observation that “to talk of relevant 
resemblance” leaves “unexplained what principle of relevance to species-membership 
there is other than arbitrary definition.”226 In that case, we may ask why similarity in 
terms of substances’ constantly coexisting qualities is that respect of resemblance 
relevant to their classification.  
An answer that Ayers suggests but goes on to reject is that we thereby track in our 
ideas of kinds not only superficial resemblance but what Ayers calls “deep 
                                                
226 Ayers, Locke: Epistemology and Ontology, 2:81.  
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resemblance”.227 To see this, note that according to Locke’s account of real essence, real 
essences are common cause explanations; real essences are what in particulars explains 
why certain observable qualities regularly co-occur in certain particulars, where such 
regular co-occurrence is attributed to all such qualities flowing from the same aspect of a 
thing’s internal constitution. However, suppose that we set aside the criterion of co-
occurrence and go by observable, or “superficial” resemblance alone. I make an idea that 
picks out particulars we would in fact distinguish as belonging to distinct kinds: 
diamonds and rhinestones (amongst, possibly, other things). Those aspects of the internal 
constitutions of diamonds and rhinestones that explain their shared superficial properties 
are, we know, not the same; according to Locke’s way of thinking, this would eventually 
be revealed by observation and experiment. Thus while my idea picks out a respect in 
which some particulars superficially resemble one another, I have not thereby picked out 
a respect in which they deeply resemble one another. However, a classification that 
attempts to track real essences understood as common causes will (defeasibly) track deep 
resemblance. But why, Ayers asks, should we think that deep resemblance can draw 
boundaries between kinds any more than superficial resemblance can? According to 
Ayers, “what superficial resemblance cannot do, deep resemblance cannot do either.”228 
In later chapters I argue that we can locate a reason why deep resemblance – 
resemblance in terms of a shared common cause explanation – is indeed that respect of 
resemblance that is relevant to the classification of substances. I argue that we find a clue 
to Locke’s thinking on the matter in his treatment of artifacts. The qualities relevant to an 
artifact’s classification are determined by reference to the artificer’s idea – the idea in 
                                                
227 Ayers, Locke: Epistemology and Ontology, 2:81.  
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accordance with which she makes that artifact. The artificer’s idea fixes the essence of an 
artifact, and so fixes how it is to be classified; or, at least, the artificer’s idea is that to 
which speakers defer when they make their own abstract ideas of the artifactual kind. 
Locke’s claims are revealing, I argue, because natural substances are, on Locke’s view, 
the product of God’s workmanship. God’s ideas, I suggest, play a role similar to that 
played by an artificer’s idea: God’s ideas fix the essences of natural substances. Further, 
these essences are fixed at the level of a substance’s internal structure, which God 
imparts to natural substances when he makes them, and this explains why Locke thinks 
that what Ayers calls deep resemblance is, as I have argued in this chapter, indeed 
relevant to the classification of natural substances. It is notable that Ayers himself admits 
that deep resemblance is something that Locke thinks we should attempt to track in 
classification, although Ayers thinks that this betrays an inconsistency in Locke’s 
account:  
There is in fact a certain tension or inconsistency in Locke’s account. Although he 
is unyielding in his belief that the presumption of an unknown structure can have 
no semantic relevance once the sortal term has been introduced and defined, he 
nevertheless allowed the rationality of such a presumption to play a role at an 
earlier stage, guiding us in the formation of substance-ideas. In general there is an 
implicit suggestion that repeated observation of coexisting qualities and powers is 
requisite to justify the presumption of a recurrent underlying cause of their union, 
and so to justify the formation of a complex idea.229 
 
Ayers seems to be suggesting that there is a tension in Locke’s account because 
he allows deep resemblance to play a role at one stage in the life of a kind term – that of 
determining how we define a term when we introduce it – but not in our verdicts 
regarding whether anything satisfies the genus or species concept to which we annex that 
kind term. But why, Ayers seems to be suggesting, can’t we continue to defer to deep 
                                                
229 Ayers, Locke: Epistemology and Ontology, 2:79.  
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resemblance as what plays a semantic role after we have introduced and defined it? That 
is, why don’t we defer to deep resemblance as what in fact determines whether a 
particular satisfies our genus and species concepts? Or rather, why should deep 
resemblance play a role at that first stage at all?  
It plays that role at the first stage, I’m arguing, because Locke really thought there 
are objective kinds in the world. But we don’t know their essences. And while we defer 
to hypotheses regarding which particulars deeply resemble one another in forming our 
ideas of substantial kinds, we cannot defer to a shared common cause, or real essence, in 
verdicts regarding membership in a kind for the simple reason that we would then never 
be in a position to know whether something in fact belongs to the kind. But Locke thinks 
that we can and certainly should revise and update our genus and species concepts to 
reflect further discoveries and new hypotheses regarding which particulars deeply 
resemble one another. But Locke’s point is that such revisions must result in now 
different parochial species, because such revisions result in different abstract ideas or 
nominal essences, and so result in different conditions on membership in a kind. Contrary 
to Ayers, then, it is not clear that the particular role deep resemblance plays in Locke’s 
account isn’t in fact a feature as opposed to a source of tension within it.  
In the next chapter, I turn to consider a rival to the Idea-Theoretic Account, 
namely, the view that it is not Locke’s theory of ideas that leads Locke to 
conventionalism, but rather his commitment to corpuscularian mechanism.  
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   Chapter V 
 
 Strings, Physies, and Hog’s Bristles: Does Corpuscularianism Entail Conventionalism?  
 
                                             §5.1 Introduction 
 
 
Locke argues that the “species” in terms of which we classify things – the species 
we pick out with our general terms – are the “workmanship of the understanding”. What 
he means is that we classify particulars according to criteria we alone determine. These 
species are thus parochial in that they embody criteria that can be traced to our own 
activity. That activity consists in abstracting features from our ideas of particular 
substances. On Locke’s view, the resulting abstract ideas, or “nominal essences”, 
constitute the only criteria for membership in our parochial kinds. To say, then, that the 
species in terms of which we classify things are parochial is to both capture and 
emphasize the fact that we are solely responsible for individuating criteria for 
membership in these kinds.  
A natural question is whether Locke thinks there are objective kinds apart from 
our parochial kinds. In order to answer that question, the following conditional is often 
tacitly assumed on Locke’s behalf: if there are objective kinds in nature, it must be 
possible to arrive at a non-arbitrary sorting of things. It is often argued that nothing about 
the sensible properties of substances determines which of them ought to be criteria for 
sorting them, in which case sorting substances on the basis of their sensible properties 
must be arbitrary. However, as many have pointed out, acquaintance with the “internal” 
or hidden properties of substances might yet reveal objective criteria for sorting them.  
Citing what I refer to as the Watch passage [henceforth Watches], many of 
Locke’s commentators claim to find evidence that there is no non-arbitrary sorting of 
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substances even supposing acquaintance with their hidden, internal properties. Some, like 
Michael Ayers, have suggested that Locke’s commitment to corpuscularianism motivates 
the view. I argue that these commentators, Ayers included, are mistaken in their reading 
of the passage.  
In Watches, Locke invokes several properties of the internal constitutions of 
“silent” and “striking” watches: some “are made with four Wheels, others with five” 
some “have Strings and Physies, and others none; some have the Balance loose, and 
others regulated by a spiral Spring, and others by Hogs Bristles”. Locke indeed goes on 
to pose the question: “Are any, or all of these enough to make [a difference in species]?” 
However, commentators have missed the fact that Locke poses that question to an 
interlocutor who insists that the wholly parochial distinction in kind between striking and 
silent watches holds independently of a speaker’s regarding them as belonging to distinct 
kinds. And, the interlocutor insists, that distinction in kind holds independently of a 
speaker’s so distinguishing them because striking and silent watches differ in their 
internal constitutions. Locke retorts: which hidden property makes for the “specifick 
difference” – the difference in kind – between silent and striking watches? None do, and 
that is because those hidden properties never constituted criteria for membership in these 
respective parochial kinds. The passage is thus silent regarding whether Locke thinks we 
can arrive at a non-arbitrary sorting of substances on the basis of their hidden, internal 
properties.  
The question still remains: Does Locke think that there is a non-arbitrary sorting 
of substances on the basis of their hidden properties? I argue that what, for Locke, fixes 
which of an artifact’s features are relevant to its classification is the idea in accordance 
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with which a designer realizes that artifact in matter. I go on to suggest that what, for 
Locke, grounds an objective sorting of natural substances are divine ideas in terms of 
which God, the “all-wise Architect”, designs and creates natural substances.  
              
        §5.2 The Watch Passage and the ‘No Objective Kinds’ Reading 
 
 
Locke imagines a Watchmaker acquainted with the hidden mechanical differences 
between the internal constitutions of watches. As several commentators read the passage, 
the watchmaker’s acquaintance with these differences, far from putting him in a position 
to recognize “objective” distinctions between kinds of watch, rather presents him with 
such an array of internal mechanical properties that any choice regarding how to sort 
watches on their basis must be wholly arbitrary. The following excerpt of the passage is 
typically cited:  
There are some Watches, that are made with four Wheels, others with five: Is this 
a specifick difference to the Workman? Some have Strings and Physies, and 
others none; some have the Balance loose, and others regulated by a spiral Spring, 
and others by Hogs Bristles: Are any, or all of these enough to make a specifick 
difference to the Workman, that knows each of these, and several other 
contrivances, in the internal Constitutions of Watches?230  
 
Locke thus appears to be arguing that, when it comes to artifacts, sorting is a hopelessly 
arbitrary affair, even down to the hidden, micro-constitutions of things.  
More importantly, Locke appears to argue that the lesson of the Watchmaker, who 
is acquainted with the internal constitutions of watches and yet unable to locate what is 
sufficient to make for a “distinction of species,” is one that carries over to the case of 
natural substances. Locke writes:  
                                                
230 E III.vi.39: 463.  
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Just thus, I think, it is in natural Things. No body will doubt, that the Wheels, or 
Springs (If I may so say) within, are different in a rational Man, and a 
Changeling, no more than that there is a difference in the frame between a Drill 
and a Changeling.231  
 
In a line of reasoning that should ring familiar, Guyer takes the significance of the 
passage to be that knowledge of the internal constitutions of things will not lift the burden 
of choice when it comes to sorting:  
Locke’s argument…implies that no matter how much objective similarity there is 
between natural entities and how much we know about them, we must still choose 
which similarities to make the basis of our system of classification. This holds 
even if we can recognize the microscopic constitutions of things[.]232  
 
I will not consider Guyer’s reading any further, although the argument I provide in this 
chapter shows it to be mistaken. I turn instead to a reading that appeals not to Locke’s 
theory of meaning, but rather to his commitment to corpuscularian mechanism. This 
requires that we step back from the Watch passage for a moment and canvass some more 
general considerations regarding the significance of mechanism with respect to the 
possibility of objective kinds.  
  
      §5.3 Corpuscularian Mechanism and Objective Kinds 
 
 
Michael Ayers cites two ways in which a mechanist ontology233 might inform 
one’s theory of classification. The first draws on mechanism’s comparison to an 
Aristotelian ontology of “irreducible universals”.234 Consider first the main tenets of 
corpuscularian mechanism, which find a useful summary in Locke’s Elements of Natural 
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Philosophy:   
[I]t may be now fit to consider what sensible bodies are made of, and that is of 
unconceivably small bodies or atoms, out of whose various combinations bigger 
moleculæ are made: and so, by a greater and greater composition, bigger bodies; 
and out of these the whole material world is constituted. By the figure, bulk, 
texture, and motion, of these small and insensible corpuscles, all the phenomena 
of bodies may be explained.235 
 
All of the “phenomena” of sensible bodies, for instance their shapes and sizes, and all of 
their active and passive powers, are to be explained just in terms of the intrinsic features 
of matter. In that case, all of the phenomena of bodies are reducible to the figure, bulk, 
texture, and motion, of small and insensible corpuscles.  
Locke thus provides a reductive account of the phenomena of bodies, and this 
provides a clue to understanding how a commitment to mechanism might entail a certain 
form of anti-realism about kinds. As Ayers explains, what distinguishes the mechanist 
ontology from the Aristotelian world-view is the latter’s commitment to understanding 
natures such as humanity, animality, or, say, ‘dogginess’, as metaphysical items that are 
irreducibly universal. Ayers writes that  
whereas on the Aristotelian story the nature that two human beings or two pieces 
of gold have in common is irreducibly universal, for the mechanist, on the other 
hand, what makes two spheres or two cubes of matter behave in similar ways is 
not a common universal nature but a perspicuous resemblance. There is nothing in 
each case but extended substance within geometrically similar boundaries.236 
 
Ayers concludes that “corpuscularian mechanism provided a framework within which it 
might seem that universals could be reduced to resemblances.”  
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It should be pointed out that corpuscularian mechanism does not obviously 
dispense with universals altogether, as Ayers will concede.237 Ayers’s point rather seems 
to be that, on the Aristotelian view, we find a proliferation of irreducibly universal 
natures – humanity, dogginess – that, on the mechanist view, are in fact reducible to 
something else, namely, modifications of extended substance characterized now by a 
sparse number of fundamental properties (which, depending on one’s view, might 
themselves to be understood as universals).238 Mechanism thus promises to dispense with 
many of the universals posited by the Aristotelian view by providing an account whereby 
such natures find their explanation by reference to the fact that they are entailed by a 
description of what a body possessing such a ‘nature’ is like in terms of its constituent 
corpuscles and their properties and relations.  
One implication of such a view is that the distinctions between things that, on the 
Aristotelian ontology, are grounded in universals – humanity, dogginess – no longer 
appear to be distinctions in kind but rather reveal only differences in the various ways in 
which matter is modified, differences which, so the thinking goes, are now to be 
understood as differences in degree. The Aristotelian recognizes many different natures 
metaphysically distinct from one another. Mechanism reveals that such apparent 
differences in kind are really just differences in how matter, understood in terms of a 
sparse number of properties, is modified. In that case, you might think that a 
classification that distinguishes human beings from dogs tracks nothing more than 
differences in how matter happens to be arranged or disposed in the two cases. The 
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thought that there are distinctions to be drawn over and above how matter is arranged 
loses its foothold. What the Aristotelian conceives of as a nature – humanity or dogginess 
– now does not seem to reveal any facts about how things are to be classified. Even so, it 
might be objected, there are real distinctions to be found between lumps of matter we 
classify as human beings and lumps of matter we classify as dogs. But the mechanist 
picture seems to imply that, were we to group together, say, dogs, daffodils, and 
chocolate milkshakes as belonging to the same lowest species, we would not violate any 
metaphysical facts. Indeed, all the things just described have a common nature, namely, 
they are material things.  
This observation – that all material things have a common nature – might be 
helpful for understanding the second feature of mechanism that, on Ayers’ reading, 
informs Locke’s theory of classification. Mechanism would seem to fail to ground what 
appears to be a necessary condition for the existence of natural kinds, namely, that there 
be very clear, salient and stable differences between things. If there are natural kinds, 
there must be “joints” in nature, which in turn ground a carving of nature at those joints. 
Though the metaphor is too vague to sustain any detailed theorizing, it does provide an 
intuitive gloss as to why a mechanistic picture of bodies fails to offer up any joints. Once 
we descend to the corpuscularian level, we find that the building blocks of things are 
absolutely uniform in character – imagine legos arranged in various ways.239 And there is 
an intuitive line of thought according to which all we find at the corpuscularian level are 
the various ways in which corpuscles (think legos) of various shapes and sizes are 
arranged, as Ayers explains below:  
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The mechanist’s world is one in which all differences are differences of degree, 
and everything, unless an atom, is in principle mutable. For all differences and 
changes are ultimately just differences and changes in the spatial quantity and 
ordering and motion of the parts of things. Crudely, the particular complex 
perceptible things in existence, particular men, horses, oak trees, quantities of 
gold etc., constitute a vast plurality of machines among which there may be 
natural structural resemblances, but no two of which, for all we know, are 
precisely alike. How we should rank them on the basis of our observational 
knowledge is a matter to be more or less pragmatically determined.240 
 
Again, whatever the differences between sensible bodies, then, they are not differences in 
kind but rather differences in degree.  
 Whatever merits of this line of thought – and one might have reason to think that 
it can be resisted – it is, in any case, one that many commentators attribute to Locke. In 
fact, Ayers’s argument appears to be an instance of just the sort of appeal Locke makes in 
the Watch passage, and it is a line of reasoning that William Uzgalis, responding to the 
same passage, echoes. As Uzgalis reads him, Locke is saying that, while many might 
think that acquaintance with the internal constitutions of watches would enable the 
watchmaker to apprehend clear differences between species, in fact he would be at a loss 
as to which features “make for” a “specifick difference,” or a difference in species. 
Uzgalis writes,  
[I]f the Watch-maker has a clear idea of these different mechanisms, surely he 
could classify them on this basis. Locke thinks that this will not be the case. He 
asks: ‘For what is sufficient in the inward Contrivance, to make a new 
Species?’.241  
 
According to Uzgalis, Locke’s reference to all of the minute differences between 
particular watches suggests that watches lie along a continuum by virtue of their 
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mechanical differences. We are thus unable to find the “gaps” that would ground a 
natural sorting of watches into kinds:  
Locke is suggesting that a continuous distribution of different properties among 
the internal mechanisms of watches prevents the watch-maker from finding gaps 
or clear differences between groups, which would mark the boundaries between 
species in a non-arbitrary way. The watch-maker is the analogue of God and the 
analogical implication is that continuity of the distribution of properties on the 
real essence level makes it impossible to find non-arbitrary boundaries of species 
on the real essence level just as it does on the phenomenal level.242  
  
Ayers finds the lesson of the passage to be much the same as Uzgalis, though he places a 
different emphasis on the role that corpuscularianism plays in the argument. According to 
Ayers, Locke is arguing that there is no natural or non-arbitrary point at which to stop 
drawing distinctions between bodies at the corpuscularian level, in which case there are 
no naturally lowest species:  
Locke is here arguing that there are no naturally last species because there is no 
end to the structural differences between members of any species we like to name, 
differences any one of which might just as well be made the basis for a finer 
division between species. He is indeed saying that knowledge of the real 
constitutions would leave us with the need for choice, but the argument is 
palpably and crucially appealing to a mechanistic model, and to the thought that 
structural or mechanical differences will always exist between complex 
individuals however fine our divisions, and cannot be regarded as essential or 
accidental independently of our divisions. For one mechanical difference is as 
good a ground for distinction as another—there is no principled difference 
between them.243  
 
Ayers and Uzgalis then seize upon the analogy Locke draws between the internal 
constitutions of watches and the “Wheels” and “Springs” of natural substances – e.g., 
between men, changelings (the mentally incompetent), and drills (baboons) – as evidence 
that their classification, too, is a hopelessly arbitrary affair. The underlying thought 
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articulated by both Ayers and Uzgalis is that, while all will agree that classification, on 
Locke’s view, is arbitrary at the level of observable qualities (a mistaken view, as I 
argued in the previous chapter), perhaps classification isn’t arbitrary at the level of 
microstructure. As Ayers and Uzgalis read it, the Watch Passage blocks the possibility of 
such a reading: classification is arbitrary at any level of description. 
In summary, as commentators like Ayers and Uzgalis read Watches, there are at 
the level of the real constitutions of things no clear or obvious gaps between individuals 
that would ground a non-arbitrary sorting of them. In addition, Ayers argues that there is 
an indefinite variety of differences between the internal constitutions of things such that 
we could always draw finer distinctions between them, and so there is no non-arbitrary 
point at which we should stop. These claims appear to be articulated in the Watch 
passage, and also appear to be entailed by Locke’s commitment to corpuscularianism. It 
seems there are decisive reasons for thinking that Locke denies the possibility of an 
objective sorting of substances. I will refer to this as the No Objective Kinds reading, 
henceforth NOK.  
 In what follows I argue that Watches is silent as to whether there are objective 
kinds in nature. That is, I argue that whether a sorting of things on the basis of their 
internal constitutions is arbitrary is not Locke’s intended topic in the watch passage. 
What, then, of Locke’s commitment to corpuscularian mechanism, which, for reasons 
articulated by Ayers, appears to entail conventionalism? As we have seen, one premise of 
the argument from mechanism is that all mechanical similarities and differences are, from 
the perspective of classification, on a par with one another, in which case there are no 
objective facts about which mechanical similarities and differences are relevant to a 
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thing’s classification. In the next sections, I argue that, contrary to Ayers’s and Uzgalis’s 
readings of the Watch passage, Locke does not embrace this purported consequence of 
corpuscularian mechanism.  
 
                      §5.4 The necessity of general names in ‘completing a Species’ 
 
 
I will argue that Locke makes two claims in Watches, both of which are 
orthogonal to whether there is an objective sorting of substances on the basis of their 
internal constitutions. According to my reading, Locke is first claiming that whether a 
speaker regards some qualitative difference between things as a difference in kind 
depends on which general terms are a part of her vocabulary. And which general terms 
are part of a speaker’s vocabulary depends in turn on conventions established by her 
linguistic community, conventions about which qualitative differences between things are 
to be regarded as making for a difference in kind.  
Second, Locke is challenging a pervasive tendency of ours to assume that the 
parochial species we make – the species we pick out with our general terms – are not in 
fact the product of our own workmanship, but are rather “made by nature”. Part and 
parcel of this tendency is our commitment to the claim that the unknown constitutions or 
real essences of things are what in fact make it the case that something belongs to one of 
our parochial kinds. Locke will remind us, however, that we individuate our parochial 
kinds in terms of known qualities. The hidden and thus unknown real essences or real 
constitutions of things do not constitute the basis upon which our parochial kinds are 
individuated.  
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Rather than ruling out the possibility of a nonarbitrary sorting of artifacts and 
natural substances, Locke’s aim in Watches is thus (i) to demonstrate the role general 
terms play in grounding facts about the taxonomical distinctions a language user is 
disposed to make, a role he describes as “completing a species”; and (ii) to show that 
nothing apart from criteria that constitute our parochial kinds determines membership in 
these kinds.  
Let’s consider (i). A speaker’s vocabulary of general terms, Locke argues, plays a 
necessary role in explaining the taxonomical distinctions a speaker is disposed to make. 
Locke describes that role as “completing” a species, which brings to mind his 
Workmanship metaphor. Our work in making a parochial kind is not “complete” unless 
we annex a unique general term to an abstract idea or nominal essence. Note how Locke 
opens Watches:  
How much the making of Species and Genera is in order to general names, and 
how much general Names are necessary, if not to the Being, yet at least to the 
completing of a Species, and making it pass for such, will appear, besides what 
has been said above concerning Ice and Water, in a very familiar Example. A 
silent and a striking Watch, are but one Species, to those who have but one name 
for them: but he that has the name Watch for one, and Clock for the other, and 
distinct complex Ideas, to which those names belong, to him they are different 
Species.244 
 
If a speaker uses the name “watch” to pick out both silent and striking watches, then for 
that speaker, silent and striking watches belong to the same species. But if a different 
speaker uses the term “watch” to pick out silent watches, and uses the term “clock” to 
pick out striking watches, then for her, silent and striking watches belong to distinct 
species.  
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Locke notes that he has already illustrated just this point—why names are 
necessary for completing a species—with another example that occurs earlier in Book III, 
an example involving the case of Ice and Water. Locke imagines an Englishman bred in 
Jamaica who visits England in winter and encounters frozen water for the first time:  
If I should ask any one, whether Ice or Water were two distinct Species of Things, 
I doubt not but I should be answered in the affirmative: And it cannot be denied, 
but that he that says they are two distinct Species, is in the right. But if an 
English-man, bred in Jamaica, who, perhaps, had never seen nor heard of Ice, 
coming into England in the Winter, find, the Water he put in the Bason at night, 
in a great part frozen in the morning; and not knowing any peculiar name it had, 
should call it harden’d Water; I ask, Whether this would be a new Species to him, 
different from Water? And, I think, it would be answered here, It would not to 
him be a new Species, no more than congealed Gelly, when it is cold, is a distinct 
Species, from the same Gelly fluid and warm; or that liquid Gold, in the Fornace, 
is a distinct Species from hard Gold in the hands of a Workman. And if this be so, 
‘tis plain, that our distinct Species, are nothing but distinct complex Ideas, with 
distinct Names annexed to them.245  
 
Though we, Locke’s readers, distinguish liquid from frozen water as distinct species,246 
Locke argues that “hardened water” is not a new “species” of substance to the Traveler 
because he does not have a distinct general name for it.  
In both the Ice/Water passage and the Watch passage Locke is arguing that a 
speaker’s regarding two qualitatively different things as belonging to distinct kinds 
depends on her using distinct general terms for each. Thus, while x and y might differ 
qualitatively – where x and y might be ice and water, or silent and striking watches – and 
though a speaker’s recognition of that fact may be cashed out in terms of a speaker’s 
having an idea of x which is distinct from her idea of y, her having ideas that reflect that 
qualitative difference between x and y are not yet sufficient for her to distinguish x and y 
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as belonging to distinct species. In order for her to regard them as belonging to distinct 
species she must assign distinct general terms to each idea. If she does not assign distinct 
general terms to each idea, she is likely to mark the difference between x and y with some 
description that deploys the same general term, for instance, what we find in the 
descriptions “water” and “harden’d water” or “congealed Gelly” and “Gelly fluid and 
Warm”. But when she does the latter – that is, when she uses distinct descriptions using 
the same general term – she does not distinguish the two things as instances of distinct 
species.  
 Returning to Watches, Locke argues that the same must be said of the man who 
employs the general term Watch for all timepieces, including those that are “silent” and 
those that are “striking”. In that case, “a silent and a striking Watch” are “but one 
Species” to him, because he has “but one name for them.” Conversely, “he that has the 
name Watch for one [silent watches], and Clock for the other [striking watches], and 
distinct complex Ideas, to which those names belong, to him they are different Species.” 
However, an imagined interlocutor responds: surely what makes for the 
distinction in kind between silent and striking watches amounts to something independent 
of a speaker’s employment of distinct general terms for each. For these two kinds of 
watch must be different in their internal constitutions. Furthermore, the Watchmaker has 
an idea of these different constitutions:  
It will be said, perhaps, that the inward contrivance and constitution is different 
between these two [silent and striking watches], which the Watch-maker has a 
clear Idea of. 
 
The moral of Watches lies in Locke’s reply to precisely this challenge. That challenge 
can be articulated as follows: “Contrary to what you, Locke, say, the measures of 
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parochial species like watch and clock are independent of linguistic practice, independent 
of our making nominal essences and annexing general terms to them. Membership in 
these parochial species is determined by the internal constitutions of things themselves.”  
In the next section I argue that we find guidance for how to read Locke’s response 
to this challenge in a passage I refer to as Creatures.   
 
§5.5 ‘Our measures of Species are only our abstract Ideas’ 
 
 
 In the previous section, I suggested that Locke makes two claims in Watches. The 
first has to do with the role general terms play with respect to whether a speaker regards a 
qualitative difference between two things as a difference in kind. Locke then imagines an 
objector who disputes this claim. The objector argues that, whether or not a speaker 
happens to regard, say, silent and striking watches as belonging to two distinct species, 
there really is a difference in kind between them, and the reason they belong to distinct 
species lies in the fact that they must differ in their internal constitutions. In order to 
adjudicate this dispute, Locke asks us to consider what the Watchmaker would be able to 
do on the basis of his knowledge of the internal constitutions of watches. If the objector is 
correct, Locke argues, the Watchmaker should be able to identify, just on the basis of his 
acquaintance with the differences in internal constitution between various watches, which 
internal mechanical properties make it the case that silent and striking watches belong to 
distinct species.  
However, Locke clearly thinks that the Watchmaker can’t locate which of the 
internal mechanical properties of various watches make a “specific” difference, that is, 
which of their properties make it the case that a watch possessing that property belongs to 
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a distinct lower species of watch from others. And if the watchmaker can’t identify any of 
these internal mechanical properties as difference making properties, it follows that he 
will not be able to identify those mechanical features that underwrite a watch’s behavior, 
say, its behavior as a striking watch, as a difference making property. And that, Locke 
thinks, contradicts the objector’s claim that a watchmaker would be able to identify 
striking watches as distinct species from silent watches just on the basis of his 
acquaintance with the internal constitutions of watches.  
The question that faces us as interpreters is why Locke thinks that the watchmaker 
cannot locate which of the various internal mechanical properties of watches are 
“sufficient” to make for a difference in kind. Ayers et al. will say that it is because of the 
nature of mechanism. There just are no specific differences to be found. Contrary to this 
reading, I will suggest that we find the answer to that question if we pay close attention to 
the task the watchmaker is faced with. We can get a better grip on the nature of that task 
if we turn to yet another passage, what I’ll refer to as the Creatures passage. Not only 
does the passage offer guidance for how we should understand the nature of the task the 
Watchmaker is faced with, it supplies an answer to why the Watchmaker cannot locate a 
specific difference in the internal constitutions of watches.  
In Creatures Locke writes:  
There are Creatures…that have shapes like ours, but are hairy, and want 
Language, and Reason. There are Naturals247…that have perfectly our shape, but 
want Reason, and some of them Language too. There are creatures…that with 
                                                
247 By a “Natural” Locke means what he elsewhere refers to as a Changeling, a creature that has 
the shape and appearance of a human being but lacks rationality. We find the following definition of the 
term “Natural” in the Oxford English Dictionary: “A person having a low learning ability or intellectual 
capacity; a person born with impaired intelligence.” The Oxford English Dictionary, Third edition, June 
2003; online version December 2011. <http://www.oed.com.ezp 
prod1.hul.harvard.edu/view/Entry/125332>; accessed 12 January 2012. An entry for this word was first 
included in New English Dictionary, 1906. 
 
 141 
Language, and Reason, and a shape in other Things agreeing with ours, have hairy 
Tails; others where the Males have no beards, and others where the Females have. 
If it be asked, whether these be all Men, or no, all of humane Species; ‘tis plain, 
the Question refers only to the nominal Essence. For those of them to whom the 
definition of the Word Man, and the other not.248 
 
Here Locke provocatively cites creatures that invite doubt about how to classify them. 
And while “’tis plain” to Locke that whether they are of “humane Species” “refers only to 
the nominal essence” of Man, Locke understands this will satisfy few of his readers. 
Elsewhere Locke notes:  
When a man asks, whether this or that thing he sees, let it be a Drill, or a 
monstrous Foetus, be a Man, or no; ‘tis evident, the Question is not, Whether that 
particular thing agree to his complex Idea, expressed by the name Man: But 
whether it has in it the real Essence of a Species of Things, which he supposes his 
name, Man to stand for.249  
 
When we ask whether a Drill (a baboon) belongs to the parochial species man we are not 
concerned to answer that question in reference to our nominal essence. Rather, we tacitly 
assume that what makes it the case that something is a man is not its agreement with 
criteria embodied in our nominal essence, but its possession of a real essence. But this, 
Locke points out, is to treat the kind man not as a parochial species, i.e., as a species 
made by us, but rather as a species “made by nature”. Nature, so the mistaken assumption 
goes, makes the species man by imparting a supposed “real essence” – the real essence of 
man – to particulars that are men. The species is thus understood to be prior to and 
independent of any way we happen to define it in our nominal essence.  
Returning to Creatures, Locke writes:   
But if the Enquiry be made concerning the supposed real Essence; and whether 
the internal Constitution and Frame of these several Creatures be specifically 
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different, it is wholly impossible for us to answer, no part of that going into our 
specific Idea [nominal essence][.] 
 
The “Enquiry” Locke mentions in this passage concerns whether “these several Creatures 
be specifically different”. By “specifically” Locke means species-wise. Are these 
creatures different in kind because of differences in their “internal Constitution and 
Frame”?  
That question is impossible to answer, Locke replies, because “no part of” the 
internal constitution and Frame of these creatures goes into the nominal essence of man. 
It is important to see, then, that Locke takes the enquiry not to be whether differences 
between the internal constitutions of these creatures make for just any difference in kind, 
but rather whether they make a difference to their being men. It is “impossible” to answer 
that question, not because these differences in internal constitution are hidden, but rather 
because these differences are irrelevant to whether they are men. Invoking them in order 
to answer that question is otiose.  
 Certainly, as Locke admits:  
…only we have Reason to think, that where the Faculties, or outward Frame so 
much differs, the internal Constitution is not exactly the same[.] 
 
That is, differences in the sensible qualities of these creatures – differences in faculties or 
outward frame – indicate that they are correspondingly different in their internal 
constitutions. But, Locke writes:  
[W]hat difference in the internal real Constitution makes a specifick difference, it 
is in vain to enquire; whilst our measures of Species be, as they are, only our 
abstract Ideas, which we know; and not that internal Constitution, which makes 
no part of them.250 
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The lesson of Creatures is thus to unmask and debunk a way of thinking about our 
parochial kinds. We are liable to treat them not as the product of our own workmanship 
but rather as species “made by nature”. In Creatures this mistaken way of thinking is 
exposed when we invoke the real constitutions of things as the basis for settling questions 
about membership in a parochial kind. In the next section I argue that a similar lesson is 
at work in Watches.  
                                       
    §5.6 Watches Revisited 
 
 
In Watches, an interlocutor suggests that surely what makes for the distinction in 
kind between silent and striking watches is something independent of whether a speaker 
employs a distinct general term for each. For these two kinds of watch are different in 
their internal constitutions.  
In response, Locke appeals to an overwhelming array of hidden mechanical 
properties and asks: “Are any, or all of these enough to make [a difference in species] to 
the Workman?” Call this the Rhetorical Question. According to commentators, Locke 
invokes the Rhetorical Question to argue that no one of these mechanical properties 
stands out as the basis for distinguishing distinct species, in which case any sorting of 
substances by their hidden properties must be arbitrary.  
However, the Rhetorical Question is aimed at showing, not that sorting by internal 
constitutions is arbitrary, but that differences in internal constitution are silent regarding 
whether there is a parochial distinction in kind between two things that differ from one 
another qualitatively. Timepieces that differ in their outward behavior – for instance 
those that differ in terms of whether they are striking or silent – certainly differ in their 
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internal constitutions, since it is in light of those differences that differences in their 
observable behavior are to be explained. However, the distinction in kind between silent 
and striking watches is a parochial distinction. It is not written into the natures of things, 
but rather drawn by human beings on the basis of criteria they deem significant. Whether 
timepieces that differ in internal constitution belong to the same parochial species or to 
different parochial species depends not on those differences but on the content of the 
nominal essence (or nominal essences) for the parochial kind (or kinds) in question.  
To see this, note that one speaker’s nominal essence and corresponding general 
term may embrace both silent and striking watches, while another speaker’s nominal 
essence and corresponding general term may exclude striking watches as belonging to a 
distinct species of watch. Differences in internal constitution between silent and striking 
watches are thus idle with respect to the parochial distinction between silent and striking 
watches; in some cases watches that differ in internal constitution belong to the same 
parochial species, in other cases to distinct parochial species. And that shows that facts 
about whether watches belong to the same or to distinct parochial species do not depend 
on differences in internal constitution.  
If Locke’s objector were right, there should be some difference in the internal 
constitutions of watches that are specific differences, and they should be specific 
differences independently of the parochial criteria in terms of which speakers distinguish 
striking from silent watches as belonging to distinct kinds. In that case, the watchmaker 
ought to be able to identify those internal mechanical differences as specific differences, 
and he must be able to do so just by eyeballing them, so to speak. That is – and this is the 
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crucial point – he should be able to identify them as specific differences independently of 
any nominal essence.  
Thus I’m suggesting that the reason that the watchmaker cannot identify any 
internal mechanical differences as specific differences is because, ex hypothesi, he has no 
nominal essence in light of which any of these internal mechanical properties count as 
specific differences. And on Locke’s view it’s going to follow quite clearly that the 
Watchmaker is going to come up empty handed, because nothing counts as a specific 
difference independently of any nominal essence. That is, Locke subscribes to what 
might be the more familiar Quinian dictum, namely, that nothing is essential to a thing 
independently of any way of describing it. A feature is a specific difference only in 
relation to some nominal essence.  
In that case, it should come as no surprise that the watchmaker is unable to locate 
any of these features as sufficient to make for a specific difference. Here a simple-minded 
analogy may be helpful for illustrating the point. Suppose you were charged with the task 
of evaluating whether particulars in the world are bachelors on the basis of their mass 
alone. But the criteria for bachelorhood make no reference to the mass of a thing. So 
something’s mass is going to be silent with respect to whether a thing is a bachelor. Were 
we to attempt to sort things into bachelors and non-bachelors by reference to their mass 
alone we would be at a loss. I’m suggesting that we read Locke as making a similar point: 
The internal constitutions of various creatures are going to be silent as to whether they 
are men; that is, they are going to be silent as to whether they belong to the parochial 
species we pick out with the general term ‘man’. And, likewise, the internal constitutions 
of clocks are going to be silent (no pun intended) as to whether there is a distinction in 
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kind between silent and striking watches because that distinction in kind is a parochial 
distinction individuated solely in terms of the outward, observable behavior of watches.  
Still, some might argue, the Rhetorical Question has implications beyond what I 
claim is its intended meaning. For how would we sort watches on the basis of their 
internal constitutions? Isn’t it true that no one of their internal, mechanical properties 
would stand out as the basis for distinguishing watches as belonging to distinct species, in 
which case any sorting of them by their hidden properties must be arbitrary?  
In the following chapter I take a closer look at Locke’s claim that we defer to an 
artificer’s idea or nominal essence as a standard in light of which we determine which of 
an artifact’s properties are relevant to its classification. I take this to be a clue for how to 
think about natural substances, and I go on to suggest the following line of interpretation. 
The real essences of natural substances are individuated in terms of God’s workmanship. 
Just as a watchmaker, acting in accordance with his idea of a kind of thing – a watch – 
“frames” matter such that it gives rise to a watch’s characteristic behavior – behavior that 
matter would not otherwise and of its own accord display – God “frames” matter at the 
level of a body’s microstructure such that the resulting body exhibits features 
characteristic of its kind. It seems reasonable to assume, then, that like the artificer, God 
does so according to his ideas of kinds. What kinds there are, then, is a matter of God’s 
ideas. That existing particulars are instances of these kinds is explained by appeal to 
God’s workmanship, or his framing matter in various ways when he creates substances.  
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         Chapter VI 
  
   Artifacts, Natural Substances, and God’s Workmanship 
 
        §6.1 Artifacts and natural substances 
 
 
 
Immediately following Watches, Locke explains that speakers have no trouble 
settling on definitions of artifactual kinds because they can easily identify the features in 
virtue of which an artifact is the kind of thing it is:  
[A]n artificial Thing being a production of Man, which the Artificer design’d, and 
therefore well knows the Idea of, the name of it is supposed to stand for no other 
Idea, nor import any other Essence, than what is certainly to be known and easily 
enough to be apprehended.251  
 
First, we understand artifacts as products of design and often in terms of a 
function or purpose bestowed on them by a designer. Second, Locke claims that because 
a contriver (designer) fashions the contrivances or features in virtue of which a thing has 
its characteristic purpose or function, the features that are characteristic of the kind are, in 
the usual case, sensible to all who would form an idea of that kind of artifact.  
Locke concludes: “it is not beyond the reach of our Faculties to attain a certain 
Idea thereof; and so settle the signification of the Names, whereby the Species of 
artificial Things are distinguished[.]”252 The reasons are clear. Artifacts are the artifactual 
kinds of things they are in virtue of being made to realize features a designer intends 
them to have, where such features are often understood in terms of a function or 
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purpose.253 In the usual case, Locke appears to be suggesting, what these features are is a 
matter that is transparent to us. In the usual case, we have a sufficient grip on which 
features a thing ought to have in order to be, say, a clock. Locke writes that the “Idea, or 
Essence, of the several sorts of artificial Things, [consists], for the most part, in nothing 
but the determinate Figure of sensible Parts; and sometimes Motion depending thereon, 
which the Artificer fashions in Matter, such as he finds for his Turn.”254 The question 
regarding which features of an artifact are relevant to its being the kind of artifact it is, 
and so which features are relevant to its classification, is something about which we can, 
in principle, be certain.  
It seems, then, that we can motivate the idea that there is a privileged 
classification of artifacts in terms of a designer’s nominal essence. Further, to argue that 
there is a privileged classification of artifacts is compatible with Locke’s claims 
regarding the role that general terms play in grounding facts about what constitutes a 
“specifick difference”. However, we might think that it is the designer’s nominal essence 
that we privilege when we develop a taxonomy of artifacts. In fact, Locke’s claim that “in 
the Species of artificial Things, there is generally less confusion and uncertainty, than in 
natural” suggests that we do defer to a common standard, which cuts down on 
disagreement regarding how to define artifactual kinds.  
Unlike artifacts, we distinguish the species of natural substances with “Doubt, 
Obscurity and Equivocation”. This is because, Locke says, their “differences and 
                                                
253 It follows, then, that a thing that is designed to realize that function, but which, for whatever 
reason, fails in that realization, would count as an instance of that kind – for instance, a broken watch.  
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Operations depend upon Contrivances, beyond the reach of our Discoveries”.255 Note that 
the contrast Locke draws between artifacts and natural substances is epistemological. In 
the next section I take a closer look at this line of thought, which surfaces throughout the 
Essay, namely, that if we had insight into the features of natural substances relevant to 
their classification – their real essences – we would have no trouble settling on relatively 
clear and certain meanings for our kind terms because these essences would fix their 
significations in much the way that an artificer’s idea fixes the significations of the names 
of artifactual kinds. Then, in the section that follows (6.3), I adduce some considerations 
for thinking that objective kinds are, on Locke’s view, to be understood by reference to 
divine ideas and God’s workmanship.  
  
        §6.2 Real Essences and the Names of Substances 
 
      
Locke traces the ultimate source of the variability in the criteria speakers attach to 
the same general term to “our want of Knowledge, and Inability to penetrate into 
[substances’] real Constitutions”.256 Thus it appears that the variability we find in the 
signification of the names of substances arises because we don’t know what would fix 
their significations: we don’t know their ‘real Constitutions’, what he also refers to as 
their “real essences” or “formal constitutions”.  
In fact, Locke claims that, were we to know the real essence or “formal 
constitution” of a particular substance that possesses all those features commonly thought 
to give a particular a right to the name ‘gold’, we would be able to “ascertain” the 
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signification of that word as easily as we are able to ascertain the signification of the 
word ‘triangle’.257 Thus Locke endorses the following conditional: if we knew the real 
essences of substances, our ideas of these real essences would fix the signification of 
their names.  
But what is it about the “formal constitution” or real essence of a triangle that 
makes it easy to ascertain the signification of its name? As we have already seen, one of 
the themes of Locke’s discussion of language and classification is the variable criteria 
speakers attach to the same general term, although we have thus far focused on the case 
of substantial kinds.258 And the cases in which that variability is most pronounced are 
those in which the names in question pick out complex or “compounded” ideas, that is, 
ideas that consist in a number of simple ideas of their qualities. Thus the names of simple 
ideas, Locke says, are the least likely to be confused and uncertain. Moving from simple 
ideas to ideas that have slightly more complexity, we find that examples of what Locke 
calls simple modes, for instance, ideas of “figure” and “number,” are “least liable to 
doubt or uncertainty” because they are the “least compounded” of their kind:  
[T]he names of simple Modes are next to those of simple Ideas, least liable to 
Doubt or Uncertainty, especially those of Figure and Number, of which Men 
have so clear and distinct Ideas. Who ever, that had a Mind to understand them, 
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258 The same can be said of the species of ‘mixed modes’, which is arguably a bit of grab-bag 
category, but consists primarily of our ideas of moral and social kinds. Our ideas of the species of mixed 
modes are, like our ideas of substantial kinds, variable, and for the following reason: “[T]hough the Names 
of simple Ideas, have not the help of Definition to determine their signification; yet that hinders not but that 
they are generally less doubtful and uncertain, than those of mixed Modes and Substances. […] There is 
neither a multiplicity of simple ideas to be put together, which makes the doubtfulness in the Names of 
mixed Modes; nor a supposed, but an unknown real Essence, with properties depending thereon, the 
precise number whereof are also unknown, which makes the difficulty in the Names of Substances. But on 
the contrary, in simple Ideas the whole signification of the Name is known at once, and consists not of 
parts, whereof more or less being put in, the Idea may be varied, and so the signification of its Name, be 
obscure, or uncertain” (E III.iv.15: 427).  
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mistook the ordinary meaning of Seven, or a Triangle? And in general the least 
compounded Ideas in every kind have the least dubious names.259 
 
Since the formal constitution, or real essence, of a triangle consists in just three lines 
enclosing a space, the signification of its name is easy to ascertain, in which case there 
isn’t a great deal of room for variability in the criteria speakers attach to that name, and 
so simple modes like a triangle have the “least dubious names”.  
Above we saw Locke proposing that the signification of the term ‘gold’ would be 
as easy to ascertain as the signification of the term ‘triangle’ were we to know the formal 
constitution of a particular substance that has the properties commonly associated with 
the general term ‘gold’. Locke appears to be suggesting that, were we to know the formal 
constitution of that substance, there would not be “confusion and uncertainty” with 
respect to the significance of the term ‘gold’. And the reason, Locke is suggesting, is that 
we would apprehend something relatively simple, as simple as the definition of a triangle. 
In that case, the idea would be “compounded” to a small degree, and so would limit the 
various possible ways various speakers might define the term. Returning to the example 
of a triangle, notice that there are very few ways that a speaker could vary her definition 
of a triangle from that of other speakers while still counting as thinking and talking about 
a triangle.  
In order to appreciate Locke’s point, it’s helpful to note his explanation for why 
our ideas of substantial kinds are all over the place. Since we don’t know their real 
essences, we are consigned to collecting the various candidate qualities of substances – 
their propria, or those qualities that we can reasonably hypothesize to flow from their 
unknown real essences. But these qualities are “endless”. In addition, speakers “cannot 
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doubt, but different Men may have discovered several Qualities in Substances of the 
same Denomination, which others know nothing of.”260 By this method of defining 
substantial kinds there is thus enormous room for variability in the way that speakers 
define them. But all of these factors would not be in play, Locke is suggesting, were we 
to know the real essences of substances. This is confirmed by Locke’s remark that “The 
great disorder that happens in our Names of Substances” proceeds “for the most part from 
our want of Knowledge, and Inability to penetrate into their real Constitutions.”261 
In addition, when Locke considers what it would mean to have an idea of 
something’s real essence, Locke appears to conceive of it as a matter of our 
apprehending it, that is, as a matter of discovery. Or so I will argue below.  
In chapter IV we saw Locke describe two possible ways we might come to know 
the properties that belong to a kind. We can “collect” them piecemeal, as we do in the 
case of substances by trial and experiment. Thus Adam subjects the piece of matter he 
names ‘zahab’ to various proto-experiments, e.g., “he finds it will bend without 
breaking.”262 Or we can, as we do in the case of geometrical figures, start from their real 
essences and derive their properties. Of course, the latter method is unavailable to us in 
the case of substances. Locke writes:   
In the Knowledge of Bodies, we must be content to glean, what we can, from 
particular Experiments: since we cannot from a Discovery of their real Essences, 
grasp at a time whole Sheaves; and in bundles, comprehend the Nature and 
Properties of whole Species together.263  
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262 Locke adds: “Is not now Ductility to be added to his former Idea, and made part of the Essence 
of the Species, that Name Zahab stands for?” (! III.vi.47: 469).  
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I argued in chapter IV that the properties belonging to substantial sorts are a 
matter of discovery. I then argued that Voluntarism, according to which properties that 
are a matter of discovery are to be understood as qualities common to particulars falling 
within conventionally imposed boundaries, did not have the resources to account for 
Locke’s story of how Adam introduces a new sortal term ‘zahab’ to denominate a piece 
of matter that “no Body…will deny to be a distinct Species, and to have its peculiar 
Essence[.]”264  
In the “sheaves and bundles” passage cited above, we find Locke claiming that 
real essences are a matter of discovery.265 Further, it appears that the properties that we 
would apprehend ‘at a time’ in ‘whole Sheaves’ by grasping a real essence are just those 
properties that we glean from observation and particular experiments. But Locke’s claim 
that properties and the real essences that flow from them are a matter of discovery 
suggests that there are two routes to determining the signification of a kind term. In fact, 
it is just this contrast between two ways of coming to know the signification of a kind 
term that provides context to the claim we saw at the beginning of this section, namely, 
that we could easily ascertain the signification of ‘gold’ if we knew the real essence.  
In the passage in which we find these remarks, Locke describes the ways we 
make the signification of the names of substances known to others. Locke first suggests 
we show a sample of a substance we call gold to a subject so that by sight she can see 
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265 Of course, it would still be a matter of abstraction to arrive at general ideas of these real 
essences. For, as I will argue in the next chapter, real essences are to be understood as some aspect of the 
totality of a thing’s microstructure, which aspect is individuated by God’s workmanship. Thus to apprehend 
a real essence is much like what it means to apprehend the propria of body: we select them out from all the 
further observable qualities that we find in the thing but which we have reason to believe are not propria.  
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some of its “leading” qualities. But since this method fails to make known the less 
obvious qualities belonging to the sample – its ductility, fusibility, fixedness and 
solubility in aqua regia – Locke suggests we enumerate them to our observer:  
[B]ecause many of the simple Ideas that make up our specifick Ideas of 
Substances, are Powers, which lie not obvious to our Senses in the Things as they 
ordinarily appear; therefore, in the signification of our Names of Substances, some 
part of the signification will be better made known, by enumerating those simple 
Ideas, than in shewing the Substance it self. For he that, to the yellow shining 
Colour of Gold got by sight, shall, from my enumerating them, have the Ideas of 
great Ductility, Fusibility, Fixedness, and Solubility, in Aqua Regia, will have a 
perfecter Idea of Gold, than he can have by seeing a piece of Gold, and thereby 
imprinting in his Mind only its obvious Qualities.266  
 
However, the easiest way to get at the signification of “the Names of Substances as they 
stand for the Ideas we have of their distinct Species” is to know their real essences:  
But if the formal Constitution of this shining, heavy, ductil Thing (from whence 
all these Properties flow) lay open to our Senses, as the formal Constitution, or 
Essence of a Triangle does, the signification of the word Gold, might as easily be 
ascertained, as that of Triangle.267  
 
In coming to know the source of properties we otherwise collect by trial and 
experiment, why does Locke think that we come to know something that is easy to 
ascertain? Above we saw that the significations of the names of simple modes like figure 
and number are easily ascertained because there are few components to our complex 
ideas of them. Our complex idea of a simple mode like a triangle is an idea of its real 
essence. Locke describes that real essence as lying in “a very little compass”, and so easy 
to ascertain. In the passage below, Locke compares the real essence of a triangle to the 
real essences of substances:  
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The essence of a Triangle, lies in a very little compass, consists in a very few 
Ideas; three Lines including a Space, make up that Essence: But the Properties 
that flow from this Essence, are more than can be easily known, or enumerated. 
So I imagine it is in Substances, their real Essences lie in a little compass; though 
the Properties flowing from that internal Constitution, are endless.268  
 
Michael Ayers notes Locke’s claim that the signification of the term ‘gold’ would be easy 
to ascertain were we to know the real essence. Recognizing the suggestion of an objective 
criterion for the definition of a species, Ayers counters:  
Yet this means, not that we would then perceive the objective boundary of a 
species, but that we could then fix and agree on a nominal essence consisting of a 
relatively few mechanical properties, as in the classification of machines with 
observable working parts, or indeed of geometrical figures.269  
 
Ayers resists the reading I have articulated in this section because he thinks that, on 
Locke’s view, nothing could supply objective boundaries: “Locke really believed that 
nothing on earth” supplies objective boundaries between kinds.270 The argument of this 
chapter and the next is that there are reasons for thinking that God supplies the objective 
boundaries between kinds.  
 
            §6.3 Natural Substances and God’s Workmanship 
 
 
Which features of natural substances are relevant to their classification? I argue in 
the next chapter that God makes substances such that they have real essences distinctive 
of their kind. There is thus a case to be made for thinking that the factors that determine 
which of an artifact’s features are relevant to its being the kind of artifact it is – and thus 
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relevant to its classification – are also at work in the case of natural substances. Locke 
describes the natural world as “The Workmanship of the All-wise, and Powerful God,”271 
and he describes God as “the infinite wise Contriver of us, and all things about us”.272 
This suggests that natural substances are the products God’s design, in which case an 
objective sorting of natural substances would be grounded in God’s ideas.  
However, we have limited insight into the natures of natural substances. We are 
privy only to the outward signs of their internal “contrivances” or mechanisms, much as 
the “gazing Country-man,” standing before the Strasburg Clock, “barely sees the motion 
of the Hand…hears the Clock strike, and observes only some of the outward 
appearances.” The Countryman’s idea is “far different from” he “who knows all the 
Springs and Wheels, and other contrivances within.”273  
Locke himself exploits the analogy between what the gazing countryman can 
observe of the Strasburg Clock and what we’re in a position to observe in natural 
substances. Locke writes:  
Our faculties carry us no farther towards the knowledge and distinction of 
[natural] Substances, than a Collection of those sensible Ideas, which we observe 
in them; which however made with the greatest diligence and exactness, we are 
capable of, yet is more remote from the true internal Constitution, from which 
those Qualities flow, than…a Countryman’s Idea is from the inward contrivance 
of that famous Clock at Strasburg, whereof he only sees the outward Figure and 
Motions.274 
 
It is worth noting Locke’s appeal to a countryman – he is presumably someone for whom 
the Strasburg Clock is a completely novel thing. As such, he figures in an analogy Locke 
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draws between the workmanship of God and the workmanship of the “most ingenious 
Man”:  
The Workmanship of the All-wise, and Powerful God, in the great Fabrick of the 
Universe, and every part thereof, farther exceeds the Capacity and 
Comprehension of the most inquisitive and intelligent Man, than the best 
contrivance of the most ingenious Man, doth the Conceptions of the most ignorant 
of rational Creatures. (III.vi.9: 444) 
 
To put it quaintly, we are all gazing countrymen with respect to God’s workmanship. 
“Our faculties carry us no farther towards the knowledge and distinction of [natural] 
Substances, than a Collection of those sensible Ideas, which we observe in them[.]” 
Locke observes that “[t]here is not so contemptible a Plant or Animal, that does not 
confound the most inlarged Understanding.” And what “counfounds” the understanding 
is the “make” of natural things. Locke writes:  
When we…examine the Stones, we tread on; or the Iron, we daily handle, we 
presently find, we know not their Make; and can give no Reason, of the different 
Qualities we find in them. ‘Tis evident the internal Constitution, whereon their 
Properties depend, is unknown to us […] What is that Texture of Parts, that real 
Essence, that makes Lead, and Antimony fusible…And yet how infinitely these 
come short, of the fine Contrivances, and unconceivable real Essences of Plants 
and Animals, every one knows.275 
 
Locke suggests that natural substances, like artifacts, also have a “make” which are 
conceived in terms of hidden, internal “fine Contrivances, and unconceivable Real 
essences”. 
It seems reasonable to presume, then, that God has ideas in terms of which he 
creates and “distinguishes” substances. There is also some textual evidence for this claim. 
In Book IV of the Essay, Locke defends his proposal to reclassify changelings as a 
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species distinct from the species ‘Man’ and ‘Beast’276 in light of the fact that they possess 
our shape and appearance, but, like beasts, do not possess reason. Locke imagines the 
protests that would greet such a proposal: “If Changelings are something between Man 
and Beast, what will become of them in the other World?” Locke replies: 
They [Changelings] are in the hands of a faithful Creator and a bountiful Father, 
who disposes not his Creatures according to our narrow Thoughts or Opinions, 
nor distinguishes them according to Names and Species of our Contrivance.277 
 
Here Locke contrasts the ways in which God distinguishes creatures from the “Names 
and Species of our own Contrivance”, that is, from what I’ve been calling our parochial 
species. Their ultimate fate depends on God’s sorting, not on ours. And while Locke does 
not say here that God’s ideas are nominal essences, it’s reasonable to conclude that God 
distinguishes creatures in terms of ideas that specify features that form the bases for such 
distinctions.  
I conclude this section by noting briefly some of the additional textual reasons for 
embracing my suggestion that (i) there are objective, or natural kinds, and (ii) that these 
kinds are individuated in terms of God’s Workmanship and thus ultimately by reference 
to the ideas in terms of which God creates things.  
First, consider the fact that Locke states unequivocally that there are sharp 
boundaries between men and beasts, and between beasts and plants. What distinguishes 
men from beasts is our power of reason, more specifically our ability to form abstract 
ideas. What distinguishes beasts from plants is the faculty of perception.278 In the 
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passages in which we find these claims, it is evident that Locke is not merely recording 
how speakers in fact draw the boundaries between human beings and animals, and 
animals and plants. Locke’s remarks occur in the chapters on perception and ‘discerning’, 
in which he draws out the implications of what it means to have these faculties. It is thus 
difficult to reconcile a commitment to conventionalism with arguments that, for instance, 
there is a real criterion according to which we ought to distinguish men from beasts:  
[T]he having of general Ideas, is that which puts a perfect distinction betwixt Man 
and Brutes; and is an Excellency which the Faculties of Brutes do by no means 
attain to.279 
 
These remarks also go a long way towards explaining why Locke argues that we must 
revise our classificatory practices in a way that excludes changelings from the kind man, 
since such creatures fail to have the intellectual faculties requisite for membership in the 
kind. It is notable that Locke is here resisting common practice, which lumps changelings 
in the category of man. If he believed that there is no genuine fact of the matter about 
how things ought to be classified, it is unclear why he should have reasons for resisting it.  
Second, Locke argues in his Essays on the Law of Nature and Two Treatises of 
Government that the world – and all of the things we find in it – is the product of God’s 
workmanship. In the Two Treatises, Locke argues that God has fitted human beings with 
the faculties of perception and reason so that we may carry out our business on this earth. 
More specifically, God has made us such that we may arrive at knowledge of God and 
how to conduct ourselves in this life given the kind of creatures we are. Rather notably, 
we stand above other creatures in a hierarchy of kinds. We have dominion over other 
creatures, but, importantly, not over other human beings. Locke thus appears to think that 
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there are moral considerations that ride on correctly identifying the kinds to which 
creatures belong, since we are not permitted to have dominion over other human 
beings.280 In that case, kinds appear to be part of the order God creates when he creates 
the world and the particulars we find in it.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
280 For a conventionalist account of the significance of Locke’s claims, see Jeremy Waldron, God, 
Locke, and Equality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).  
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  Chapter VII  
 
      Real and Nominal Essences    
 
                            §7.1 Real Essences not Relative to Nominal Essences 
 
 
 In this chapter I argue that we should understand real essences as what Locke 
elsewhere describes as the “frame” or structure of a thing, and I provide an account of 
how we should understand the notion of a frame or structure. In his correspondence with 
Stillingfleet, Locke is quite clear that it is God who individuates a thing’s real essence or 
frame, and God does this by way of “framing” or organizing matter in certain ways. I 
argue that these claims are nothing short of a refutation of the Standard Reading, 
according to which we individuate that aspect of a thing’s hidden microstructure that 
counts as its real essence by way of observable qualities we freely choose to include in a 
general idea, a claim familiar from the thesis of Voluntarism articulated in Chapter IV.  
 In his correspondence, Locke responds to Stillingfleet’s various 
misrepresentations of Locke’s own views on real essence. For instance, Locke writes 
that:  
I think the real essences of things are not so much founded on, as that they are the 
very real constitution of things, and therefore I easily grant there is reality in 
them; and it was from that reality that I called them real essences.281  
 
Locke goes on to address Stillingfleet’s claim that the real essences of things “are 
unchangeable, i. e. the internal constitutions are unchangeable." Locke replies:  
Of what, I beseech your lordship, are the internal constitutions unchangeable? Not 
of any thing that exists, but of God alone; for they [internal constitutions] may be 
                                                
281 Locke, Works, 4:83. Incidentally, this passage displays what is evident in the Essay, namely, 
that by real essence Locke understands the real constitution of things – that is, he uses these terms 
interchangeably.  
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changed all as easily by that hand that made them, as the internal frame of a 
watch.282  
 
Locke is here drawing a parallel between real essences, or the real, internal constitutions 
of things and the “frame” of a watch. We understand the frame of a watch as individuated 
in terms of a designer’s workmanship, and so consists of just those features a designer 
realizes in a thing by organizing or “framing” its matter in certain ways.   
 Natural substances also have a frame, and God is responsible for what frame they 
have. This is evident in Locke’s insistence to Stillingfleet that real essences do not flow 
from the substance of a thing:  
Here I must acknowledge to your lordship, that my notion of these essences 
differs a little from your lordship's; for I do not take them to flow from the 
substance in any created being, but to be in every thing that internal constitution, 
or frame, or modification of the substance, which God in his wisdom and good 
pleasure thinks fit to give to every particular creature, when he gives a being: and 
such essences I grant there are in all things that exist.283 
 
It is worth noting that Locke very clearly equates the notion of a frame with an internal 
constitution in the Essay.284 In order to give a little more content to the notion of an 
internal constitution, frame,285 or modification of a substance, we can look to the Essay’s 
                                                
282 Locke, Works, 4:90-91. 
 
283 Locke, Works, 4:82. 
 
284 To cite just a couple of passages, Locke writes: “But if the inquiry be made concerning the 
supposed real essence, and whether the internal constitution and frame of these several creatures be 
specifically different, it is wholly impossible for us to answer, no part of that going into our specific idea” 
(E III.vi.22); “And so of the rest, if we pretend that distinction of species or sorts is fixedly established by 
the real frame and secret constitutions of things” (! III.vi.22); “This then, in short, is the case; nature 
makes many particular things which do agree one with another, in many sensible qualities, and probably 
too in their internal frame and constitution” (E III.vi.36).  
 
285 To see Locke’s various uses of the term ‘frame’, the following passage is helpful: Locke writes 
that we can imagine “that spirits can assume to themselves bodies of different bulk, figure, and 
conformation of parts” in which case it seems that “one great advantage some of them have over us, may 
not lie in this, that they can so frame and shape to themselves organs of sensation or perception, as to 
suit them to their present design, and the circumstances of the object they would consider.” Further 
down, Locke writes “And though we cannot but allow that, the Infinite Power and Wisdom of God, 
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account of how we are to understand the differences between the mere “mass of matter” 
that composes an oak tree, and the oak itself:  
We must therefore consider wherein an oak differs from a mass of matter, and 
that seems to me to be in this, that the one is only the cohesion of particles of 
matter any how united, the other such a disposition of them as constitutes the 
parts of an oak; and such an organization of those parts as is fit to receive and 
distribute nourishment, so as to continue and frame the wood, bark, and leaves, 
&c. of an oak, in which consists the vegetable life.286 
 
By appealing to the fact that a succession of masses of matter instantiate something like a 
“disposition” or “organization of parts”, we can determine that in which the persistence 
conditions of an oak tree consist. Given that Locke describes a real essence as that 
internal constitution, or frame, or modification of a substance, all of these remarks, taken 
together, suggest that, while a mass of matter is what, at any given instant, realizes a 
thing’s disposition or organization of parts, a real essence is not to be identified with that 
mass of matter. The question is what further implications can be gleaned from that 
observation.  
As a proponent of the Standard Reading, according to which we individuate a 
thing’s internal constitution or real essence by way of sensible qualities we freely choose 
to include in a general idea, Ed McCann argues for one of that view’s implications, 
namely, that the persistence conditions of things are also tied to our abstract ideas:  
It is the (our) idea of the kind of thing whose identity is at issue which determines 
its identity, and thus which accounts for its being the same thing through changes 
in its (accidental) qualities and particularly in its matter. There is no question, of 
course, of this idea’s playing a causal role in organizing a thing’s matter, or being 
a causal basis for its vital processes; it is in no sense a constituent of the thing. 
But as long as a spatio-temporally continuous series of masses of matter 
                                                
may frame creatures with a thousand other faculties and ways of perceiving things without them, than what 
we have: Yet our thoughts can go no farther than our own” (E II.xxiii.13: 303-304; bold emphasis mine).  
 
286 ! II.xxvii.4.  
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continues to satisfy the idea, we have the same thing: the same horse, or oak-
tree, or whatever; and in that sense the idea keeps the thing the same.287  
 
In particular, and this is the important point, McCann argues that it makes no sense to talk 
of a thing’s internal structure or organization independently of our general ideas:  
The taxonomic divisions we have set up, more or less arbitrarily, are what 
determine the level of abstraction at which internal structure is to be described so 
as to arrive at an internal constitution characteristic of the species.288   
 
The thought is that there are any number of ways of picking out internal “structure” in a 
thing, so something, namely, one of our ideas, must determine which way of picking out 
structure is relevant to a thing’s identity, and so which way of picking out structure is 
relevant to a thing’s persistence conditions.  
 McCann’s reading runs into difficulties, however, when we return to Locke’s 
correspondence with Stillingfleet, who continues to confuse our parochial kinds for real 
or objective kinds, and continues to mistake real essences for the essences of parochial 
species, or species as distinguished and denominated by us. Though Stillingfleet only 
further misrepresents Locke’s view by claiming that “the essences of men and horses, and 
trees, remain always the same; because they do not depend on the ideas of men, but on 
the will of the Creator,” Locke is happy to make one concession in response:  
It is true, the real constitutions or essences of particular things existing, do 
not depend on the ideas of men, but on the will of the Creator; but their being 
ranked into sorts, under such and such names, does depend, and wholly depend, 
upon the ideas of men.289 
 
                                                
287 Edwin McCann, “Locke on Identity: matter, life, consciousness,” Archiv fuer Geschichte der 
Philosophie 69 (1987): 58; bold emphasis mine.  
 
288 McCann, “Locke on Identity,” 66.  
 
289 Locke, Works, 4:91.  
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Intuitively, the thought Locke is expressing is that real essences are independent of the 
ideas of men. As Locke continues to engage Stillingfleet, he signals his agreement that 
real essences cannot be “altered” by changes in our nominal essences:  
And therefore I grant it true, what your lordship says in the next words, "and let 
the nominal essences differ never so much, the real, common essence or nature of 
the several kinds, is not at all altered by them;" i. e. that our thoughts or ideas 
cannot alter the real constitutions that are in things that exist; there is nothing 
more certain.290  
 
Pace McCann, these passages suggest that real essences are not at all tied to, individuated 
by, or dependent upon our nominal essences. This reading is confirmed in Locke’s 
observation that our nominal essence of the sun comes apart from its real essence. 
Wheeling out the familiar story of what gives a thing a right to a species name, Locke 
writes “any thing will be a true sun, to which the name sun may be truly and properly 
applied”. It follows, Locke observes,  
[that] our sun is denominated and distinguished from a fixed star; not by a real 
essence that we do not know (for if we did, it is possible we should find the real 
essence or constitution of one of the fixed stars to be the same with that of our 
sun) but by a complex idea of sensible qualities co-existing; which, wherever they 
are found, make a true sun.291  
 
Locke’s admission is striking. It is possible that we should “find” that the real essence of 
the sun is the same as the real essence of one of the fixed stars. Further, Locke observes 
that were we to find that one of the fixed stars shared the same real essence with the sun, 
it nevertheless would not count as a sun since it would not satisfy our nominal essence of 
the sun:  
For should it be true (as is now believed by astronomers) that the real essence of 
the sun were in any of the fixed stars, yet such a star could not for that be by us 
                                                
290 Locke, Works, 4:90. 
 
291 Locke, Works, 4:84. 
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called a sun, whilst it answers not our complex idea or nominal essence of a 
sun.292 
 
The difficulties of rendering Locke’s remarks consistent with the Standard Reading 
articulated by McCann are apparent. If we understand real essences as individuated 
relative to our nominal essences, as McCann et al. will argue, and if our nominal essence 
of the sun is distinct from our nominal essence of a fixed star – Locke argues that we 
could not call a fixed star a sun – then it would appear that we could not find that the real 
essence of the sun was the same as the real essence of one of the fixed stars.  
              
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
292 Locke, Works, 4:84. 
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                          Chapter VIII 
 
    Knowing the Real Kinds 
 
         §8.1 Marks of Distinction and God’s Workmanship 
 
 
In this chapter I raise an objection to my reading. If the essences of the real or 
objective kinds are individuated in terms of God’s ideas, and if the internal 
microstructures of things that answer to those ideas are unavailable to us in perception, 
aren’t the objective kinds, for all intents and purposes, of little interest in the wider 
context of Locke’s views? While there is certainly no reason to think that we have insight 
into God’s ideas – at least, not those that would fix how we are to sort substances – I 
argue that we do more or less track the real kinds, albeit imperfectly. That we do is again 
a matter of God’s workmanship and design. God places marks of distinction in things that 
provide a clue to their proper classification. Finally, this story is of a piece with Locke’s 
conception of God as the benevolent creator of man.293  
As we saw in Chapter II, words have no natural signification, in which case any 
idea may “properly” be annexed to a word. For instance, Locke writes “the word person 
in itself signifies nothing; and so no idea belonging to it, nothing can be said to be the 
true idea of it.”294 However, once the convention of annexing a name to an idea takes 
hold within a linguistic community – which convention Locke refers to as “common use” 
– we make judgments about the truth or falsity of our ideas with respect to the ideas other 
speakers annex to those names. Amongst the three primary categories of idea – simple 
ideas of the qualities and powers of things; general ideas of substantial sorts; and general 
                                                
293 I thank Don Rutherford for suggesting this latter claim as a plausible reading of Locke.    
 
294 Locke, Works, 4:92; emphasis mine.  
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ideas of what Locke refers to as the species of mixed modes – all are liable to be false in 
respect of common use. However there are notable differences between the three cases. 
As Locke observes, our simple ideas are the least liable to be false on this count, while 
our ideas of mixed modes are more liable to falsity than our ideas of substantial sorts. 
What is revealing is Locke’s reasoning as to why this is so, for the differences turn on 
whether there are sensible standards that regulate common use, and the degree to which 
those sensible standards both determine common use, and function as the standard 
against which speakers can rectify violations of common use.   
 We are least liable to annex the wrong names to our simple ideas, where, again, 
the impropriety Locke speaks of is measured only with respect to common use, that is, 
with respect to the names (most) other speakers annex to their simple ideas. Only in rare 
instances would someone apply the name ‘red’ to her simple idea of green because, 
Locke explains, speakers are by their “Senses and every Day’s Observation” able to 
determine “what the simple Ideas are, which their several Names, that are in common use 
stand for.”295 Further, Locke explains that a subject “may easily rectify” any mistakes by 
reference to “the Objects they [simple ideas] are to be found in.”296 That is, we look to 
things themselves in order to determine which simple idea goes with a name. 
There is, however, a much greater liability for error with respect to our ideas of 
the species of mixed modes. Mixed modes are primarily social and moral kinds, 
                                                
295 ! II.xxxii.9: 386-87.  
 
296 Locke writes “Because a Man by his Senses and every Day’s Observation, may easily satisfy 
himself, what the simple Ideas are, which their several Names, that are in common use stand for, they being 
but few in Number, and such, as if he doubts or mistakes in, he may easily rectify by the Objects they are to 
be found in. Therefore it is seldom, that any one mistakes in his Names of simple Ideas; or applies the 
Name Red, to the Idea of Green; or the Name Sweet, to the Idea of Bitter: Much less are Men apt to 
confound the Names of Ideas, belonging to different Senses; and call a Colour, by the Name of a Taste, etc. 
whereby it is evident, that the simple Ideas, they call by any Name, are commonly the same, that other have 
and mean, when they use the same Names” (! II.xxxii.9: 386-87).  
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properties like justice, cruelty, liberality, and prodigality.297 Our ideas of mixed modes 
are made up of collections of simple ideas of qualities united in one complex idea. 
However – and this is the important point – the qualities represented by each component 
simple idea are not themselves united in nature, which is Locke’s way of saying that we 
do not find these qualities united together in one, existing thing, as we find the qualities 
of yellowness and a smooth, waxy surface united in a lemon. While our abstract or 
general idea of a lemon reflects the unity of qualities in a thing, the simple ideas we 
combine in our idea of justice or prodigality are “scattered” across different subjects and 
different things; it is “the mind alone that collects them, and gives them the union of one 
idea.”298 
 Locke’s reasoning here provides a common explanation as to why, on the one 
hand, we rarely violate common use with respect to the names of simple ideas, and, on 
the other hand, why we make such mistakes in the case of mixed modes. In respect of the 
former, there is a “sensible standard” in reference to which we both settle and rectify 
which simple ideas go with which names, while there is no such standard in the case of 
mixed modes. What Locke’s reasoning suggests, then, is that where there is a sensible 
standard, common use is fixed in part by what the world is like. For this explains how, 
without access to ideas in others subjects’ minds, any given speaker applies the term 
‘green’ in much the way most speakers do; it explains how it is that we more or less pick 
out not only the same things, but the same qualities in those things in our use of the 
names of simple ideas.    
                                                
297 These are Locke’s examples; see E II.xxxii.10: 387.  
 
298 E III.xi.18.  
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 Remarkably, Locke appeals to the same reason as an explanation of how, between 
the names of mixed modes and the names of substantial kinds, we are less apt to make 
mistakes of common use with respect to the latter. Thus if common use annexes the name 
‘frog’ to the idea of a living thing that is green and hops, and annexes the name ‘stabbing’ 
(a mixed mode) to the idea of killing with the sharp point of an object,299 we are, Locke 
will observe, less apt to apply the name ‘frog’ to creatures common use designates 
‘lizards’ than we are to apply the term ‘stabbing’ to an act of bludgeoning. This is 
because,  
some remarkable sensible qualities, serving ordinarily to distinguish one 
[substantial] sort from another, easily preserve those, who take any care in the use 
of their words, from applying them to sorts of substances, to which they do not at 
all belong.300  
 
Common use distinguishes substantial kinds in terms of particularly remarkable qualities 
to which speakers can refer in determining common use and correcting mistakes. On the 
other hand, the combination of simple ideas we find in our complex ideas of stabbing and 
bludgeoning are “voluntary Combinations” of simple ideas “made by Men alone.” There 
is no “sensible Standard existing anywhere”301 to which we can refer. In fact, the act of 
                                                
299 “Thus the Mind in mixed Modes arbitrarily unites into complex Ideas such as it finds 
convenient; whilst others that have altogether as much union in Nature, are left loose, and never combined 
into one Idea, because they have no need of one name. ‘Tis evident then, that the Mind by its free choice 
gives a connexion to a certain number of Ideas, which in Nature have no more union with one another than 
others that it leaves out: Why else is the part of the Weapon, the beginning of the Wound is made with, 
taken notice of to make the distinct Species called Stabbing, and the Figure and Matter of the Weapon left 
out? I do not say, this is done without Reason, as we shall see more by and by; but this I say, that it is done 
by the free choice of the Mind, pursuing its own ends; and that therefore these Species of mixed Modes are 
the workmanship of the Understanding: And there is nothing more evident, than that, for the most part, in 
the framing these Ideas the Mind searches not its Patterns in Nature, nor refers the Ideas it makes to the real 
existence of Things; but puts such together, as may best serve its own Purposes, without tying itself to a 
precise imitation of any thing that really exists” (E III.v.6: 431).  
 
300 E II.xxxii.10.  
 
301 [T]he abstract Ideas of mixed Modes, being Men’s voluntary Combinations of such a precise 
Collection of simple Ideas; and so the Essence of each Species, being made by Men alone, whereof we 
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defining mixed modes is “the only way whereby the signification of the most of them can 
be known with certainty” for, as Locke explains,   
the assistance of the senses in this case not helping us, by the proposal of sensible 
objects, to show the ideas which our names of this kind stand for, as it does often 
in the names of sensible simple ideas, and also to some degree in those of 
substances.302  
 
It is worth lingering over the contrast Locke draws between substantial kinds and species 
of mixed modes. For the suggestion is that the proposal of sensible objects, e.g., pointing 
to a thing, or pointing to a thing while speaking a name, can show a speaker “the ideas 
which our names [of substantial kinds] stand for,” while no such recourse is available to 
us in the case of mixed modes. In fact, it is this difference that, as Locke explains below, 
distinguishes the species of mixed modes from substantial kinds:  
These mixed modes being…such combinations of simple ideas as are not looked 
upon to be characteristical marks of any real beings that have a steady 
existence, but scattered and independent ideas put together by the mind, are 
thereby distinguished from the complex ideas of substances.303 
 
This passage echoes Locke’s earlier point that what distinguishes the case of substantial 
kinds from the species of mixed modes is the fact that substances possess “remarkable 
sensible qualities”, what he here refers to as “characteristical marks”. In what follows, I 
argue that these characteristical marks provide the occasion for making our ideas of 
substantial sorts and so are the independent standard that fixes common use. This much is 
already implied in Locke’s claim that violations of common use may be held in check if 
                                                
have no other sensible Standard, existing any where, but the Name it self, or the definition of that Name: 
We have nothing else to refer these our Ideas of mixed Modes to as a Standard, to which we would 
conform them, but the Ideas of those, who are thought to use those Names in their most proper 
Significations” (E II.xxxii.12: 387-88).  
 
302 E III.xi.18: 518; bold emphasis mine.  
 
303 E II.xxii.1: 288; bold emphasis mine. Note that by “complex ideas of substances” Locke means 
general ideas of substances, not complex ideas of particular substances.  
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only speakers attend to sensible standards. For the only way that sensible standards could 
by themselves guide speakers towards common use is if common use is itself (in part) a 
matter of apprehending certain qualities of things as the characteristical marks of a sort. 
In other words, which qualities count as the characteristical marks in accordance with 
which we sort substances is not, as the standard, conventionalist reading would suggest, a 
matter of choice.  
My claim will be that God makes us, and makes natural substances, such that the 
sorts to which they belong are more or less obvious to us by their sensible qualities. To 
put it crudely, confronting things as they appear to us is not, as Guyer suggests, a matter 
of apprehending innumerably many possible resemblances between things. Rather, God 
makes us, and he makes things, such that certain qualities are particularly salient to us for 
the purposes of classification. What Locke elsewhere (and often) refers to as “marks of 
distinction in things” afford a foundation for distinguishing substances into kinds, the 
implication being that God, through his own workmanship, positions us to make ideas of 
substantial kinds whose extensions may, and likely often do, approximate the extensions 
of real, objective kinds.  
Here Locke’s reasoning appeals to the fact that the existence of natural kinds, and 
the possibility of sorting in accordance with them, promotes not only our survival, but our 
particular aims and interests given the kinds of creatures we are – that is, there are real 
kinds, and we sort substances accordingly, and well enough for our business in this 
world. Notice that to say this does no violence to Locke’s thesis that the essences of 
species as distinguished and denominated by us are the workmanship of the 
understanding. For note Locke’s response to Stillingfleet’s claim that "when we see 
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several individuals that have the same powers and properties, we thence infer, that there 
must be something common to all, which makes them of one kind." Locke replies:  
I grant the inference to be true; but must beg leave to deny that this proves, that 
the general idea the name is annexed to is not made by the mind.304  
 
What Locke grants here is similar to an admission he makes on more than one occasion 
in the Essay:  
[M]any particular substances are so made by nature, that they have agreement and 
likeness one with another, and so afford a foundation of being ranked into 
sorts. But the sorting of things by us, or the making of determinate species, being 
in order to naming and comprehending them under general terms; I cannot see 
how it can be properly said, that nature sets the boundaries of the species of 
things.305 
 
We assume there are real sorts in nature – as I will argue, Locke thinks that this is 
obvious to us from observation and experience – nevertheless, Locke cautions, their real 
essences are unknown, so we cannot make them the criteria for the application of our 
general terms, and so we cannot be said to sort substances by their real essences. How we 
in fact sort substances is according to criteria, essences, or general ideas of our making.  
We set the boundaries of the species of substantial kinds. However, it is still the 
case that we make our general ideas by reference to standards made by nature. This 
brings us back to the comparison Locke draws between mixed modes and substances. 
Unlike the essences of the species of mixed modes, the essences of the species of 
substances are a joint venture between us and nature – nature makes contributions in the 
form of particularly salient qualities or marks of distinction in things (and, in addition, by 
offering up collections of qualities that are “regularly and permanently united in 
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nature”306). By comparison, nature – the realm of sensible things – makes no contribution 
to how we form our ideas of mixed modes, which are “voluntary Combinations” “made 
by Men alone” and “whereof we have no other sensible standard, existing any 
where…but the definition of that Name.”307  
The names of substantial sorts stand for Ideas that are “supposed conformable to 
the reality of Things, and are referred to Standards made by Nature.” More importantly, 
Locke writes:  
In our Ideas of Substances we have not the liberty as in mixed Modes, to frame 
what Combinations we think fit, to be the characterstical Notes, to rank and 
denominate Things by[.]308  
 
This seems as clear a statement as any that our ideas of substantial kinds are not 
“voluntary combinations” of simple ideas, and that we do not decide what qualities are to 
count as the marks of distinction in things – the “characteristical Notes” – by which we 
classify them. In fact, Locke’s observation helps to explain what would otherwise be a 
puzzling feature of Locke’s story about how Adam forms his abstract idea of gold, which 
we saw in the previous chapter. Locke writes that the object in respect of whose qualities 
Adam goes on to make an abstract idea is “quite different from any he had seen before” 
in which case no one “will deny [it] to be a distinct Species, and to have its peculiar 
Essence[.]” Locke’s observation is of course no argument that Adam is faced with an 
objective kind, but it does capture a feature of Locke’s account that has to do with how 
substances appear to us and how those appearances strike us vis-à-vis the task of 
classification. Thus Locke describes the glittering substance as notable for its “peculiar 
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308 E III.ix.11: 481-82.  
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bright yellow Colour, and an exceeding great Weight.” In fact, in a completely unrelated 
passage, Locke writes that we can, by sight, distinguish true from counterfeit gold:  
[T]he Idea of the particular Colour of Gold, is not to be got by any description of 
it, but only by the frequent exercise of the Eyes about it; as is evident in those 
who are used to this Metal, who will frequently distinguish true from counterfeit, 
pure from adulterate, by the sight, where others, (who have as good Eyes, but yet, 
by use, have not got the precise nice Idea of that peculiar Yellow) shall not 
perceive any difference.309   
 
Moreover, gold is not an isolated case. The passage occurs in the context of an argument 
that the signification of the names of substances “are best made known by shewing” – 
that is, by proposing a sensible object that counts as an exemplar of the kind. And this is 
because, Locke explains, the qualities distinctive of kinds are sufficiently peculiar that we 
have no names for our simple ideas of them. After noting that we can, with practice, 
distinguish true from counterfeit gold, Locke writes:  
The like may be said of those other simple Ideas, peculiar in their kind to any 
Substance; for which precise Ideas, there are no peculiar Names. The particular 
ringing sound there is in Gold, distinct from the sound of other Bodies, has no 
particular Name annexed to it, no more than the particular Yellow, that belong to 
that Metal.310  
 
This much seems to be true, then: we are struck by qualities whose peculiarity is our cue 
to classify substances on their basis. In fact these qualities are sufficiently striking that 
Locke writes that they are peculiar to a kind.  
Locke’s observations provide the context in which we can understand his repeated 
claims that secondary qualities serve primarily to help us distinguish substances one from 
another and so make up the lion’s share of qualities we include in our ideas of substantial 
kinds. Locke isn’t arguing that secondary qualities help us distinguish particular 
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substances one from another – circumstances of time and place are alone sufficient to 
distinguish qualitatively identical particulars. Locke is saying, rather, that secondary 
qualities help us distinguish sorts of substances. He writes:  
Nor are we to wonder, that Powers make a great part of our complex Ideas of 
Substances; since their secondary Qualities are those, which in most of them serve 
principally to distinguish Substances one from another, and commonly make a 
considerable part of the complex Idea of the several sorts of them.311 
 
Note that the claim expressed here runs against Guyer’s Idea-Theoretic account, 
according to which secondary qualities are not distinguishing marks of sorts, but rather 
provide innumerably many respects in which substances resemble one another. By the 
lights of Guyer’s account, secondary qualities could not of themselves serve to 
distinguish the sorts of substances, for they are merely the basis upon which we may 
generate innumerably many abstract ideas, all of which are on all fours with respect to 
one another, thus forcing us to make decisions about which secondary qualities are 
relevant to species membership. As further cause for resisting such a reading, note 
Locke’s reference below to secondary qualities as “characteristical marks” on the basis of 
which we distinguish sorts:  
[O]ur Senses failing us in the discovery of the Bulk, Texture, and Figure of the 
minute parts of Bodies, on which their real Constitutions and Differences depend, 
we are fain to make use of their secondary qualities, as the characteristical Notes 
and Marks, whereby to frame Ideas of them in our Minds, and distinguish them 
one from another.312  
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312 Ibid. That the complex ideas Locke speaks of here are abstract or general ideas is clear from 
what he says in the passage immediately preceding: “For he has the perfectest Idea of any of the particular 
sorts of Substance, who has gathered, and put together, most of those simple Ideas, which do exist in it, 
among which are to be reckoned its active Powers, and passive Capacities […] [T]he Powers that are 
severally in them, are necessary to be considered, if we will have true distinct Notions of the several sorts 
of Substances (E II.xxiii.7: 299-300; bold emphasis mine).  
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We find the strongest declaration of the claim that secondary qualities of themselves serve 
to distinguish the sorts of substances in Locke’s explanation of why knowledge on the 
basis of our simple ideas (most of which are simple ideas of secondary qualities) is 
“real”, which is just to say that our simple ideas have a conformity to “the reality of 
things”. Locke reasons that since the mind cannot make its own simple ideas, they “must 
necessarily be the product of Things operating on the Mind in a natural way”. Locke then 
explains that the conformity between a simple idea of a quality and the quality itself lies 
in the fact that the perceptions produced in us are “by the Wisdom and Will of our 
Maker” “ordained and adapted to” the thing that produce those perceptions. Locke 
continues:  
For they [simple ideas] represent to us Things under those appearances which 
they are fitted to produce in us: whereby we are enabled to distinguish the sorts of 
particular Substances, to discern the states they are in, and so to take them for our 
Necessities, and apply them to our Uses.313 
 
This passage echoes a point Locke makes much earlier in Book II of the Essay, where he 
explains that even if our ideas of secondary qualities do not resemble their causes in 
bodies, they nonetheless have all the necessary conformity to things requisite for 
knowledge. Again, part of Locke’s justification for this claim appeals to the fact that our 
simple ideas of secondary qualities are designed by God to be the “marks” whereby we 
know and distinguish things:   
…those !deas of Whiteness and Coldness, Pain, &c. being in us the Effects of 
Powers in Things without us, ordained by our Maker to produce in us such 
Sensations; they are real Ideas is us, whereby we distinguish the Qualities that are 
really in things themselves. For these several Appearances being designed to 
be the Marks, whereby we are to know and distinguish Things which we 
have to do with; our Ideas do as well serve us to that purpose, and are as real 
                                                
313 E IV.iv.4: 564.  
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distinguishing Characters, whether they be only constant Effects, or else exact 
Resemblances of some thing in things themselves.314  
 
(It is worth noting that Locke’s claims that sensible qualities enable us to distinguish the 
sorts of substances sheds light on Locke’s preferred account of the real essences of 
substances. Recall that Locke contrasts “Two Opinions” about the real essences of 
corporeal substances, the more rational opinion being held by 
those who look on all natural things to have a real, but unknown constitution of 
their insensible parts; from which flow those sensible qualities which serve us to 
distinguish them one from another, according as we have occasion to rank them 
into sorts under common denominations.315 
 
As this passage is often read, a real essence is what, in a particular, gives rise to all of its 
qualities, some of which qualities we freely choose to make essential to a kind. Drawing 
upon the evidence cited thus far, however, it appears that the sensible qualities to which a 
real essence gives rise are not all of a particular’s qualities but rather just those qualities 
that serve us to distinguish substances into sorts.) 
 Also notable in these passages is the prominent role God plays in making 
substances, and us, such that we are able to distinguish substances into sorts. Locke 
writes that “we have reason to be satisfied” that “the all-wise Architect has suited our 
organs, and the bodies that are to affect them, one to another.”316 Being able to 
                                                
314 E II.xxx.2: 372-73. In a similar passage, Locke writes that “…our simple ideas being barely 
such perceptions as God has fitted us to receive, and given power to external objects to produce in us by 
established laws and ways, suitable to his wisdom and goodness, though incomprehensible to us, their truth 
consists in nothing else but in such appearances as are produced in us, and must be suitable to those powers 
he has placed in external objects, or else they could not be produced in us: And thus answering those 
powers, they are what they should be, true ideas” (! II.xxxii.14).  
 
315 ! III.iii.17: 418.  
 
316 E II.xxiii.12: 302; Elsewhere Locke writes “[T]he certainty of things existing in rerum natura, 
when we have the testimony of our senses for it, is not only as great as our frame can attain to, but as our 
condition needs. For our faculties being suited not to the full extent of being, nor to a perfect, clear, 
comprehensive knowledge of things free from all doubt and scruple; but to the preservation of us, in whom 
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distinguish substances into sorts by their secondary qualities itself serves a purpose. For 
natural kinds, and the possibility of distinguishing things accordingly, ground the 
possibility of inductive reasoning, which in turn enables us to form hypotheses about 
what we can expect from things, and so make use of them for our purposes.   
Locke explains that “God, in his wisdom” “set [simple ideas] as marks of 
distinction in things, whereby we may choose any of them for our uses, as we have 
occasion[.]317 Simple ideas are that “whereby we are enabled to distinguish the sorts of 
particular substances, to discern the states they are in, and so to take them for our 
necessities, and apply them to our uses[.]”318 This echoes a point brought up in Chapter 
II, viz., Locke’s observation that common folk, pretending no insight into real essences, 
and “content with knowing things one from another by their sensible Qualities,” are 
“often better acquainted with their Differences, can more nicely distinguish them from 
their uses, and better know what they expect from each.”319  
We find an example of the practical importance of distinguishing things for our 
uses in Locke’s complaint that knowledge of many of the useful properties of sorts 
remains out of reach given our ignorance of real essences:  
Knowing the colour, figure, and smell of hyssop, I can, when I see hyssop, know 
so much, as that there is a certain being in the world, endued with such distinct 
powers and properties; and yet I may justly complain, that I want something in 
order to certainty, that hyssop will cure a bruise or a cough, or that it will kill 
moths; or, used in a certain way, harden iron; or an hundred other useful 
properties that may be in it, which I shall never know; and yet might be certain of, 
                                                
they are; and accommodated to the use of life; they serve to our purpose well enough, if they will but give 
us certain notice of those things, which are convenient or inconvenient to us” (IV.xi.8: 634). 
 
317 E II.xxxii.14: 388.  
 
318 E IV.iv.4: 563-64.  
 
319 E III.vi.24: 452.  
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if I knew the real essences, or internal constitutions of things, on which their 
properties depend.320  
 
Nevertheless, Locke explains that our ignorance of real essences, and our imperfect 
knowledge of their characteristic properties, is a function of, and suitable to, our natures:  
[I]t appears not, that God intended we should have a perfect, clear, and adequate 
knowledge of [things]: That perhaps is not in the comprehension of any finite 
being. We are furnished with faculties (dull and weak as they are) to discover 
enough in the creatures, to lead us to the knowledge of the Creator, and the 
knowledge of our duty: And we are fitted well enough with abilities to provide for 
the conveniences of living: These are our business in this world.321   
 
Thus one reason to think that we have an (admittedly imperfect) grasp of the boundaries 
between kinds is that it is implied by a larger story Locke tells regarding how we are 
suited to the world, and how things are suited to us, such that we can make our way 
through the world:  
The infinitely wise contriver of us, and all things about us, hath fitted our senses, 
faculties, and organs, to the conveniences of life, and the business we have to do 
here. We are able, by our senses, to know and distinguish things; and to examine 
them so far, as to apply them to our uses, and several ways to accommodate the 
exigencies of this life.322  
 
It should be noted that the argument of this section is not that there are objective 
kinds individuated in terms of God’s workmanship, although the texts clearly suggest that 
Locke presupposed that there are observable distinctions between things that are the basis 
of their classification. What I attempted to show here was that it is not obvious we require 
insight into God’s ideas, or insight into the unknown real essences of things that answer 
to those ideas, in order to arrive at a sorting of things that roughly approximates the 
                                                
320 Locke, Works, 4:81-82.  
 
321 E II.xxiii.12: 302-303.  
 
322 Ibid.  
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boundaries between objective kinds. In fact, that we more or less cotton on to the real 
kinds would itself be explained in terms of God’s workmanship.  
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   Chapter IX  
         
                        ~ Conclusion ~ 
 
In this dissertation, I have argued that objective kinds, on Locke’s view, are 
grounded in divine ideas in accordance with which God designs natural things. These 
ideas, and the real essences of substances that answer to them, are remote from our 
comprehension. This account is in keeping with Locke’s conceptualism, the view that 
universals or general natures that correspond to genus and species are to be understood, 
not as metaphysical constituents in numerically many particulars, but rather as concepts 
in the mind.  
In Chapter II, I argue that Locke’s primary complaint against the Aristotelian 
shows him to be objecting not to the Aristotelian’s understanding of real essences as the 
essences of objective kinds, but rather to the Aristotelian’s understanding of real essences 
as the essences of our parochial species. The Aristotelian, Locke argues, takes the names 
of our parochial kinds to be the representatives of unknown real essences, and tacitly 
takes our parochial concepts of genus and species to represent unknown real essences. 
Thus the important difference between Locke’s own understanding of real essence and 
the Aristotelian conception is, I argue, how each conceives of the relationship between 
real essences and the species and genus concepts in accordance with which we classify 
substances. The Aristotelian believes that a sorting of substances in accordance with our 
genus and species concepts just is a sorting according to real essences.  
Further, because the Aristotelian believes that our definitions of species and genus 
represent real essences, the view fails to recognize the need for refining and revising our 
current definitions of kinds in light of reflection, observation and experiment. Nor does it 
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recognize any need for further scrutinizing our verdicts regarding whether a particular is 
indeed a member of a kind. These claims help us understand the significance of Locke’s 
appeal to monsters and changelings in the Essay. Against the Standard Reading, I argue 
that Locke does not raise these examples as a challenge to the claim that there are stable, 
clear boundaries between kinds – the Aristotelian may happily admit of the existence of 
defective cases. Rather, Locke is interested in challenging the verdicts speakers are 
disposed to make regarding these examples. Locke argues that we have reason to revise 
these initial verdicts, in some cases our definitions, too, a fact that would otherwise be 
apparent to us were we not in the grip of the Aristotelian view.  
 In Chapter III, I follow commentators like McCann, who argue that the modesty 
with which Locke approaches metaphysical questions in the Essay was motivated by his 
methodological aims in that work. Locke’s project was that of providing an account of 
what ideas we have and how we come to have them. However, I argue that Locke 
nevertheless signals his own metaphysical commitments in at least one important case. 
Locke believed in the existence of a divinely decreed moral law. However, he saw the 
Essay as no place to provide any extended argument for that view. I argue that we can 
understand Locke’s position with respect to natural kinds on the model of his approach to 
morality in the Essay. Locke did signal his belief in the existence of objective or natural 
kinds; however I suggest that his primary aim in the Essay was that of providing an 
account of how we form our ideas of substantial kinds. Finally, I argue that limits on the 
expressibility of the very thesis that there are natural kinds goes some way towards 
showing that Locke, by his own lights, would have found himself limited to only certain 
ways of expressing that commitment in the Essay.  
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In Chapter IV, I consider one powerful motivation for thinking that Locke meant 
to reject natural kinds. According to the Idea-Theoretic account, Locke’s theory of 
meaning entails conventionalism about kinds. On my own interpretation, the unknown 
real essences of substances, and the propria that flow from them, are fixed in advance of 
our coming on the scene to classify them. Further, I argue that the propria of a kind count 
as the independent standard in light of which we make our ideas of substantial sorts. This 
is evident in Locke’s claims that (i) we make our general ideas by reference to constantly 
coexisting qualities (propria), whose coexistence merits the inference to a real essence; 
(ii) propria are a matter of discovery; and (iii) no property (proprium) may be excluded 
from an idea of a substantial kind. I then articulate the most promising way of explaining 
these apparently realist commitments and argue that that attempt fails.  
In Chapter V, I take on another powerful motivation for thinking that Locke 
meant to reject natural kinds. Many have thought that corpuscularian mechanism entails 
conventionalism about kinds. Thus according to Michael Ayers’s reading of a widely 
discussed passage, Locke argues that, just as sorting natural substances in terms of their 
observable qualities is arbitrary, sorting them in terms of their inner corpuscularian 
constitutions or real essences is also arbitrary, and so there are no objective kinds. 
According to Ayers, Locke’s argument turns on corpuscularian mechanism: there is no 
end to the inner, mechanical differences between bodies, hence there are no naturally 
lowest species. I argue that Locke’s aim in the passage is orthogonal to whether there are 
objective boundaries between kinds.  
In Chapter VI, I argue that the objectivity of kinds is grounded in divine ideas.  
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In Chapter VII I take up the Standard Reading’s claim that real essences are 
individuated only relative to qualities we freely (and so arbitrarily) choose to include in a 
general idea. I argue that Locke’s exchanges with Stillingfleet reveal that real essences 
are individuated in terms of God’s workmanship.  
In Chapter VIII, I consider an objection to my view, namely, that the objective 
kinds are idle on Locke’s view because God’s ideas of kinds, and their real essences, 
cannot be known. I argue that God places observable marks of distinction between things 
that enable us to more or less track objective boundaries between kinds.  
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